State Ex rel. Robertson v. New England Furniture & Carpet Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1914 |
| Docket Number | 18,622 - (20) |
| Parties | STATE ex rel. JAMES ROBERTSON v. NEW ENGLAND FURNITURE & CARPET COMPANY and Others |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county by the county attorney in the name of the state against defendants Lane Kalogerson, Hadris, Isadore Weisman, William Weisman, and all other persons or parties unknown claiming any right, title estate, lien or interest in the personal property and real estate described in the complaint, to abate a nuisance, to enjoin defendant Lane from maintaining the nuisance, to enjoin the other defendants from permitting such use of the building, and to obtain an order in which the court should direct that all the furniture, fixtures and musical instruments and movable property used in conducting such house should be removed from the building and sold according to law, to direct the effectual closing of the building for the period of one year unless sooner released by law, and to impose a penalty of $300 according to law. Plaintiff obtained an order requiring defendants to show cause why an injunction should not be issued restraining defendant Lane from maintaining the house and restraining the other defendants from permitting the building to be used as a house of ill fame, and to restrain the removal of the furniture, fixtures musical instruments and movable property in the building.
The New England Furniture & Carpet Co. and the Hartman Furniture & Carpet Co. were permitted to intervene and they each filed answers to the complaint.
The matter was heard before Molyneux, J., who denied the motion of defendant Lane to dismiss the action and ordered a temporary injunction restraining defendants as prayed in the complaint, without prejudice to the defendants other than Lane, Kalogerson and Hadris, making application for a modification of the injunction. From the order granting the temporary injunction, the intervening defendants appealed. Affirmed.
Property -- use injurious to public health or morals.
1. An owner of property has no vested or constitutional right to use or allow the use of it for purposes injurious to the public health or morals, and, if he has knowledge or notice in the premises, he cannot complain if loss ensues, when the law deals therewith in any way reasonably necessary for the suppression of the evil in connection with which it is used.
Bawdy house -- seizure of personal property therein.
2. Although, prior to Laws 1913, c. 562, there was no statute authorizing seizure or forfeiture of personal property used in connection with the maintenance of a bawdy house, equity had power to deal with such property in any way reasonably necessary to the abatement of the nuisance in which it was employed.
Bawdy house -- conditional sale of chattels -- right of seller.
3. An owner of personal property covered by a contract of conditional sale executed prior to the enactment of Laws 1913, c. 562, had no vested right, contractual or otherwise, to allow it to be used in connection with the maintenance of a bawdy house after the passage of the act, even if prior thereto such sale and use were not unlawful.
Act valid.
4. Laws 1913, c. 562, held not invalid as constituting an unreasonable exercise of the police power with respect to personal property used in maintenance of a bawdy house.
Evidence of nuisance -- due process of law.
5. Neither section 3 of the act, making the general reputation of the place as being a bawdy house prima facie evidence of the existence of the nuisance, etc., nor section 5, creating a presumption of knowledge on the part of all defendants, authorizes interference with property rights without due process of law; being merely a change in matter of procedure, which was entirely within the power of the legislature to make, without reference to whether the causes of action or rights to which it would apply were already in existence or would accrue thereafter.
Preponderance of evidence.
6. The provision of section 5 that claimants of personalty used in maintaining the house must prove innocence "to the satisfaction of the court," is not subject to the objection that it calls for more than a preponderance of the evidence.
Provision of act inapplicable.
7. Section 6 applies only to defendants convicted in inferior courts, and, if invalid, does not concern appellants as defendant property owners in the civil action alone.
Injunction.
8. The act does not contemplate determination of the rights of defendants to personal property used in the house, on application for a temporary injunction.
Stevens & Stevens, E. P. Mahoney and Jonas Weil, for appellants.
Lyndon A. Smith, Attorney General, and James Robertson, County Attorney, for respondent.
Charles S. Cairns, at the request of the Attorney General, filed a brief for respondent.
Appeal by the New England Furniture & Carpet Co., the Hartman Furniture Co. and Isadore and William Weisman, from an order granting a temporary injunction under Laws 1913, p. 815, c. 562, restraining defendant Lane from further conducting a bawdy house in a certain building in Minneapolis, and also enjoining further use of the house for such purpose, and all defendants from removing or interfering with the furniture and movable property theretofore employed in maintaining the same until further order.
The facts and proceedings antecedent to the order were as follows: On December 5, 1913, defendant Lane was convicted in the municipal court of Minneapolis of the offense of maintaining such house at the place mentioned. Thereafter the county attorney instituted an action for abatement and all relief prescribed by the terms of the act. All the defendants except Lane answered. The New England and Hartman companies alleged, among other things, ownership, under conditional sale contracts, of certain personal property in the house, and denied knowledge or notice or reasons for belief that defendant Lane was maintaining the nuisance alleged. Defendants Weisman admitted ownership of a leasehold interest in the property, and denied knowledge or notice of the nuisance. Thereafter plaintiff applied for a temporary injunction under section 2 of the act, and on the hearing all the defendants appeared, and the record of defendant Lane's conviction in the municipal court was received in evidence, together with oral evidence of the bad reputation of the house prior thereto. Defendants objected to all the evidence and also to the granting of the order, for numerous reasons hereinafter to be considered, and offered to prove the allegations of their answers, which they were not permitted to do. The order of the court, however, was conditioned to be without prejudice to the right of any of defendants except Lane to make application, under the law, for a modification of the temporary writ to be issued under the order. After this appeal was taken, the parties stipulated, for the purposes thereof only, that the material allegations of defendants' answers were true except the claim of lack of knowledge or notice.
Defendants raise the same constitutional objections to the validity of the act that were considered in State v. Ryder, infra, page 95, 147 N.W. 953, and in which the provisions of the act are stated, and in addition certain questions concerning procedure and personal property not there determined. The discussion will be confined to these questions.
1. Defendants New England and Hartman companies contend that as their conditional sale contracts were entered into and their contractual rights fixed prior to the passage of the act, and the property covered thereby being "innocent," interference therewith under the terms of the act constituted violation of their vested rights and impairment of contractual obligations. The act, however, condemns only "movable property used in conducting or maintaining" the nuisance, and operates only against those having knowledge, or who by reasonable diligence could have acquired it, of such unlawful use; authorizing owners to come in and prove innocence. No vested or constitutional right exists to use or allow the use of property for purposes injurious to either public health or morals, and an owner, with knowledge or notice in the premises, cannot complain if loss ensues, when the law deals with the property in any way reasonably necessary for the suppression of...
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