State ex rel. Robinson v. Superior Court for King County

• Decision Date: 25 June 1935
• Docket Number: 25714.
• Citation: 46 P.2d 1046,182 Wash. 277
• Parties: STATE ex rel. ROBINSON, Director of Department of Agriculture, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

46 P.2d 1046

182 Wash. 277

STATE ex rel. ROBINSON, Director of Department of Agriculture, v. SUPERIOR COURT FOR KING COUNTY et al.

No. 25714.

Supreme Court of Washington

June 25, 1935

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; James B. Kinne, Judge.

Application for writ of prohibition by the State, on the relation of Walter J. Robinson, as Director of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Washington, against the Superior Court of the State of Washington for King County and another.

Application denied.

G. W Hamilton, Atty. Gen., and Geo. G. Hannan, Asst. Atty. Gen (E. J. Eagen, of Seattle, of counsel), for relator.

Roberts & Skeel, of Seattle, for respondents.

Allen Froude & Hilen, of Seattle, amici curiae.

STEINERT Justice.

This proceeding is upon the application for a writ of prohibition to compel the superior court for King county to desist and refrain from further proceedings in a cause pending Before it.

At its special or extraordinary session of 1933-1934, the Legislature of this state enacted what is known as the Washington Agricultural Adjustment Act. Chapter 12, Laws 1933, Ex. Sess., p. 26, Rem. Rev. Stat. 1934 Supp. § 3035-1 et seq. (P. C. § 77-11 et seq.). That act will hereinafter be referred to as 'the 1933 act.' Pursuant to the act, the director of agriculture, relator herein, promulgated a series of orders affecting the production, sale, and distribution of various classes of food products throughout the state. The validity of the act was subsequently questioned in a number of suits brought against the director, and, upon two appeals to this court, the act was declared invalid because of its unauthorized delegation of legislative powers. Uhden, Inc., v. Greenough (Wash.) 43 P.2d 983; Griffiths v. Robinson (Wash.) 43 P.2d 977.

While the two cases last mentioned were still pending, and Before decision therein by this court, the Legislature in its 1935 session enacted what is, likewise, termed as the Washington Agricultural Adjustment Act. Chapter 78, Laws 1935, p. 170. That act will hereinafter be referred to as 'the 1935 act.' The 1935 act not only contains all the vital provisions and elements of the 1933 act, but extends and broadens them.

After the 1935 act had become effective, an action, out of which this proceeding subsequently grew, was instituted in the superior court for King county. The plaintiffs in that action consisted of a consumer, a farmer who was selling his products at retail at a public market, and a number of retail merchants. The defendants included the director of agriculture and a number of wholesalers and jobbers of food products in Seattle. The complaint alleged, in extenso, that in pursuance of the orders above mentioned the director was threatening to cancel the licenses of the several retail plaintiffs, prohibit them from handling food products, and prosecute them criminally unless they complied with such orders. By specific recitals, also, the complaint alleged that the act, or acts, under which such orders were promulgated, were violative of various sections of both the State and the United States Constitutions. Upon these allegations, the complaint sought (1) to restrain the director from enforcing the orders and marketing agreements promulgated or made by him under the 1933 act, and (2) to have the 1935 act declared unconstitutional and to prevent the defendants from taking any action thereunder.

In response to an order to show cause why a temporary injunction should not issue, the director appeared specially in the action and moved to quash the order, on the ground that he was a state officer and was not subject to be sued in his official capacity except in Thurston county, the seat of state government, and that the superior court for King county had no jurisdiction over him in such capacity. The court denied the motion to quash, and ruled that it would proceed with a hearing upon the cause of action stated in the complaint Before it. The application for prohibition was then made in this court.

The principal question, and, under our view of the case, the only question, now properly Before us is whether the superior court had jurisdiction to proceed in the cause pending Before it.

Article 2, § 26, of the State Constitution provides that the Legislature shall direct by law in what manner and in what courts suits may be brought against the state. Rem. Rev. Stat. § 886 (P. C. § 6260), provides that persons having claims against the state shall have a right of action against the state in the superior court of Thurston county. In the light of the above constitutional provision, the term 'claim,' as used in the statute, has the same meaning as the phrase 'cause of action.' Northwestern, etc., Bank v. State, 18 Wash. 73, 50 P. 586, 42 L. R. A. 33; Billings v. State, 27 Wash. 288, 67 P. 583; Riddoch v. State, 68 Wash. 329, 123 P. 450, 42 L. R. A. (N. S.) 251, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 1033. An action cannot be maintained against the state without its consent, and when the state does so consent, it may fix the place in which it may be sued. State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 P. 108. As to these principles, there is no dispute.

The question thus narrows itself to this: Is the action which was brought in the superior court an action against the state? If it is, then it can be maintained only in Thurston county, and the motion to quash the writ should have been granted. If it is not an action against the state, then the rule of immunity does not apply.

It is now settled beyond question that a suit against state officers in which an attack is made against the constitutionality of a state statute is not a suit against the state. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165, 30 S.Ct. 286, 54 L.Ed. 430, 431; Herndon v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 218 U.S. 135, 30 S.Ct. 633, 54 L.Ed. 970; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S. 178, 38 S.Ct. 85, 62 L.Ed. 230; Public Service Co. v. Corboy, 250 U.S. 153, 39 S.Ct. 440, 63 L.Ed. 905; Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 53 S.Ct. 190, 77 L.Ed. 375; Ex parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444, 53 S.Ct. 682, 77 L.Ed. 1311; Dennison Mfg. Co. v. Wright, 156 Ga. 789, 120 S.E. 120; Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 110 N.E. 130, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 1120; Commonwealth v. Norman, 249 Mass. 123, 144 N.E. 66; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, 111 S.W. 565; Ware Shoals Mfg. Co. v. Jones, 78 S.C. 211, 58 S.E. 811; White Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Gunderson, 48 S.D. 608, 205 N.W. 614, 43 A. L. R. 397; Cochran v. Cavanaugh (Tex. Civ. App.) 252 S.W. 284; Coal & Coke Ry. Co. v. Conley, 67 W.Va. 129, 67 S.E. 613; Bonnett v. Vallier, 136 Wis. 193, 116 N.W. 885, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 486, 128 Am. St. Rep. 1061 ; 25 R. C. L. p. 414, § 51; 59 C.J. p. 310, § 465.

In Ex parte Young, supra, the United States Supreme Court said, 209 U.S. 123, at page 159, 28 S.Ct. 441, 454, 52 L.Ed. 714, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764: 'The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional; and if it be so, the use of the name of the state to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the authority of, and one which does not affect, the state in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part of a state official in attempting, by the use of the name of the state, to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconstitutional. If the act which the state attorney general seeks to enforce be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer, and proceeding under such enactment, comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct.'

In Truax v. Raich, supra, that court said, 239 U.S. 33, at page 37, 36 S.Ct. 7, 9, 60 L.Ed. 131, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283: 'As the bill is framed upon the theory that the act is unconstitutional, and that the defendants, who are public officers concerned with the enforcement of the laws of the state, are about to proceed wrongfully to the complainant's injury through interference with his employment, it is established that the suit cannot be regarded as one against the state. Whatever doubt existed in this class of cases was removed by the decision in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155, 161, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714, 727, 729, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764, which has repeatedly been followed. (Citing cases.)'

We will not quote from the other cases cited. They all contain statements to the same effect.

It is contended by the relator, however, that a different rule applies in this state. We will therefore briefly notice the cases in this jurisdiction that have touched upon the subject. State ex rel. Pierce County v. Superior Court, 86 Wash. 685, 151 P. 108, laid down the rule already given in the early part of this opinion, that the state may not be sued without its consent, and, when it does so consent, may fix the place in which...