State ex rel. Ross v. King County

Decision Date30 August 1937
Docket Number26529.
Citation191 Wash. 340,71 P.2d 370
PartiesSTATE ex rel. ROSS et al. v. KING COUNTY et al. STATE ex rel. ALDERSON et al. v. SAME.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Hugh Todd, Judge.

Actions in mandamus by the State of Washington, on the relation of William J. Ross and others, and by the State of Washington on the relation of Thomas Alderson and others, against King County, a municipal corporation of the State of Washington and others, which were consolidated. From adverse judgments the defendant county appeals.

Causes remanded with instructions to modify the judgments in accordance with the opinion.

B. Gray Warner and Patrick M. Tammany, both of Seattle, for appellant.

Colvin & Rhodes, of Seattle, for respondents.

Joseph B. Alexander, of Seattle, for interveners.

STEINERT Chief Justice.

Two actions in mandamus, herein consolidated, were instituted by a number of employees of King County to compel the issuance of warrants for the unpaid portions of their salaries alleged by them to have been earned during a period of two successive years. Trial upon the merits Before the court, sitting without a jury, resulted in findings and conclusions, based upon which judgments were entered conformable to the prayers of the petitions. The county has appealed.

During the years 1933 and 1934, respondents, thirty-five in number, were members of the staff of the county clerk of King County. All of the respondents had been duly appointed and were either qualified to act as deputy clerks or else were employed as clerical helpers. Most of the respondents had held their positions for many years previous; these will hereinafter be referred to as the majority respondents. The other respondents were appointed some time in 1933; these will hereinafter the referred to as the minority respondents.

In October, 1932, the clerk's budget for 1933 was regularly approved and adopted by the county commissioners in accordance with the budget law, to which further reference will be made later herein. In the budget with reference to the clerk's office, the sum of $85,248 was appropriated for the year's payment of salaries and wages for forty-six designated positions, the amount for each being separately and specifically stated. The proportional amount for salaries and wages for the period between March 1 and December 31, 1933, was $71,040. Of this latter amount, the sum of $64,438.62 was currently paid to the employees, including respondents, then holding various positions with titles as designated in the budget.

In 1933 the clerk's budget for 1934 was similarly approved and adopted. Under the classification of 'Salaries and Wages,' the sum of $73,180 was appropriated for forty-two designated positions, the amount payable to each being likewise separately and specifically stated. Of this total amount, the sum of $60,861.30 was currently paid to the employees, including respondents, then holding various positions with titles as designated in the budget.

Prior to the adoption of the annual budgets, the county commissioners had instructed the various public officials, including the clerk, to reduce the amount of their respective budgets, but to avoid the cutting of wages, if possible. As finally adopted, the budgets designated the number of positions in the clerk's office and the amount of salary to which each was entitled. We emphasize the fact that during all of this time, and for many years prior thereto, the respondents, with the exception of a very few, retained their designated positions in the office of the county clerk.

It appears that in 1933, after the budget for that year had been adopted, the clerk employed twelve extra, or additional, persons in his office. Similarly, in 1934, he employed seventeen extra persons. This was done, however, without the consent, and without any action on the part of the county commissioners. The reason for employing these additional persons, it is asserted by all parties herein, was that the increase of work in the office necessitated it. For present purposes, we are concerned only with the fact that there was an increase in number of employees, and not with the reasons therefor.

Because of the limitations prescribed by the budget, the clerk, in order to maintain the extra help on the pay roll, adopted a plan for paying salaries and wages upon a basis which was at variance with the provisions of the budget law. Instead of seeking a revision of the salaries and wages of his employees, or securing an emergency appropriation for any excess, in the manner provided by law, the clerk, with the budget appropriation Before him, arbitrarily allocated to each employee a purported budget position, and then, instead of paying the full monthly base pay for that position, paid a smaller monthly amount estimated on a number of days less than a full month. The employees, however, were required to work at their accustomed duties the full time, the days which were deducted being considered as contributed service.

All of the employees took the reduced amount of pay, but none of them agreed, orally or in writing, to accept it as in full payment. Some of them knew what the legal rate of pay, as established by the budget, was; others did not. Protests were made by some, but not by all. It was generally understood, however, that those who did not accept the deduced amount of pay would lose their positions. Protests, therefore, would have been of no avail, and consequently all of the employees retained their positions.

Warrants were issued upon the basis of the plan adopted by the clerk and were recognized and paid by the county auditor. The amounts thus paid to the extra help aggregated $6,485.30 in 1933 and $12,298 in 1934. In neither year, however, did the clerk exceed the total appropriation for salaries and wages as specified in the budget. In fact, there was a balance of $126.58 for that item left in 1933, and $19.20 in 1934. The net result, however, was that a substantial part of the amounts allocated by the budget for the payment of salaries for the positions held by the majority respondents was used to employ and pay extra help. In these actions, respondents, both majority and minority, seek to recover from the county the alleged deficiencies in their respective salaries.

At this point in becomes necessary to examine the budget law and to consider its application to the facts herein presented. The budget law is contained in chapter 164, Laws 1923, p. 523, as amended by chapter 143, Laws 1925, Extraordinary Session, p. 391, and chapter 301, Laws 1927, p. 736, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 3997-1 to 3997-10, inclusive.

Section 1 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 3997-1, provides that each county official shall annually file with the county auditor detailed and itemized estimates of probable revenues from sources other than taxation and of all expenditures required by his office for the ensuing fiscal year.

Section 2 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat., § 3997-2, requires the auditor to prepare a county budget which shall set forth the complete financial program of the county with reference to sources of revenue and expenditures. The expenditure section must set forth in comparative and tabular form the estimated expenditures for the ensuing fiscal year, the appropriations for the current fiscal year, the actual expenditures for the first six months of the current fiscal year, and the actual expenditures for the last completed fiscal year. That section then continues:

'Such estimates, appropriations and expenditures shall be classified under the general classes of (1) salaries and wages (2) maintenance and operation (3) capital outlay (4) interest and debt redemption, and (5) expenditures proposed to be made from bond or warrant issues not yet authorized.
'Within the general class of 'salaries and wages' each salary shall be set forth separately together with the title or position of the recipient.'

The clerk's budget conformed to the provisions of this section, both as to general classification and as to specific designation of positions and salaries thereof.

In sections 3 and 4, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 3997-3, 3997-4, provisions are made for hearings on the preliminary budget, fixing and determining each item of the budget, adoption of the budget as finally determined, and fixing the amount of the necessary levies. These provisions were likewise fully met.

Section 5 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 3997-5, is the important section in our present consideration. So far as pertinent here, it provides as follows:

'The estimates of expenditures itemized and classified as required in section 3997-2 hereof and as finally fixed and adopted in detain by said board of county commissioners shall constitute the appropriations for the county for the ensuing fiscal year; and the county commissioners and every other county official shall be limited in the making of expenditures and/or the incurring of liabilities to the amount of such detailed appropriation items or classes respectively; provided, that upon a resolution formally adopted by the county commissioners at a regular or special meeting and entered upon the minutes, transfers or revisions within the general class of 'salaries and wages' * * * may be made. * * *

'Expenditures made, liabilities incurred or warrants issued in excess of any of the detailed budget appropriations or as revised by transfer as herein provided shall not be a liability of the county but the official making or incurring such expenditure or issuing such warrant shall be liable therefor personally and upon his official bond.' (Italics ours.)

Section 6 of the act, Rem.Rev.Stat. § 3997-6, refers to public emergencies, and outlines the procedure for...

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