State ex rel. Russell v. Dist. Court

• Citation: 60 Minn. 478,62 N.W. 831
• Parties: STATE EX REL. RUSSELL v. DISTRICT COURT, FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, POLK COUNTY. STATE EX REL. QUIGLEY v. IVES, DISTRICT JUDGE.
• Decision Date: 19 April 1895
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

60 Minn. 478

62 N.W. 831

STATE EX REL. RUSSELL

v.DISTRICT COURT, FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT, POLK COUNTY.

STATE EX REL. QUIGLEY

v.IVES, DISTRICT JUDGE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

April 19, 1895.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Gen. St. 1894, §§ 6157, 6158, 6165, 6166 (Gen. St. 1878, c. 87, §§ 3, 4, 11, 12), construed, and held:

1. That a party proceeded against for a constructive contempt of court-that is, one not committed in the immediate presence of the court-is entitled, as a matter of legal right, to a hearing upon the charge, and to have his witnesses examined in his defense.

2. That in such proceeding the court cannot convict the accused upon facts within his own knowledge. His guilt must be established, on the hearing, by competent evidence, and the affidavit upon which the warrant for his arrest was issued is not such evidence.

3. Held, that the conviction of the relators is not supported by any competent evidence.

Case certified from district court, Polk county; Frank Ives, Judge.

W. D. Russell and Hugh Quigley were each adjudged by Frank Ives, district judge, guilty of contempt of court, and in answer to writs of certiorari issued on their relation the proceedings were certified to the supreme court. Judgment in each case reversed.

R. J. Montague, De Forest Bucklen, Edward George, and S. L. Pierce, for relators.

H. W. Childs, Atty. Gen., for respondent.

START, C. J.

The relators in these cases, on January 30, 1895, were arrested by virtue of a warrant issued for that purpose, and brought before the district court, in and for the county of Polk, to show cause why they should not be punished for an alleged contempt of court and such proceedings were then and subsequently had and taken in such matter that each of them was convicted of the charge. The relator Russell was thereupon adjudged to pay a fine of $250, and be imprisoned in the county jail 30 days, and a fine of $100 was imposed upon the relator Quigley. Upon the application of each of them, writs of certiorari issued out of this court to bring up the record in such contempt proceedings for review. We shall not discuss the merits of these cases, for the reason that it is manifest, from an inspection of the record, that the district court made an error in the procedure which renders the conviction of the relators void. It is conclusively settled that courts of record have an inherent power to punish contempts, for such power is essential to their very existence. The statute (Gen. St. 1894, c. 87; Gen. St. 1878, c. 87) recognizes this power, but imposes certain limitations upon the manner of its exercise. It also recognizes the usual classification of contempts, as direct and constructive, or consequential. Direct contempts are those committed in the immediate view and presence of the court. They are punishable summarily by order of the presiding judge, who takes judicial notice of such contempts, acts upon his own motion, and upon facts within his own knowledge, based upon the words or acts of the accused, or both, said or done in his presence or hearing. No formal trial is necessary. The court simply makes an order without proof, reciting what occurred in its presence or hearing, adjudging the person proceeded against guilty, and fixing his...