State ex rel. Sch. Fund of Gentry Cnty. v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific Ry. Co.

Decision Date31 October 1884
Citation83 Mo. 144
PartiesTHE STATE to the use of THE SCHOOL FUND OF GENTRY COUNTY v. THE WABASH, ST. LOUIS & PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Gentry Circuit Court.--HON. JOHN C. HOWELL, Judge.

REVERSED.

H. S. Priest for appellant.

The statement does not contain facts sufficient to constitute any cause of action. Parish v. R. R., 63 Mo. 286; Haworth v. Ormerod, 6 Q. B. 307; Rex v. Shaw, 6 East 518; Potter's Dwarris Stats., p. 246; Strong v. Stibbins, 5 Cowen, 211; Palmer v. Conley, 4 Denio 375; The Enterprise 1 Paine 32; Hubbard v. Johnston, 3 Taunt. 177; Ingersoll v. Skinner, 1 Denio 540; State v. Brown,8 Mo. 211; Neals v. State, 10 Mo. 498; State v. Haden, 15 Mo. 447; State v. Lisles, 58 Mo. 359. The act of the legislature of 1881 is unconstitutional, both as to the constitution of this state and of the United States. ( a.) It is not a legitimate exercise of the power of eminent domain. Const. 1875 (Mo.) sec. 20, Art. 2; St. Louis Co. v. Griswold, 58 Mo. 175; Const. 1875 (Mo.) sec. 21, Art. 2; Const. 1875 (Mo.) sec. 4, Art. 12; Leslie v. City of St. Louis, 47 Mo. 477; Judge Field in Munn v. Ill., 94 U. S. 141; Pampelly v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 177; State ex rel. v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188. ( b.) It is not an exercise of the police power. Judge Field in Munn v. Ill., supra; Const. 1875 (Mo.) sec. 5, Art. 12; Cooley, Const. Lim. (2d Ed.) 706; Const. 1875 (Mo.) sec. 14, Art. 12; State ex rel. v. Greer, 78 Mo. 188; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. 211; Com'rs v. R. R., 63 Me. 274.

J. W. Witten, Martin & Hardin and Porter & Waller for respondent.

The same completeness requisite in a petition in the circuit court has never been required in an action before a justice of the peace. It is sufficient if the statement in such action advise the party of the nature of the claim and be sufficiently specific to be a bar to another action. Razor v. R. R., 73 Mo. 471; Key v. R. R., 73 Mo. 475; Norton v. R. R., 48 Mo. 387; Iba v. R. R., 45 Mo. 470. The act of the legislature of March 25th, 1881, is constitutional and a proper exercise of the police power. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations (3d Ed.) 575, and note 1, p. 574; Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington Railroad Company, 27th Vt. 140; Beer v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. Rep. 25; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. Rep. 113; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518-629; Sloan et al. v. Pa. Railroad Co., 61 Mo. 24; Peters v. St. Louis & Iron Mountain Railroad Company, 23 Mo. 107; Commissioners et al. v. Holyoke Water Power Company, 104 Mass. 446; Hegeman v. Western RailroadCompany, 16 Barb. 353. The court will not pronounce an act of the legislature void for any supposed injustice, if it be upon a subject matter within the scope of legislative authority, when the provisions of the law are general. Armington v. The Town of Barnet et al., 15 Vermont, p. 745, and reported in vol. 40, American Decisions, p. 705.

NORTON, J.

The plaintiff filed the following statement before a justice of the peace of Gentry county as her cause of action: Plaintiff states that the defendant is a railroad corporation in the state of Missouri, organized under and by virtue of the statutes of said state, and is engaged in the transportation of passengers and property. That said railroad crosses the St. Joseph and Des Moines Railroad, a corporation under and by virtue of the statutes of said state, near Darlington, Gentry county, Mo., upon the same grade. That the character of the land at said crossing will admit of the erection of a depot thereon. That the defendant, either jointly with the said St. Joseph and Des Moines Railroad Company, or separately, has failed, neglected and refused to erect, build or maintain a depot, passenger house or waiting room at said crossing on the 11th day of July, 1881, as under the statutes in such cases made and provided the defendant was required. Wherefore the plaintiff asks for judgment against the defendant for the sum of twenty-five dollars and costs.

Plaintiff had judgment before the justice, and on defendant's appeal again had judgment from which the defendant has appealed to this court. On the trial defendant objected to the introduction of any evidence on the following grounds: 1. Because the petition, or statement, did not aver facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. 2. Because the statute under which the action was commenced is repugnant to the constitution of the United States and the constitution of the state.

Plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the following statute: “Every railroad corporation in this state, which now is or may hereafter be engaged in the transportation of passengers or property, shall give public notice of the regular time of starting and running its cars, and shall furnish sufficient accommodations for the transportation of all such passengers, baggage, mail and express freight as shall, within a reasonable time previous thereto, be offered for transportation at the place of starting, at the junctions of other railroads, and at the several stopping places; and shall, at all crossings and intersections of other railroads, where such other railroad and the railroad crossing the same are now or may hereafter be made upon the same grade, and the character of the land at such crossing or intersection will admit of the same, erect, build and maintain, either jointly with the railroad company whose road is crossed, or separately by each railroad company, a depot or passenger house and waiting room or rooms sufficient to comfortably accommodate all passengers awaiting the arrival and departure of trains at such junction or railroad crossing, and shall keep such depot or passenger house warmed, lighted and open to the ingress and egress of all passengers a reasonable time before the arrival and until after the departure of all trains carrying passengers on said railroad or railroads; and they are hereby required to stop all trains carrying passengers at the junction or intersection of other railroads a sufficient length of time to allow the transfer of passengers, personal baggage, mail and express freight from the trains of railroads so connecting or intersecting, or they may mutually arrange for the transportation of such persons and property over both roads without change of cars; and they shall be compelled to receive all passengers and freight from such connecting or intersecting roads whenever the same shall be delivered to them. Every railroad corporation or company which shall fail, neglect or refuse to comply with the conditions of this section from and after the first day of July, 1881, shall, for each day said corporation or railroad company refuses, neglects or fails to comply therewith after said day forfeit and pay the sum of twenty-five dollars, which may be recovered in the name of the state of Missouri to the use of the school fund of the county wherein said crossing is situated; and it shall be the duty of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute for and recover the same.” R. S. § 797, as amended by Laws, 1881, p. 77.

It will be observed that this is a penal statute. It enjoins upon railroad companies the duty of doing certain things which, if not done, subjects them to the payment of a fixed penalty, and, being penal, it should be strictly construed, and so as not to enlarge the liability it imposes nor allow a recovery under it, unless the party seeking it brings his case strictly within the terms or conditions authorizing it. Parish v. Railroad, 63 Mo. 284. Giving force and effect to this rule we must hold that the first objection to the sufficiency of the statement is well taken. The evident purpose of the statute, in requiring railroad companies carrying passengers to build depots or station houses * * * at all places where they cross each other, was to afford facilities not so much to those living in the immediate...

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