State ex rel. School Dist. of ScottsBluff, Scotts Bluff County v. Ellis

• Decision Date: 13 March 1959
• Docket Number: No. 34486,34486
• Citation: 95 N.W.2d 538,168 Neb. 166
• Parties: STATE of Nebraska ex rel. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SCOTTSBLUFF, in COUNTY OF SCOTTS BLUFF, State of Nebraska, et al., Appellees, v. P. Cooper ELLIS, County Treasurer of Scotts Bluff County, State of Nebraska, Appellant. Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, Amicus Curiae.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 538

95 N.W.2d 538

168 Neb. 166

STATE of Nebraska ex rel. SCHOOL DISTRICT OF SCOTTSBLUFF, in COUNTY OF SCOTTS BLUFF, State of Nebraska, et al., Appellees, v. P. Cooper ELLIS, County Treasurer of Scotts Bluff County, State of Nebraska, Appellant.

Clarence S. Beck, Attorney General, Amicus Curiae.

No. 34486.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 13, 1959.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The legislative power to tax is a plenary one, limited only by the restrictions upon it contained in the Constitution. The provisions of the Constitution in relation to taxation are not grants of power but are limitations on the taxing power lodged in the Legislature.

2. The power to tax and the power to provide for the allocation and distribution of revenues raised by taxation are identical and inseparable. The power to allocate and distribute tax revenues, including those raised by political subdivisions of the state under authority of the state, is a plenary one, subject only to the restrictions of the Constitution.

3. The provision providing for the allocation of tax proceeds from motor vehicles taxed in each county, contained in Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution, means that they shall be allocated in the same proportion that the levy of each bears to the total levy in each tax district in the county on tangible personal property.

4. Section 77-1240.01, R.S.Supp., 1955, does not violate Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution. Its effect is to make definite that which is implicit in the constitutional provision.

5. In construing a provision of the Constitution that is subject to more than one construction, the court should adopt the meaning which is consistent with rules of law and established legislative policy on the subject involved, unless a contrary intent is indicated by its terms, rather than a meaning in conflict therewith.

6. Under the provisions of section 77-1240.01, R.S.Supp., 1955, the proceeds from the taxation of motor vehicles shall be allocated to the taxing units levying taxes on tangible personal property in which the motor vehicle had a tax situs in the same proportion that the mill levy on tangible personal property of each of such taxing units bears to the total mill levy on tangible personal property of all the taxing units in which the motor vehicle has its tax situs.

Townsend & Youmans, Scottsbluff, for appellant.

Russell E. Lovell, Scottsbluff, Donn C. Raymond, Gering, Loren G. Olsson, Scottsbluff, for appellees.

C. S. Beck, Atty. Gen., H. G. Hamilton, Asst. Atty. Gen., amicus curiae.

Heard before SIMMONS, C. J., and CARTER, MESSMORE, YEAGER, CHAPPELL, WENKE, and BOSLAUGH, JJ.

CARTER, Justice.

This is an action at law by the plaintiffs to recover from the defendant county treasurer certain money alleged to be due them because of his failure to distribute motor vehicle tax proceeds as the law requires. The trial court found for the plaintiffs and entered judgment in behalf of each against the defendant for the amounts found to be due. The defendant appeals.

The plaintiffs are the School District of Scottsbluff, the Junior College District of Scottsbluff, and the City of Scottsbluff. The defendant is the county treasurer of Scotts Bluff County, Nebraska, and as such is the collector of all taxes levied on tangible personal property, including motor vehicles, within the county. No questions are raised on the appeal as to the joinder of parties, or the capacity of the parties to sue or be sued, as they were in the present action. We do not consider or determine any such questions.

The facts are admitted by the pleadings and stipulations made at a pre-trial conference. The defendant paid the sum of $14,555.50 into court for distribution in accordance with the final determination of the issues. Such amount was withheld from distribution by the defendant in such sum as would permit full compliance in the distribution of motor vehicle taxes to the plaintiffs for the period covered in the litigation whether the formula of the plaintiffs or that of the defendant was found to be the correct one by the court. The want of any dispute on the facts leaves only one question of law for determination by this court.

In 1952 Article VIII, section 1, of the Nebraska Constitution was amended to read as follows: 'The necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions shall be raised by taxation in such manner as the Legislature may direct. Taxes shall be levied by valuation uniformly and proportionately upon all tangible property and franchises, except that the Legislature may provide for a different method of taxing motor vehicles; Provided, that such tax proceeds from motor vehicles taxed in each county shall be allocated to the state, counties, townships, cities, villages, and school districts of such county in the same proportion that the levy of each bears to the total levy of said county on personal tangible property. * * * Taxes uniform as to class may be levied by valuation upon all other property. Taxes, other than property taxes, may be authorized by law. Existing revenue laws shall continue in effect until changed by the Legislature.'

In 1953 the Legislature enacted section 77-1240.01, R.S.Supp., 1955, which provides: 'Beginning January 1, 1954, in addition to the registration fees provided by Chapter 60, article 3, a motor vehicle tax is hereby imposed on motor vehicles registered for operation upon the highways of this state, except such motor vehicles as are exempt from taxation by section 77-202, which motor vehicle tax shall be in lieu of all ad valorem taxes to which such motor vehicles would otherwise be subject. Such motor vehicle tax shall be computed annually on the value of the motor vehicle as certified to the county assessor by the Board of Equalization and Assessment at a rate equal to the ad valorem rate for all purposes for the preceding year in the several taxing units of the state in which the motor vehicle is located and such motor vehicle tax as thus computed shall be collected annually by the county treasurer at the time of application for and before registration of the motor vehicle each year. The proceeds from such motor vehicle tax in each county shall be allocated to each taxing unit levying taxes on tangible personal property in the county in which the motor vehicle is located, in the same proportion that the levy on tangible personal property of such taxing unit bears to the total levy on tangible personal property of all the taxing units in which the motor vehicle is located.'

It is the contention of the defendant that the constitutional provision cited, as it related to the apportionment and distribution of motor vehicle taxes, is a self-executing provision and, it being the highest law of the state, the method of distribution contained within its provisions must be followed. Collateral to this contention, the defendant asserts that the distribution provision contained in section 77-1240.01, R.S.Supp., 1955, is in conflict with Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution, and therefore void. Plaintiffs assert that the distribution of motor vehicle taxes in all the counties of the state have been made in accordance with section 77-1240.01, R.S.Supp 1955, since the enactment of that statute in 1953, that the statute is not in conflict with the constitutional provision and, consequently, it is valid and sets forth the formula to be followed in distributing the proceeds of motor vehicle taxes.

It is the fundamental law of this state that the Legislature is vested with the taxing...