State ex rel. School Dist. No. 34, Lincoln County, v. Begeman
| Decision Date | 07 February 1928 |
| Citation | 2 S.W.2d 110,221 Mo.App. 257 |
| Parties | THE STATE OF MISSOURI EX REL. SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 34, LINCOLN COUNTY, MISSOURI, RESPONDENT, v. FLORENCE DIGGS BEGEMAN, ALLIE MONROE, W. P. SMITH, JOHN M. REID AND AMOS RINAMAN, ACTING AS A BOARD OF ARBITRATION, APPELLANTS. [*] |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lincoln County.--Hon. Edgar B Woolfolk, Judge.
REVERSED.
Judgment reversed.
Grover C. Huston for appellants.
(1) (a) The courts do not require technical compliance with school laws, but give such laws a liberal construction. School District v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 498; School District v. School District, 181 Mo.App. 583. (b) Under section 11201, Revised Statutes 1919, no records of many jurisdictional prerequisites are required to be kept therefore the courts presume same have been complied with or the county superintendent of schools would not have entertained jurisdiction on appeal. Sec. 11201, R. S. 1919; State ex rel. v. Andrea, 216 Mo. 617; State ex rel. v. Sexton, 151 Mo.App. 517. (2) An appeal to the county superintendent of schools from the result of school elections on the question of changing boundary lines under sec. 11201, R. S. 1919, does not have to be perfected by a school district, but may be referred on appeal by any interested and aggrieved party, since the statute does not specify who shall perfect the appeal. Sec. 11201, R. S. 1919; State ex inf. v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409; School District No. 42 v. School District No. 45, 254 S.W. 726; State ex rel. v Stone, 152 Mo. 202.
Creech & Penn for respondents.
(1) The interest of Broady Morris in the question of change of boundary lines between School District 34 and School District 46, was not an interest peculiar to him, but such interest only as that of any other taxpaying citizen of either district. He possessed no special interest, but a public interest, and was not entitled to have the question of the change of boundary lines referred to the county school superintendent, and the county superintendent, therefore, was without jurisdiction to refer the matter to "four disinterested taxpayers of the county," and said taxpaying citizens were without jurisdiction to find and determine the necessity of the change of boundary lines between said districts. State ex rel. Pickett v. Caims, 305 Mo.App. 333, 265 S.W. 527; State v. Hefferman, 243 Mo. 442, 148 S.W. 90; Newman v. Frizzell, 238 U.S. 537, 34 S.Ct. 881, 59 L.Ed. 1446; State v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409, 86 S.W. 135. (2) Where, as here, the vote to change the boundary lines, was a question to be decided by two separate and distinct corporations, the corporations, being entities, possessing capacity to sue and liability to be sued, it is contemplated by the law that said corporations are the real parties in interest and should act as districts, if aggrieved, and not by a taxpayer residing within one of the districts. Sec. 11201, R. S. 1919; State v. Scott, 270 S.W. 382; State v. Stone, 152 Mo. 202; State v. McClain, 187 Mo. 409.
This appeal involves a controversy growing out of the change of boundaries of certain school districts in Lincoln county, Missouri. The school districts are Nos. 34 and 46, respectively. In March, 1927, two petitions were presented to the clerks of the said districts, asking that a quarter section of land be taken from School District No. 46 and added to School District No. 34. For the present, we will treat the petitions as being in the record, referring to that matter later on in the opinion, each being signed by the proper number of qualified voters of the respective districts.
Proper notices were posted and school meetings were held April 5, 1927. In District No. 46 the majority voted in favor of the change, and in District No. 34 the majority voted against the change. Within five days thereafter, Broady Morris, a resident taxpayer in District No 46, who was, as we must assume, one of the original petitioners for the change, residing in District No. 46 and who owned one hundred fifty-eight acres of the one hundred sixty acres proposed to be taken from one district into the other, filed with Miss Begeman, the county superintendent of public schools of that county, an affidavit for appeal, praying that the superintendent inquire into and determine as the law requires the necessity for such change of the boundary lines. In appropriate time the superintendent appointed four resident taxpayers of that county as a board of arbitration to examine this appeal. The board met at the county seat, to-wit Troy, Missouri, on April 20, 1927, to consider the matter, and made its findings in writing, holding unanimously that a necessity for this change did exist. The superintendent then transmitted the decision of the board of arbitration to the clerks of the two districts. Thereafter School District No. 34, as relator, presented its petition to the circuit court for a writ of certiorari, which was issued and served upon the arbitration board as respondents. Thereupon the respondents below filed their return to the writ, and on the same day relator filed its motion to quash the return. The cause was heard in the circuit court, the entire record being offered in evidence, and the court rendered its judgment in favor of relator on its motion to quash. The return was quashed. By appropriate steps the board of arbitration, respondents below, appealed to this court.
There is but a single question involved in the case, and that is as to the proper construction of section 11201, Revised Statutes Missouri, 1919. For a more ready understanding, we will refer to respondent here as School District No. 34, and to the appellant here as the board of arbitration.
The lower court shared the view of District No. 34, that is, that Morris, a resident taxpayer whose land, almost exclusively, was the subject of the election as being placed in one district or the other, could not, when the districts divided on the vote, appeal to the board of arbitration but that such appeal under the terms of the statute of necessity had to be taken by one district or the other. The contention of the arbitration board, on the other hand, is that Morris, being the aggrieved and interested party, a taxpayer whose land was involved and whose children were affected, had such right of appeal to the board, and on this question the whole case hinges.
In the first place, it is the salutary law that our courts must give a liberal construction to the working of the school laws. Indeed, the section of the statute, supra, requires no records to be kept of many of the jurisdictional prerequisites, and the fair presumption is indulged that preliminary steps have been complied with when the county superintendent entertains jurisdiction on appeal. [State ex rel. v. Andrae, 216 Mo. 617, 116 S.W. 561; School District v. Chappel, 155 Mo.App. 498, 135 S.W. 75.]
In the latter case, this court held that it is our policy not to require extreme technical compliance of the school laws, but only a substantial compliance with the statutes, and that the efforts of laymen who carry into effect the laws pertaining to schools is accomplished when a substantial compliance has been had. As said in School District v. School District, 181 Mo.App. 583, 164 S.W. 688, technical niceties should be brushed aside and we should rather
And so, while it does not appear from the records actually preserved by the superintendent in the case at bar that the petitions for the change were signed by the requisite number of resident taxpayers, it is not denied by the School District that such a petition did exist, and in fact it was proffered as evidence...
To continue reading
Request your trial