State ex rel. Shevin v. Metz Const. Co., Inc., 42947

• Decision Date: 14 November 1973
• Docket Number: No. 42947,42947
• Citation: 285 So.2d 598
• Parties: STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, Appellant, v. METZ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 598

285 So.2d 598

STATE of Florida ex rel. Robert L. SHEVIN, Attorney General, Appellant, v. METZ CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., a Florida corporation, et al., Appellees.

No. 42947.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Nov. 14, 1973.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Jerry E. Oxner, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

William P. O'Malley, Clearwater, for appellees.

CARLTON, Chief Justice.

The Attorney General was permitted to intervene in this cause for purposes of appeal (279 So.2d 836) because the final judgment of the trial court dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus held that the last sentence in Section 4(3) of Chapter 71--172, Laws of Florida, was unconstitutional. We reverse.

Appellees, Metz Construction Company, Inc. and Nationwide Land Corporation, filed the petition for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel appellee Kerwin, the Building Official for the City of Safety Harbor, to issue them building permits. The permits had been requested for the construction of 'closed-system', factory-built housing in an area zoned by the city as R--2 for single-family dwellings. The permits were denied on the basis of the city zoning ordinance, which prohibited such closed-system buildings in R--2 areas. The petitioners contended that Chapter 71--172, Laws of Florida, prevented municipalities from discriminating in their zoning requirements between factory-built housing and that constructed in a conventional manner.

Appellee Kerwin moved to dismiss the petition for writ of mandamus on the ground that the pertinent portion of Chapter 71--172 was unconstitutional. The trial court dismissed the petition, holding that '. . . the last sentence of Section 4(3) in Chapter 71--172, Laws of Florida, fails to meet the requirements of the Florida Constitution Article 3, Section 6 (1968) in that the Title of the Act does not embrace sufficient mention of the far reaching and harsh innovations of the sentence in question.'

Chapter 71--172 is a comprehensive act relating to factory-built housing and establishing a department of community affairs to inspect, approve, and regulate such housing. The title to the act is as follows:

'An Act relating to factory built housing; providing for the duties and powers of the department of community affairs; providing for the inspection and approval of factory built housing; providing penalties; providing injunctive relief; providing an effective date.'

Section 4(3) of the act provides:

'(3) The department shall enforce every provision of this act and the regulations adopted pursuant thereto; provided that local land use and zoning requirements, local fire zones, building set-back, side and rear yard requirements, site development and property line requirements, subdivision control, onsite installation requirements, as well as the review and regulation of architectural and aesthetic requirements are hereby specifically and entirely reserved to local jurisdictions. Such local requirements and regulations and others which may be enacted which relate to transportation, erection, and use, shall be reasonable and must be uniformly applied and enforced without distinctions as to whether such housing is factory-built or built in a conventional manner.'

Appellee Kerwin contends that the last sentence above-quoted was properly held to be unconstitutional because Chapter 71--172 did not 'embrace but one subject and matter properly connected therewith. . . .' Article III, Section 6, Florida Constitution. Alternatively, he contends that if the matters dealt with in the offending sentence are properly connected with the regulation of factory-built housing the sentence must nevertheless be stricken because these matters are not expressed in the title to the act. Id.

In deciding whether either of these contentions has merit, our first objective must be to determine the intent of the Legislature in including Section 4(3) in the Act. If, for example, Section 4(3) is interpreted as requiring all municipalities to restructure their existing land use plans, zoning ordinances, building requirements, and other regulations which may relate to factory-built housing, then we would agree with the trial judge that these requirements should have been expressed in the title of the Act. However, we cannot give that interpretation to Section 4(3). It is elementary that a statute is...