State ex rel. Sponaugle v. Hein

• Decision Date: 23 March 2017
• Docket Number: No. 16 CA 00007,16 CA 00007
• Citation: 87 N.E.3d 722,2017 Ohio 1210
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, EX REL. Steven SPONAUGLE, Relator v. The Honorable Jonathan HEIN, Respondent
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

87 N.E.3d 722

2017 Ohio 1210

The STATE of Ohio, EX REL. Steven SPONAUGLE, Relator

v.The Honorable Jonathan HEIN, Respondent

No. 16 CA 00007

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Second District, Darke County.

March 23, 2017

Andrew Engel, Kendo Dulaney, LLP, 7925 Paragon Road, Centerville, Ohio 45459, Attorney for Relator

R. Kelly Ormsby, III, Margaret Hayes, Darke County Prosecutor's Office, 504 S. Broadway Street, 3rd Floor, Greenville, Ohio 45331, Attorneys for Respondents

DECISION AND FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

PER CURIAM:

{¶ 1} Steven Sponaugle filed this prohibition and procedendo action on August 3, 2016. He asks this court to prohibit the Honorable Jonathan Hein from taking certain actions in a foreclosure case against him, and to direct Judge Hein to vacate an order confirming the sheriff's sale therein. SeeThe Farmers State Bank v. Sponau gle, Darke Common Pleas Court Case No. 13–CV–610 (the "Foreclosure Case"). The matter is currently before the court for resolution of the parties' dispositive motions.

Procedural History

Foreclosure Case

{¶ 2} The Farmers State Bank ("the Bank") filed a Foreclosure Case against Steven and Karen Sponaugle (and others) in 2013. On January 12, 2016, Judge Hein issued a "Judgment Entry—Decree of Foreclosure." The Foreclosure Decree set forth the following as liens on the property:

The Court further finds that the Defendant, DARKE COUNTY TREASURER, may claim a lien against the property described herein and in the Complaint of the Plaintiff hereto, for unpaid real estate taxes which may have become a lien.

The Court further finds that the Defendant, AMERICAN BUDGET COMPANY, claims an interest in the above-described real estate by virtue of a Certificate of Judgment, recorded at 12CJ00704, in the office of the Clerk of Courts of Darke County, Ohio.

The Foreclosure Decree did not include the amount of these two liens. The amount and priority of several other liens, including the mortgages being foreclosed upon, were set out and resolved. On February 26, 2016, the property was sold at sheriff's sale to the Bank.¹

First Appeal

{¶ 3} The Sponaugles appealed the Foreclosure Decree. See Darke Appellate Case No. 16 CA 00002 (the "First Appeal"). This court questioned whether it was a final appealable order in a March 10, 2016 show cause order, and on April 18, 2016, dismissed the First Appeal. We held that the Foreclosure Decree was not a final order because it set forth the liens of the Darke Country Treasurer and American Budget Company, but did not determine the amounts of those liens.

{¶ 4} The Sponaugles asked Judge Hein to set aside the Sheriff's Sale on March 14, 2016, just after this court issued the show cause order. They argued that because the Foreclosure Decree was interlocutory, no execution (i.e., sheriff's sale) could issue on it. Shortly thereafter, the Bank moved to confirm the sale. On April 21, 2016, after this court dismissed the First Appeal, Judge Hein overruled the Sponaugles' motion to set aside the sale, and sustained the Bank's motion to confirm it. Regarding the Darke County Treasurer's lien, Judge Hein held that the proposed confirmation order "properly accounts for the amount due to" the Treasurer. Regarding American Budget Company's lien, the court held that "summary judgment is properly granted against American Budget Company since it filed an answer to the complaint, no counter-claim and no pleadings in response to the motion for summary judgment." Judge Hein did not otherwise resolve the amount or status of American Budget Company's lien. He also did not issue an amended foreclosure decree.

{¶ 5} Judge Hein issued an "Order Confirming Sheriff's Sale, Ordering Deed and Order Distribution of Proceeds" (the "Confirmation Order") that same day. It said:

The Court further finds that the Defendant, AMERICAN BUDGET COMPANY, released its Certificate of Judgment Lien on or about February 18, 2016, and that, therefore, no further action is required with reference to the cancellation and release of the Lien with reference to the within described property.

The Confirmation Order also found that the Darke County Treasurer was due $8,242.47 of the proceeds of the sale.

Second Appeal

{¶ 6} The Sponaugles appealed the Confirmation Order and the decision overruling their motion to set aside the Sheriff's Sale on April 27, 2016. See Darke Appellate Case No. 16 CA 00004 (the "Second Appeal"). That appeal is fully briefed and pending before this court.

Original Action

{¶ 7} The Confirmation Order awarded a writ of possession to the Bank. On July 11, 2016, the Bank filed a praecipe for such a writ, which the Clerk issued to the Sheriff on July 12, 2016. The writ required the Sponaugles to move from the property by August 4, 2016.

{¶ 8} On August 3, 2016, Steven Sponaugle filed the instant prohibition and procedendo case against Judge Hein, the Clerk of Courts, and the Darke County Sheriff. See Darke Appellate Case No. 16 CA 00007 (the "Original Action"). This court immediately overruled Sponaugle's request for peremptory and alternative writs of prohibition and procedendo. During a later telephone conference, counsel for the parties indicated that the Sponaugles were no longer residing in the property.

{¶ 9} Respondents filed answers and a motion to dismiss. On November 21, 2016, Sponaugle voluntarily dismissed the Clerk and the Sheriff, leaving Judge Hein as the sole respondent. Sponaugle also filed a motion for summary judgment; Judge Hein filed a cross-motion for summary judgment. Evidence was submitted by way of stipulations filed on December 5, 2016 and January 18, 2017. The dispositive motions are fully briefed and are now ripe for decision.

Legal Standards

Prohibition

{¶ 10} A writ of prohibition is "an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and directed to an inferior tribunal commanding it to cease abusing or usurping judicial functions." State ex rel. Jones v. Suster, 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 73, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998), citing State ex rel. Burtzlaff v. Vickery, 121 Ohio St. 49, 50, 166 N.E. 894 (1929). "[T]he purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain inferior courts and tribunals from exceeding their jurisdiction." Id. citing State ex rel. Barton v. Butler Cty. Bd. of Elections, 39 Ohio St.3d 291, 530 N.E.2d 871 (1988). Such an extraordinary remedy "is customarily granted with caution and restraint, and is issued only in cases of necessity arising from the inadequacy of other remedies." Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted).

{¶ 11} To be entitled to a writ of prohibition, Sponaugle must establish that (1) Judge Hein is about to exercise or has exercised judicial power, (2) Judge Hein's exercise of judicial power was unauthorized by law, and (3) "denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law." State ex rel. R.W. v. Williams, 146 Ohio St.3d 91, 2016-Ohio-562, 52 N.E.3d 1176, ¶ 13. However, if Judge Hein patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction, Sponaugle need not establish that he lacks an adequate remedy at law. State ex rel. Ford v. Ruehlman, 149 Ohio St.3d 34, 2016-Ohio-3529, 73 N.E.3d 396, ¶ 62, citing State ex rel. Sapp v. Franklin Cty. Court of Appeals, 118 Ohio St.3d 368, 2008-Ohio-2637, 889 N.E.2d 500, ¶ 15. If Judge Hein did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction, an appeal is generally "considered an adequate remedy that will preclude a writ of prohibition."

State ex rel. Smith v. Hall, 145 Ohio St.3d 473, 2016-Ohio-1052, 50 N.E.3d 524, ¶ 8.

Procedendo

{¶ 12} A writ of procedendo is an order from a court of superior jurisdiction to one of inferior jurisdiction to proceed to judgment. Yee v. Erie Cty. Sheriff's Dept., 51 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 553 N.E.2d 1354 (1990). It is intended to remedy a court's "refusal or failure to timely dispose of a pending action." State ex rel. Rodak v. Betleski, 104 Ohio St.3d 345, 2004-Ohio-6567, 819 N.E.2d 703, ¶ 16 (internal citations omitted). The writ tells the lower court to rule on a motion, but does not tell that court how to rule. State ex rel. Morgan v. Fais, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 14AP-910, 2015-Ohio-1514, 2015 WL 1793492, ¶ 4. It "will not issue for the purpose of controlling or interfering with ordinary court procedure." State, ex rel. Utley v. Abruzzo, 17 Ohio St.3d 203, 204, 478 N.E.2d 789 (1985).

{¶ 13} To be entitled to a writ of procedendo, Sponaugle must show "a clear legal right to require the court to proceed, a clear legal duty on the part of the court to proceed, and the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." State ex rel. Brown v. Logan, 138 Ohio St.3d 286, 2014-Ohio-769, 6 N.E.3d 42, ¶ 13. "An appeal is an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that precludes an action for procedendo." State ex rel. Elkins v. Fais, 143 Ohio St.3d 366, 2015-Ohio-2873, 37 N.E.3d 1229, ¶ 8 (internal citations and quotation omitted).

Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment

{¶ 14} Original actions "ordinarily proceed as civil actions under the Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure." Loc. App.R. 8(A). Judge Hein appears to move to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(C). Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(C)"is appropriate where a court (1) construes the material allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in favor of the nonmoving party as true, and (2) finds beyond doubt, that the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." State ex rel. Midwest Pride IV, Inc. v. Pontious, 75 Ohio St.3d 565, 570, 664 N.E.2d 931 (1996), citing Lin v. Gatehouse Constr. Co., 84 Ohio App.3d 96, 99, 616 N.E.2d 519 (8th Dist. 1992).

{¶ 15} Both parties have moved for summary judgment. To be entitled to summary judgment, they must show that: "(1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one...