State ex rel. St. Louis Car Co. v. Hughes

• Decision Date: 18 April 1941
• Docket Number: No. 37290.,37290.
• Citation: 152 S.W.2d 193
• Parties: STATE OF MISSOURI at the relation of ST. LOUIS CAR COMPANY, a Corporation, Relator, v. WILLIAM C. HUGHES, WILLIAM DEE BECKER and EDWARD J. McCULLEN, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals of the City of St. Louis.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

152 S.W.2d 193

STATE OF MISSOURI at the relation of ST. LOUIS CAR COMPANY, a Corporation, Relator, v. WILLIAM C. HUGHES, WILLIAM DEE BECKER and EDWARD J. McCULLEN, Judges of the St. Louis Court of Appeals of the City of St. Louis.

No. 37290.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

Division One, April 18, 1941.

Rehearing Denied, June 12, 1941.

Certiorari.

RECORD AND JUDGMENT OF COURT OF APPEALS QUASHED.

Watts & Gentry and Lehmann & Lehmann for relator.

(1) The evidence stated by respondents in their opinion shows that there was no meeting of the minds of the parties to the alleged oral agreement of lifetime employment. Therefore, the holding of the respondents that said contract was valid is in conflict with the following last controlling decision of this court. Huttig v. Brennan, 41 S.W. (2d) 1054. (2) The document designated by respondents in their opinion as Exhibit A and copied therein did not release plaintiff's cause of action, if he had any, and would have been no bar to a suit based on defendant's negligence in causing Slabon's injury, if he ever had such a cause of action. Therefore, the signing of such instrument formed no consideration for a contract of life employment, and the holding of respondents in their opinion to the effect that said contract was valid is in conflict with the last controlling decisions of this court, as follows: Huttig v. Brennan, 41 S.W. (2d) 1054; Hudson v. Bowman, 264 Mo. 58; George v. Ry. Co., 214 Mo. 551. (3) As appears from respondents' opinion, plaintiff claimed that he signed said written instrument after the promise by defendant's physician of a lifetime job if he would sign the same. Such alleged promise, if made, was merged in the written agreement; and, no reference thereto being found in said instrument, there was no valid contract for such employment. That portion of respondents' opinion which holds said oral contract valid is, therefore, in conflict with the last controlling decision of this court on that subject, which is Boggs v. Pacific Steam Ldy. Co., 171 Mo. 282.

Vincent M. Flynn, S.F. Pinter and W.L. Mason, Jr., for respondents.

(1) The only question to be considered on certiorari to this court to quash an opinion of a Court of Appeals is whether the opinion of the Court of Appeals is in conflict with the latest ruling opinion of the Supreme Court either (a) as to a general principle of law announced, or (b) as to a ruling under a like, analogous or similar state of facts. As none of the cases cited in relator's brief involve conflict in either of the particulars above specified, the writ should be quashed. State ex rel. Illinois Terminal Ry. Co. v. Hughes, 144 S.W. (2d) 142; State ex rel. Alton Railroad Co. v. Shain, 143 S.W. (2d) 233. (2) The Court of Appeals having held that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish by satisfactory evidence the ultimate facts necessary to a recovery, and having held that the evidence offered by the plaintiff was sufficient to sustain that burden, it is not within the province of this court on certiorari to determine whether the ruling of the Court of Appeals was sound or unsound inasmuch as no opinion of this court involving a similar state of facts and reaching a different result is called to the attention of the court. State ex rel. Public Serv. Comm. v. Shain, 119 S.W. (2d) 220; State ex rel. Silverforb v. Smith, 43 S.W. (2d) 1054.

DALTON, C.

This is an original proceeding in certiorari to review for alleged conflict the decision of respondents in the case of Stephen Slabon v. St. Louis Car Company, a Corporation (Mo. App.), 138 S.W. (2d) 673. In the trial court, plaintiff obtained a verdict and judgment, and defendant appealed. The judgment was affirmed by respondents.

[1] In determining the question of conflict we are limited to the facts stated in the opinion. Respondents' statement is rather long. Briefly, respondents stated the facts as follows: The petition alleged that plaintiff, in the course of his employment, suffered a rupture for which he claimed defendant was liable; that in consideration of his signing a paper prepared by defendant, absolving defendant from liability, defendant agreed to give plaintiff lifetime employment; that plaintiff performed, but defendant breached the alleged contract, for which damages were prayed. The defendant's answer was a general denial.

Plaintiff testified that he was ruptured while at work in defendant's plant; that his foreman told him to go to defendant's physician, in said plant, and plaintiff went; that the physician examined him, told him he was ruptured and directed him to go home and return in a few days, which he did. He testified that when he so returned he said to the physician, "I got some demands;" that the physician told him he would speak to the president of the company, and told him to return a few days later, which he did; that the physician then told him he would get compensation, provided he signed a paper; that he had to sign the paper and he would get a lifetime job, and that the physician said before he could go back to work he would have to get a truss and would have to sign that paper in order to get a lifetime job. He signed the paper, Exhibit A, set forth in respondents' opinion; defendant furnished him with a truss and he resumed work. Later the truss broke and the company gave him a new one. This truss wore out, and the physician advised an operation. Before he went to the hospital plaintiff talked with the president, who told him he should permit himself to be operated on and that he would get $15 a week for his wife, "and that I would have a lifetime job; that I would always get that." Plaintiff was then operated on in the City Hospital. Defendant refused to let him return to work.

Plaintiff gave his testimony in the Hungarian language and it was translated by an interpreter. On cross-examination plaintiff was asked "to tell in English exactly what he said to the doctor and what the doctor said to him, but he stated that he could not remember the words because he was unable to speak enough English to remember the words the doctor used." He said he could not read, and never asked anybody to read Exhibit A to him; that it was handed to him in defendant's office and he was told to sign it, and was told "you get a lifetime job." Other facts will be stated in the course of our opinion or may be had by reference to respondents' opinion, 138 S.W. (2d) 673.

In their opinion respondents found that the question for decision by them was whether there was a substantial basis in the evidence for the jury's verdict on two propositions, to-wit, consideration for, and authorization of, the contract for life employment.

Respondents said: "Defendant contends that the court erred in overruling its demurrers to the evidence because there was no consideration for the making of the alleged oral contract for life employment; and further that plaintiff failed to show that defendant entered into said oral contract through an authorized agent of defendant."

[2] In determining the questions before them, respondents correctly stated the general rule as follows: "We must therefore apply the long-established rule and take plaintiff's evidence as true where it is not unreasonable or contrary to well-known physical laws, give plaintiff the benefit of favorable inferences arising from all of the evidence, and disregard defendant's evidence where it is in conflict with plaintiff's evidence. [Armstrong v. Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co., 331 Mo. 1224, 55 S.W. (2d) 460.]"

Respondents reached the conclusion that, under all the evidence, the trial court's action in overruling defendant's demurrers to the evidence was correct. Considering the first of the two propositions presented, to-wit, consideration, respondents, with reference to the pleadings, said: "Plaintiff's petition alleges that ... in consideration for the signing by plaintiff of a certain paper prepared by defendant and absolving defendant from liability to plaintiff for such injuries, defendant agreed to give plaintiff steady employment during the period of his natural life as long as defendant's plant should be in operation. Plaintiff further alleged that he signed the paper, performed his part of said agreement by refraining from holding defendant liable in damages."

With reference to the evidence on this issue, respondents said: "The doctor told him he would get compensation provided he signed a paper; that the doctor told him he had to sign the paper and he would get a lifetime job; that the doctor said before he could go back to work he ... would have to sign the paper in order to get a lifetime job; that he signed the paper; ... During the cross-examination defendant's Exhibit A was shown to plaintiff and he testified that he signed it, but that he could not read it; that he never asked anybody to read what was above his name thereon; that the paper was handed to him in the main office of defendant; that Dr. Rosenfeld was there when he signed his name; that Dr. Rosenfeld told him to sign the paper, and that Dr. Rosenfeld said in English, `You get a lifetime job.' ... That the doctor said to him, `You go right away to the drug store and buy a rupture belt, and first you go into the office and you must write up the paper;' and that the doctor told him what kind of a paper and said to him, `You get a paper for a lifetime job.' Plaintiff was asked, during cross-examination, to tell in English exactly what he said to the doctor and what the doctor said to him, but he stated he could not remember the words because he was unable to speak enough English to remember the words the doctor used."

[3] Since respondents stated the rule requiring them to take plaintiff's evidence as true, give plaintiff the benefit of favorable inferences arising from all of the evidence, and to disregard defendant's evidence where it conflicts with plaintiff's evidence, we must assume they did so. In so doing respondents...