State ex rel. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company v. District Court for Hennepin County
| Citation | 44 N.W. 7,42 Minn. 247 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, ex rel. St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba Railway Company, v. District Court for Hennepin County |
| Decision Date | 26 December 1889 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Certiorari to the district court for Hennepin county, to review an order by Lochren, J., in proceedings for laying out a street across the relator's railway in the city of Minneapolis.
Benton & Roberts, for relator.
Robert D. Russell, for respondent.
The writ of certiorari has been resorted to for the purpose of bringing here for review the action of the district court, upon an appeal by the relator to that court in proceedings for laying out a street across the right of way of the relator, the railroad company, within the corporate limits of the city of Minneapolis. The objection urged by the relator, and upon which the action of the district court was based, was that the damages awarded by the commissioners were inadequate. In fact no damages were awarded. The taking in question was of a strip 60 feet wide for the purposes of a public street, across the right of way of the relator. At the request of the railway company, the commissioners made, in connection with their report to the court, special findings to the effect that it would cost: (1) For planking the railway crossing for the width of 32 feet, $ 92.20; (2) for renewing and maintaining the same, $ 250; (3) for cattle-guards across the railroad, $ 211.98; (4) for renewing and maintaining the same, the interest at 6 per cent. on $ 500; (5) for signs at crossing, $ 4.19; (6) for renewal and maintenance of the same, $ 7. The district court, deeming that the first, third, and fifth of these items were allowable, made its order to the effect that the sum of those three items be awarded to the relator, and that in other respects the report of the commissioners be confirmed.
The motion on the part of the respondent to quash this writ is denied. Granting that the court was not authorized to thus fix the amount recoverable by the relator, but, by the requirements of the city charter, it should have recommitted the matter to the same or to other commissioners, it is enough, to entitle the relator to this remedy, that the court did upon the report of the commissioners, determine that the relator was entitled to receive the sum of the three items above referred to, $ 308.37, and no more, and made its order accordingly, confirming the report of the commissioners with this modification. This was a final determination of the matter, concluding the parties so long as that order should remain in force.
The relator contends that, upon the report of the commissioners, it was entitled to have awarded to it as compensation not only the sums therein specified as the cost of planking, cattle-guards, and signboards, but also the further sums named for the maintenance of the same. The city of Minneapolis, which is the real party in interest opposed to the relator, claims that none of these items should be allowed.
It should be conceded that the relator, in acquiring its right of way, whether by purchase directly, or by statutory proceedings under the power of eminent domain, acquired property rights which are protected from divestiture by the constitutional guaranty which declares that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. State v. Chicago, Mil. & St. Paul Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 402, (31 N.W. 365,) and authorities hereafter cited. Compensation must be allowed for whatever is to be regarded as a taking of the property of the corporation for other uses. We are now called upon to determine whether, in view of the duty imposed by general statutes upon railroad companies to provide and maintain planking, cattle-guards, and sign-boards at all highway crossings, the establishing of this highway over the relator's right of way entitles it to compensation for the expense thus imposed; or, in other words, whether, in view of the fact that this statutory duty as respects this particular locality did not exist until this highway was laid out over the relator's road, and only by reason of its having been so laid out, it should be considered that the obligation to provide and maintain this plank crossing, these cattle-guards, and this sign-board constitutes a taking of the property of the railroad company, or deprives the company of any right of property before belonging to it.
For the present we will confine our attention to the cattle-guards and sign-board. The necessity for these arises from the dangerous nature of the use of the railroad property; and it cannot now be questioned that, as a matter of mere police regulation, the state has the power to impose upon railroad companies the duty of maintaining these safeguards. There can be no doubt that, if no such requirement had ever been embraced in our general laws or in the charters of railroad corporations, and if all our railroads had been constructed without such devices for lessening the dangers incident to railroad operations, it would be within the police power of the legislature to require all railroad companies to provide such safeguards at all existing railway crossings. It has been decided in this court that the police power of the state authorized such requirements as to the construction of cattle-guards and fences. Gillam v. Sioux City & St. Paul R. Co., 26 Minn. 268, (3 N.W. 353;) Winona & St. Peter R. Co. v. Waldron, 11 Minn. 392, (515.) It is but an exercise of the everywhere recognized police power of the state, regulating by reasonable and necessary means the use of instrumentalities otherwise attended with obvious and great danger to the public. No other principle is involved in such requirements than is involved in imposing a reasonable limitation upon the speed of railway trains at street crossings, and within the limits of thickly populated municipal districts, or in requiring a bell to be rung or whistle blown at highway crossings, or the stoppage of trains at railway crossings, and in other like provisions which are found in the statutes of every state. Such statutory regulation of the use of property does not constitute a taking of the property, or its destruction. It is only the exercise of the power of the state to reasonably control the use of property and the conduct of the individual, so far as may be necessary for the public safety; and to such control every citizen and owner of property must submit without compensation.
If the legislature,...
To continue reading
Request your trial