Winona & St. Peter R. R. Co. v. Waldron

• Decision Date: 01 January 1866
• Citation: 11 Minn. 392
• Parties: THE WINONA & ST. PETER R. R. CO. vs. ROBERT WALDRON et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

11 Minn. 392

THE WINONA & ST. PETER R. R. CO. vs. ROBERT WALDRON et al.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal from order of the district court, Olmsted County

Points and authorities for appellant: —

1. The court erred in allowing the witness Horton, and other witnesses, to testify as to the amount of damages done to Waldron's farm on account of the indefinite use of that part taken, and of the construction and maintenance of one-half of the fences along the line of the railroad, and in allowing said witness to give his opinion as to what particular things injured the market value of the farm. First, the real question, or rather result to be arrived at in such a case as this is, will the farm, as a whole, be damaged or injured by the doing of the acts proposed? And to ascertain this fact as in other cases (except in so far as the particular law under which the assessment is had in this case may vary or change the rule), reference must be had to the market value of the whole farm before and after the injury complained of is done. The market value before and after is in all cases of alleged injury to property the true test. To this market value the party calling a witness should be confined in his examination in chief, to ascertain the process by which the witness arrives at his conclusion; and the amount of damages he fixes on account of particular injuries done, and what he considers injurious to the market value, is the exclusive province of a cross-examination. The law considers it barely competent for a witness to give his opinion in such case as this in relation to the market value of the property before and after the injury. This we understand to be the utmost limit on this subject to which a party calling a witness may go. If the rule for the examination of witnesses in chief, adopted by the court below in this case, is the correct rule, we fail to see that a cross-examination has any province whatever. The court erred in allowing the respondents to prove by their witnesses, "that during some portions of the year, Waldron hauls his wheat and produce out to market, and his lumber and heavy articles back by a route which crosses this railroad track in his field on this farm, and that by the construction of the railroad the occupant of this farm is inconvenienced, and the market value thereby affected." This is purely speculative, contingent and immaterial matter. This matter of inconvenience in crossing the railroad track in going to and returning from market, if it be one, is only such as every one visiting a market place where there is a railroad, is subjected to. It furnishes no certain data upon which to predicate damages. It is wholly intangible. If it be an inconvenience or damage, it is such as does not set the law in motion. It is damnum absque injuria. The court erred in allowing the witness Horton and other witnesses, to testify as to any additional fences that might be made necessary by the construction of the railroad, and the cost of building the same, as an item of damages allowable to the appellants, and in refusing to charge the jury that they were not entitled to such allowance.

By sec. 4 of ch. 10, Special Laws of 1865, it is provided that "section 4 of ch. 19, of the Special Laws of 1862, being an act to facilitate the construction of a railroad from Winona, westerly by way of St. Peter, be amended so as to read as follows: `Said company, or any railroad company formed by any consolidation with the Winona & St. Peter Railroad Company, shall construct and maintain a good and legal fence on both sides of their road, wherever it may run through enclosed lands, within two years after the commencement of the operation of their road across said lands, and during said period of two years shall construct and maintain good and sufficient cattle guards at points of crossing such lands, and shall also construct all necessary farm crossings over the track of their road.'" If this statute is a valid act, and binding upon the company, and applicable to this case, there would seem to be no doubt that the subject of fencing could not be properly taken into the account in assessing the damages. That the legislature intended to make it applicable to the Winona & St. Peter Railroad Company from the time of its passage, we think there can be no doubt, since it not only refers to that company in terms, but is an amendment of sec. 4, of ch. 19, of the Special Laws of 1862, which is the act under which said company acquires all its rights, and the section amended is the one in said act relating to the subject of fencing. Second, the fact that this statute was passed after these proceedings were commenced, can make no difference. No vested rights had been acquired under them by either party at the time of its passage, and so neither could insist that the law as it was at the commencement of the proceedings, should remain unchanged. The rights of the parties in this respect were and are wholly dependent upon statutory provisions, and it was competent for the legislature to change them at any time before they had become definitely fixed by a final judgment. Third, it was not necessary that an actual acceptance of the provisions of the act by the company, should be shown in order that it may avail itself of its provisions. The act by its terms does not require any formal acceptance as a condition precedent to the enjoyment of the rights conferred, and as the act is beneficial, its acceptance is presumed. Bank of U. S. v. Dandridge, 12 Wheat. 70; Chas. River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 7 Pick. 344, Parker, C. J., and Wilde, J. Fourth, but its acceptance, in so far at least as this provision relating to fencing is concerned, is not at all essential to its binding force upon the company. The power of the legislature to control railroad companies in this respect, is found in the general control over the police of the country, which resides in the law making power. Redfield on R. R. 554, note. Fifth, this statute is not in conflict with the requirements of sec. 27 of art. 4, of the constitution, which provides that no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. The design of the constitutional provision is to prevent the uniting of various objects, having no necessary or natural connection with each other, in one bill, for the purpose of combining various pecuniary interests in support of the whole, which could not be combined in favor of either by itself, and the provision should be so construed as to meet this mischief alone. Sedgwick on Statutory and Constitutional Law, 51, 53, and 567, and cases there cited; Murphy v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673; The Board of Supervisors of Ramsey County v. Heenan, 2 Minn. [330]; Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. [465]. The title of the act in question is "An act to authorize the Winona & St. Peter Railway Company to consolidate with the Minnesota Central Railroad Company, and to bridge the Mississippi River." The subject of the act is the Winona & St. Peter Railroad Company, an increase of its powers; anything therefore relating to that company might properly and legitimately be embraced within the act, without having each particular matter so relating specially mentioned in its title.

4. The court erred in refusing to allow the railroad company to give evidence of the increased market value of Waldron's farm per acre, due solely to the influence of the construction of its road, with a view of offsetting the same against the damages sustained, and in charging the jury, "That any general benefits arising from the construction or operation of the railroad shared by the defendants in common with the whole country in this vicinity, and not peculiar to them or to other lands actually crossed by the road, you will exclude and not consider in ascertaining these damages. As for instance, such benefits as defendants would receive if the railroad should be constructed through the country, but not crossing this farm." First, the company's charter provides the manner in "which compensation shall be ascertained and determined," and declares, that "in estimating damages or compensations to be paid to any claimants to lands or interests in lands so proposed to be taken, the said commissioners shall take into consideration the benefits to accrue to the claimant by the construction of said railroad, and allow such benefits by way of recoupment against the damages which such claimant may sustain thereby, and report only the balance of damages which shall remain after applying such benefits in recoupment thereof, but no balance shall be in any case reported in favor of the company." Laws of 1855, ch. 27, § 5. Second, the intention of the legislature in the adoption of this provision was manifestly to relieve the company from the payment of damages to the owner of a tract of land for the privilege of constructing its railroad through it, when the additional value to be given to the land by its construction, was fully equal to the injury which it would occasion. And since the language of the statute is general, it was never intended to be so construed as to make it at all material whether the additional value given to the land by its construction arises from draining the land which was before wet, from affording additional facilities for taking its produce to market, or from the general enhancement in the value of the land occasioned by its contiguity to the public work. The Alton & Sangamon Railroad Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190; Rexford v. Knight, 15 Barb. 627; McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts. 294; Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 491; Commonwealth v. Sessions of Norfolk, 5 Mass. 436; Commonwealth v. Sessions of Middlesex, 9 Mass. 388; Betts v. The City of Williamsburgh, 15 Barb. 258; Livingston v. Mayor of New York, 8 Wend. 85; Dwight et al. v. Commissioners of Hampden, 11 Cush. 201; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Heister, McClure & Reiley, 8 Barr. 445; Livermore v. Town of...