State ex rel. Stangvik v. Tahash
| Decision Date | 13 September 1968 |
| Docket Number | No. 40732,40732 |
| Citation | 161 N.W.2d 667,281 Minn. 353 |
| Parties | STATE of Minnesota ex rel. Philip STANGVIK, Appellant, v. Ralph H. TAHASH, Warden Minnesota State Prison, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. There is nothing in the record to support a finding that defendant's plea of guilty was coerced or was not voluntarily or intelligently entered.
It is permissible for a trial court to accept a guilty plea from a defendant even though the defendant was under commitment to a mental hospital at the time of the alleged crime, provided he is adequately represented by counsel at the time he voluntarily pleads guilty and there is no other evidence before the trial court which would support a defense of insanity.
2. Minn.St. 609.035 is procedural in nature and consequently applies to the imposition of a sentence after the effective date of the statute even though the crime was committed prior to that date.
Section 609.035, which permits punishment for only one crime when the behavior of the defendant constitutes more than one offense under the laws of this state, does not apply where the defendant's conduct constitutes separate crimes intentionally committed against more than one individual and where the multiple sentences do not result in a term of confinement grossly out of proportion to the harm which resulted.
C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, and Robert Oliphant, Asst. Public Defender, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., David J. Byron, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for respondent.
1
Relator has pled guilty to the murder of his wife and two children. He is serving a life sentence and two concurrent sentences of 40 years each. He appeals from an order of the district court discharging a writ of habeas corpus. There are three issues: (1) Whether it was error for the trial court to accept a plea of guilty in the light of relator's commitment to a mental hospital when the crimes occurred; (2) whether relator was induced to plead guilty out of fear he would be returned to a state hospital; and (3) whether under Minn.St. 609.035 relator could be sentenced for more than one of the offenses.
1. We declined to hold that a defendant, who is charged with perpetrating a crime at a time when he is under commitment to a state mental hospital, is obliged to stand trial on the question of whether he was at the time of the offense responsible for his actions under § 611.026, 2 if when he pleads guilty he is adequately represented by counsel and there is no other evidence before the sentencing court to support a defense of insanity.
In resolving this issue, it is necessary to recite in some detail the chronology of events which resulted in these convictions. In November 1961, relator was taken from the Hennepin County jail to the psychiatric ward of Glenwood Hills Hospital for observation after being charged with assaulting his wife and threatening to kill their children. The probate court thereupon committed him to the St. Peter State Security Hospital where he remained until May 17, 1962, when he was restored to capacity. About a year later, on April 22, 1963, he was committed to the Fergus Falls State Hospital by the probate court of Otter Tail County. The hospital record, prepared at the time of his admission in 1963, disclosed the following:
'The patient has had delusional thinking in that he has been convinced that his wife has been unfaithful to him, and that she has put things in his food that would be harmful to him. * * *
Relator's wife joined in petitioning for his discharge in May 1962. However, the hospital report goes on to say:
By the end of May 1963, defendant was permitted to visit his parents for periods of 3 days at 10-day intervals. It was during one of such visits on July 4, 1963, that he stabbed to death his wife and two children.
Relator was apprehended on July 6, 1963, and indicted for murder on July 22, 1963. He was first arraigned on September 23, 1963, at which time counsel was appointed to represent him. Thereupon, the matter was continued without a plea until October 8, when counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
On November 12, 1963, relator petitioned the court for an order holding him incapable of conducting his own defense by virtue of insanity as provided by § 611.026. Accordingly, the court appointed a commission consisting of a psychologist, a psychiatrist, and probate judge to inquire into the matter. On January 13, 1964, the commission filed a detailed report which concluded with a finding that relator was Not in a state of idiocy, imbecility, lunacy or insanity so as to be incapable of understanding the criminal proceedings pending against him or making a defense thereto.
Relator readily admitted to the commission that he had killed his wife. Among other things, he indicated a desire to accept punishment, adding, 'I am tired of institutions.' However, in the same interview he stated he did not mind being in the hospital. Thereafter, he told the commission,
The trial court adopted the commission's findings and ordered relator to stand trial. Concurrently, the court denied a motion made on November 12, 1963, 'for an Order finding that said defendant, Philip C. Stangvik, at the time of committing the alleged criminal acts was laboring under such a defect of reason as not to know the nature of his acts or that they were wrong.' The motion was denied with a memo attached by the Honorable Rol E. Barron as follows:
'There is no showing in the slightest that on the date of the crime, to-wit: July 4, 1963, Phillip C. Stangvik was in a state of insanity as not to know the nature of his acts or that they were wrong.'
Thereafter, venue was changed to Clay County. On April 27, 1964, Judge Barron summoned relator, his counsel, and the prosecutor, and read them a letter which he had just received from relator, as follows:
The court further stated that it was his understanding from counsel that defendant wished to plead guilty to three indictments for murder and that the state would reduce the charges involving the death of relator's children from first degree murder to second degree if relator pled guilty to first degree murder with respect to the death of his wife. Counsel acquiesced. Thereupon, relator was interrogated by the court and stated that he was presently sane and was sane at the time he committed the murders; that he knew what he was doing and knew that it was wrong; that no one had used any threats or coercion or promises of any kind to change his plea to guilty; and that he was entering a plea of guilty of his own free will. Counsel then asked relator for the record whether he had advised relator to plead guilty, to which relator answered in the negative. Counsel stated he wished the record to show that the plea of guilty was relator's own idea. Before imposing sentence, the court asked relator whether he realized that a life sentence for first degree murder was mandatory, to which relator answered in the affirmative. Thereupon, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on the indictment for murder in the first degree and 40 years on each of the other two indictments for murder in the second degree, all of the sentences to run concurrently.
The petition for a writ of habeas corpus, executed in July 1966, resulted in an evidentiary hearing in the District Court of Washington County. There relator testified that he had written to Judge Barron to avoid being sent to St. Peter. His counsel had advised him that if he pled not guilty by reason of insanity he 'would probably go to St. Peter for about 15 years.' On cross-examination, relator was interrogated with respect to a confession he had given the sheriff shortly after he was first apprehended. He admitted that his confession was correct in relating that he had stabbed and killed his wife and children and in the recitation that he had planned the crimes for some time. However, notwithstanding his confession and his letter to Judge Barron, in the habeas corpus hearing he denied that he knew what he was doing the night of the crime. He conceded, however, that he made a contrary statement to his counsel.
At the habeas corpus hearing, the attorney who represented relator in the trial court testified by position. He recited the unsuccessful attempts he had made to have relator examined by a qualified expert in anticipation of the defense of insanity, and how, at the hearing called by Judge Barron, he had advised relator not to enter a plea of guilty but to stand trial, and in any event to complete the examinations scheduled for that week. Defendant refused the advice. According to his counsel defendant said he would rather spend his time in Stillwater...
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