Chapman v. State, 41285

• Decision Date: 01 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41285,41285
• Citation: 282 Minn. 13,162 N.W.2d 698
• Parties: Robert E. CHAPMAN, Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 698

162 N.W.2d 698

282 Minn. 13

Robert E. CHAPMAN, Respondent, v. STATE of Minnesota, Appellant.

No. 41285.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Nov. 1, 1968.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The general policy which favors the finality of judgments applies in criminal cases and a judgment of conviction based upon a plea of guilty should not be vacated unless it is necessary to do so in order to correct a manifest injustice.

2. Situations when the trial court is authorized to vacate a plea of guilty include those where:

(a) The court accepting the plea lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter.

(b) The defendant tendering the plea of guilty lacked the mental capacity to do so.

(c) The defendant was not adequately afforded the advice of competent counsel.

(d) An agreement inducing the plea made by the prosecution was not fulfilled.

(e) The defendant did not understand the nature and elements of the offense charged and the consequences of his plea.

(f) The plea of guilty was interposed only because of clear and grave misapprehension concerning the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.

(g) Statements made by the defendant at the time of his plea negated the existence of an essential element of the crime charged and were inconsistent with the plea.

3. In view of testimony of the defendant, given after his plea of guilty to a second-degree murder charge was received but before he was sentenced, in which he specifically denied intent to kill the decedent, it is held that the trial court's discretion in vacating the plea was properly exercised.

4. Where a plea of guilty which was accepted prior to the effective date of Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974 (June 13, 1966), is vacated in post-conviction proceedings commenced after that date, the voluntariness of the confession in proceedings incident to trial of the case on the merits is to be tested by the pre-Miranda standard.

Douglas M. Head, Atty. Gen., Richard H. Kyle, Sol. Gen., James J. O'Connor, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Robert C. Tuveson, County Atty., Albert Lea, for appellant.

C. Paul Jones, Public Defender, Robert E. Oliphant, Ronald Haskvitz, Asst. Public Defenders, Minneapolis, for respondent.

OPINION

SHERAN, Justice.

Appeal from an order of the district court granting a petition for postconviction relief and thereby vacating a judgment of conviction for murder in the second degree. The order is appealable. Minn.St. 590.06.

The petition was based principally upon the ground that the plea of guilty should have been rejected because (a) information elicited from defendant by the court before sentence disclosed the absence of intent to kill, which is an essential element of murder in the second degree, and (b) the plea of guilty was not freely and voluntarily given since it was prompted by a 'confession' secured from defendant by improper means.

On May 23, 1963, a man was killed in Freeborn County. On June 8, 1963, the grand jury of that county returned an indictment charging defendant, Robert E. Chapman, with the crime of murder in the first degree. On June 25, 1963, this indictment was dismissed by the state and an information was filed charging defendant with murder in the second degree. Defendant then petitioned to plead guilty. He was arraigned on the charge of murder in the second degree and also upon an information charging two prior felony convictions. He pled guilty. After interrogation by the court and the county attorney, he was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of not less than 30 nor more than 80 years and was committed.

In 1966, defendant petitioned the District Court of Washington County for a writ of habeas corpus alleging that his plea of guilty to the charge of murder in the second degree was improperly accepted because the presentence interrogation to which reference has been made disclosed facts not consistent with the essential elements of murder in the second degree. He claimed, also, inadequate representation and the use of an improperly obtained confession in securing his plea. The petition was denied by the district court without a hearing and in State ex rel. Chapman v. Tahash, 277 Minn. 503, 152 N.W.2d 309, the matter was remanded to the district court for a hearing on these claims. Defendant then petitioned for relief under c. 590, the Postconviction Remedy Act adopted by the legislature in 1967 (L.1967, c. 336). After an evidentiary hearing, the petition was granted and the matter now comes before us on appeal by the state.

1. Most criminal cases are disposed of by a plea of guilty. There are considerations of public policy combined with advantages to the defendant which are furthered by the process. ¹ From the standpoint of the state, the tender of a guilty plea eliminates the necessity of a complex and costly criminal trial. Congested court calendars and overburdened prosecutors are relieved. From the standpoint of the defendant whose guilt of a criminal offense is clear and provable, it is frequently better to acknowledge guilt than to pursue a fruitless contest which may lead to a sentence more severe than that likely to be imposed upon acceptance of the plea of guilty.

The purposes of the criminal law are not served if defendants are permitted to plead guilty to offenses of which they are not in fact guilty. But once the plea is accepted and a judgment of conviction is entered upon it, the general policy favoring the finality of judgments applies to some extent, at least, in criminal as well as in civil cases. ² The tender and acceptance of a plea of guilty is and must be a most solemn commitment. While the state has no reason to imprison a man for a crime which he did not commit, '(w)e are not disposed to encourage accused persons to 'play games' with the courts at the expense of already overburdened calendars and the rights of other accused persons awaiting trial' by setting aside judgments of conviction based upon pleas made with deliberation and accepted by the court with caution. Everett v. United States, 119 App.D.C. 60, 65, 336 F.2d 979, 984.

'* * * The mere fact * * * that an accused knowing his rights and the consequences of his act, hopes and believes that he will receive a shorter sentence or milder punishment by pleading guilty than he would upon a trial and conviction by a jury, presents no ground for permitting the withdrawal of the plea after he finds that his expectation has not been realized.' People v. Morreale, 412 Ill. 528, 532, 107 N.E.2d 721, 724.

Furthermore, a judgment of conviction based upon a plea of guilty should not be vacated without the strongest of reasons if the effect of such vacation will be to seriously prejudice or bar proceedings by the state due to changes in evidentiary circumstances occurring between the time the plea of guilty was accepted and the time when the case will be tried on the merits if the judgment of conviction is, in fact, vacated and the plea of guilty annulled. ³ A plea of guilty cannot be used as a tactical device to frustrate the prosecution.

2. Subject to these restraining considerations, we have frequently held in effect that an application to withdraw a plea of guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and should be granted whenever necessary to correct a manifest injustice. There is supporting authority for this principle.

The American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty (tentative draft), § 2.1, sets out a standard for withdrawal of a plea:

'(a) The court should allow the defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere whenever the defendant, upon a timely motion for withdrawal, proves that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.

'(i) A motion for withdrawal is timely if made with due diligence, considering the nature of the allegations therein, and is not necessarily barred because made subsequent to judgment or sentence.

'(ii) Withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice whenever the defendant proves that:

'(1) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by constitution, statute, or rule;

'(2) the plea was not entered or ratified by the defendant or a person authorized to so act in his behalf;

'(3) the plea was involuntary, or was entered without knowledge of the charge or that the sentence actually imposed could be imposed; or

'(4) he did not receive the charge or sentence concessions contemplated by the plea agreement and the prosecuting attorney failed to seek or not to oppose these concessions as promised in the plea agreement.

'(iii) The defendant may move for withdrawal of his plea without alleging that he is innocent of the charge to which the plea has been entered.

'(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court. Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant's plea.'

The Wisconsin Supreme Court adopted the above standard but noted that the four factual situations used to illustrate manifest injustice are not exhaustive. State v. Reppin, 35 Wis.2d 377, 151 N.W.2d 9.

The Illinois Supreme Court apparently also follows the manifest-injustice test, suggesting that manifest injustice may exist when (1) the plea was entered on a misapprehension of the facts or the law; (2) the plea was entered in consequence of misrepresentation by counsel or the state's attorney or someone else in authority; (3) the case is one where there is doubt of the guilt of the accused; (4) the accused has a defense worthy of consideration by a jury; or (5) the ends of justice will be better...