State ex rel. Suchta v. District Court of Sheridan County

• Decision Date: 24 May 1955
• Docket Number: No. 2686,2686
• Parties: STATE of Wyoming, on the Relation of Floyd SUCHTA, Plaintiff, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, Wyoming, and Honorable G. A. Layman, Judge thereof, and the City of Sheridan, Wyoming, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 1023

283 P.2d 1023

74 Wyo. 48

STATE of Wyoming, on the Relation of Floyd SUCHTA, Plaintiff, v. The DISTRICT COURT OF SHERIDAN COUNTY, Wyoming, and Honorable G. A. Layman, Judge thereof, and the City of Sheridan, Wyoming, a Municipal Corporation, Defendants.

No. 2686.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 24, 1955.

John F. Raper, Kenneth Chetwood, Sheridan, for plaintiff.

Robert E. Holstedt, Harry F. Schwartz, Sheridan, for defendants.

BLUME, Justice.

In this case, Floyd Suchta was arrested by the police in Sheridan, Wyoming, for unlawfully operating a motor vehicle in a careless and wanton manner in disregard of the rights and safety of others, so as to endanger persons and property, all in violation of an ordinance of the city of Sheridan. He was tried in the police court, found guilty, and was fined the sum of $75. An appeal to the district court was duly taken. While the case was duly pending in the latter court, the city attorney of Sheridan moved the court that the case be removed from the docket of cases to be tried by the jury, and that the case be tried by the judge of that court without a jury. The district court sustained the motion. Thereupon on November 26, 1954, the instant action was instituted, as an original proceeding in this court, asking for a writ of prohibition, forbidding the district court of Sheridan county to try the foregoing case on appeal without a jury. The defendants have appeared, and have filed a general demurrer.

Appeal from a judgment of a police court is guaranteed by the constitution of this state, Article 5, Section 23, providing:

'Appeals shall lie from the final decisions of justices of the peace and police magistrates in such cases and pursuant to such regulations as may be prescribed by law.'

Pursuant to that provision the legislature, in enacting laws for towns has provided in Section 29-449, Wyoming Compiled Statutes 1945, as follows:

'Appeals from the judgment or sentence of such police justice may be taken to the district court in the same manner as is now provided by law for appeals from justices' courts in criminal cases, and shall be dealt with by the Courts as criminal cases.'

The charters of the cities of Laramie and Rawlins, §§ 29-3326, 29-3524, W.C.S.1945, provide for such appeals in that identical language. Thereafter in 1933, apparently to make the law of this state more uniform, the legislature provided as now appears in § 29-1805, W.C.S.1945, as follows:

'In addition to all other methods heretofore provided by law, an appeal from the judgment or sentence of a police justice in any city or town operating under a special charter or commission, commission manager or manager form of government, may be taken to the district court in the same manner as is now provided by law for appeals from justice courts in criminal cases and shall be dealt with by the courts as criminal cases.'

The city of Sheridan operates as a commission form of government.

By the term 'criminal cases' is obviously meant criminal cases under the laws of the state--cases in violation of the laws of the state. 10 Words and Phrases, p. 484 et seq. In other words, when a case of violation of an ordinance reaches the district court on appeal, the violation of such ordinance is, in the eyes of the law, considered to be on the same footing as a crime under the criminal laws of the state, and must, under the foregoing statute, be tried in the same manner. Now trials under the criminal law of this state are jury trials. That is true not only when the case originates in the district court, but also when it originates in a justice court and is then appealed, for on the appeal the trial is de novo, § 15-207, W.C.S.1945, and that term means (unless otherwise specified) that it is on the same footing as though it had originated in the district court. Doster v. State, 195 Tenn. 535, 260 S.W.2d 279; Lone Star Gas Co. v. State, 137 Tex. 279, 153 S.W.2d 681, 692; In re Farlin, 350 Ill.App. 328, 112 N.E.2d 736; Karcher v. Green, 8 Houst., Del., 163, 32 A. 225; Reck v. Reck, Ohio App., 46 N.E.2d 429 430; 12 Words and Phrases, De Novo, p. 107 et seq. In fact § 10-1101, W.C.S.1945, seems to be all inclusive when it provides: 'In all criminal cases the jury summoned and impaneled according to the laws in force, relating to the summoning or impaneling of juries in other cases, shall try the accused.' We find no qualifying exception in our statutes.

Counsel for the defendants have reasoned themselves into the belief that our statutes do not mean what they, apparently at least, seem to mean. They say that there is no constitutional right to a trial by jury in a case such as before us. We may admit that for the purpose of this case. We are here dealing with a statute or statutes. They also say that cases triable before a police justice were not triable to a jury at common law. We may admit that also. The legislature may change, and in this case has changed the common law.

It is stated in 9 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., § 27.39, that 'The right of a defendant to a jury trial upon appeal (from a judgment of the police court) depends upon the provisions of the applicable local law.' There are cases which hold that no jury trial, on appeal, is required. That was held to be true, for instance, in Stutsman v. City of Cheyenne, 18 Wyo. 499, 501, 113 P. 322, 323, under a statute providing that the case should be tried at the next term of court, "Provided, no trial de novo shall be had in the district court." Comp.St.1910 Wyo. § 1383. (Italics supplied.) That was held to be true also in City of Clovis v. Dendy, 35 N.M. 347, 297 P. 141, 143, under a statute providing that the case, on appeal, should be set before the judge of the district court without a jury. That was held to be true also in City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle, 165 Kan. 374, 196 P.2d 217, 225, 226, (a case much relied on by counsel for the defendants) under a statute, G.S.1935 Kan., 13-616, providing 'that in all matters for which specific provision is not made the chapter for criminal procedure before justices of the peace shall govern except that no jury shall be allowed.' (Italics supplied.) Even so, three of the justices dissented, and it appears that the uniform practice previously had been to allow a jury trial on appeal. It is quite apparent that such cases as these are not pertinent, and have no bearing whatever on the case before us. To the same effect as the foregoing with the same statutory limitations is the law of New Jersey. Town of Montclair v. Stanoyevich, 6 N.J. 479, 79 A.2d 288, 296.

There is not a case on record which...