State ex rel. T. J. H. v. Bills

• Decision Date: 14 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 58361,58361
• Citation: 504 S.W.2d 76
• Parties: STATE of Missouri at the relation of T.J.H., pro ami, Relator, v. The Honorable C. Patrick BILLS, Judge of the Magistrate Court of Clay County, Missouri, Respondent.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 76

504 S.W.2d 76

STATE of Missouri at the relation of T.J.H., pro ami, Relator,

v.

The Honorable C. Patrick BILLS, Judge of the Magistrate Court of Clay County, Missouri, Respondent.

No. 58361.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Jan. 14, 1974.

Richard J. Habiger, T. E. Lauer, Director, National Juvenile Law Center, Saint Louis, for relator.

William S. Brandom and Thomas E. Allen, Liberty, for respondent, who did not file brief.

SEILER, Judge.

This case involves an original proceeding in prohibition in which the juvenile relator sought and obtained the rule of the court of appeals, Kansas City district, to prevent the respondent magistrate from the exercise of an unlawful jurisdiction in criminal causes wherein the relator stood accused of possession and sale of marijuana. The petition alleged that the adjudication under Sec. 211.071, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S., whereby the juvenile court relinquished jurisdiction to the general law, and thus to the magistrate, did not comport with due process in particulars and that the statute itself was constitutionally infirm because lacking standards for that purpose.

The court of appeals, in an opinion by Shangler, J., entered judgment in prohibition against the respondent magistrate, discontinuing the prosecutions pending before him, and ordered him to transfer the custody of relator to the juvenile court which retained exclusive jurisdiction.

A dissenting opinion was filed by Pritchard, J., and the cause transferred here on his certification that the majority opinion was in conflict with this court's decision in In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433 (Mo. banc 1972), an earlier proceeding in this same case. The cause is thus before us as though here originally, Mo.Const.1945, Art. V, Sec. 10, V.A.M.S. We reach the same conclusion as did the court of appeals and largely for the same reasons, so that it is appropriate for us to borrow liberally from Judge Shangler's opinion, which we have done.

In re T.J.H., supra, determined that the order of the juvenile court relinquishing jurisdiction to deal with the child under the juvenile act was not a final appealable order and that the proper method of review was by a motion in the circuit court under rule 25.06, V.A.M.R., and that appellate review of a juvenile court dismissal is deferred until the primary issue of guilt has been determined by the criminal law.

Respondent asserted in his motion to dismiss that In re T.J.H. discountenanced any form of interlocutory review of the waiver order, whether by ordinary appellate process or by extraordinary writ. The dissenting opinion by Pritchard, J. agreed, stating, '. . . If there existed an insufficiency of evidence to support dismissal of the petitions and order for transfer for prosecution under the general law, that fact could not support issuance of the writ because of any excess of exercise of jurisdiction. Such action could only be an abuse of discretion correctible upon appeal. The majority of the court in In re T.J.H., 479 S.W.2d 433, 435 (Banc Mo.1972), held that remedy to be available, '(T)he exclusive method of reviewing the Juvenile Court's waiver order was a motion to dismiss the indictment in the District Court.' The remedy by appeal is present; it must be deemed to be an adequate remedy, a matter which precludes the issuance of a writ of prohibition . . .'

The issuance of a writ of prohibition is not an appellate process. A proceeding in prohibition is distinct and independent of the original action. It is substantially a proceeding between two judicial authorities, a superior and an inferior, and is a means by which the superior judicial authority exercises its superintendence over the inferior authority to keep it within the bounds of its lawful jurisdiction. State ex rel. City of Mansfield v. Crain, 301 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Mo.App.1957); State ex rel. Boll v. Weinstein, 365 Mo. 1179, 295 S.W.2d 62, 67 (banc 1956); High's Extraordinary Legal Remedies (3rd ed.), p. 715. This concept of ordered exercise of jurisdiction, so dominant in the common law, has been adopted into our constitution (Mo.Const.1945, Art. V, Sec. 4, V.A.M.S.) and laws (chapter 530, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.) as the primary means by which this court may exercise its superintendent control over the inferior courts. State ex rel. Boll v. Weinstein, supra, l.c. 67; 73 C.J.S. Prohibition § 2, pp. 10--14.

It is true that the writ of prohibition is a discretionary remedy and should be denied where an adequate remedy by appeal is available. State ex rel. Berbiglia Inc. v. Randall, 423 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. banc 1968); State ex rel. Boll v. Weinstein, supra. However, the right of appeal must be an adequate remedy before its availability will preclude resort to prohibition. State ex rel. Berbiglia Inc. v. Randall, supra; State ex rel. Atkins v. Missouri State Board of Accountancy, 351 S.W.2d 483 (Mo.App.1961). Where, as here, the court is wholly wanting in jurisdiction to proceed in the case, appeal is not an adequate remedy because any action by the court is without authority and causes unwarranted expense and delay to the parties involved.

The provisional rule in prohibition issued upon relator's petition, and presumptive proofs, that the order of the juvenile court relinquishing jurisdiction of relator to the general law under Sec. 211.071 was void on its face as a matter of law because it gave no statement of reasons for that determination, in violation of the due process requirements of the United States Supreme Court and this court. In consequence of the invalid waiver order, the petition further asserts, the juvenile relator remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court and is not amenable to the respondent magistrate's criminal process. Thus, relator asserts that respondent lacks jurisdiction in the most fundamental sense, that because relator remains within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the conduct alleged against him is not a matter of cognizance for the criminal law and therefore respondent magistrate has no power to adjudicate the felony complaints nor to bind relator to that determination. Secs. 211.031 and 211.061, RSMo 1969, V.A.M.S.; In re V_ _, 306 S.W.2d 461 (Mo. banc 1957); State ex rel. D_ _ V _ _ v. Cook, 495 S.W.2d 127 (Mo.App.1973). In re T.J.H. does not purpose that the remedy of prohibition be withheld from a petitioner upon such a showing nor that a court exercise any less assiduously its constitutional function of superintendence over courts subordinated to its jurisdiction.

There is no danger, as respondent fears, that our holding that a writ of prohibition is available to relator in this case will nullify our decision in In re T.J.H., supra, by making available through use of the extraordinary writs appeal which we there foreclosed. In the case at hand a writ of prohibition is available because relator has shown that the magistrate court is without jurisdiction to proceed further in the case. The juvenile court's order relinquishing jurisdiction did not set forth findings stating the basis of its decision and consequently was not sufficient to transfer jurisdiction to the magistrate court. The writ of prohibition goes to the sufficiency of the order to transfer, not to its correctness. The situation presented is unique and is unlikely to reoccur after our decision in this case. A juvenile court order transferring a juvenile for prosecution under the general law, which is supported by findings in compliance with our holding in this case, will pass jurisdiction of the cause to the adult court and will not be subject to attack on the present grounds by a writ of prohibition.

Relator contends the waiver order of the juvenile court is void and cannot confer jurisdiction on respondent because it contains no statement of reasons for the waiver, thereby denying the juvenile fundamental fairness and due process of law. The constitutional principle relator asserts is that announced by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1965) and reaffirmed in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1966). Kent arose from procedures applicable to the District of Columbia juvenile court. In its opinion, the court observed that the statutory scheme under consideration, much like our own, conferred rights and immunities upon a juvenile. Therefore, a statutory procedure whereby a court may determine to deny such benefits to a juvenile is critically important and is overlain with certain fundamental constitutional limitations, 383 U.S. l.c. 557, 86 S.Ct. l.c. 1055:

'. . . (W)e conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court's decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.' (emphasis supplied).

In re Gault, supra, made it emphatically clear that the procedures applicable to a waiver hearing are governed by constitutional principles, 387 U.S. l.c. 30, 87 S.Ct. l.c. 1445:

'In Kent v. United States, supra, we stated that the Juvenile Court Judge's exercise of the power of the state as parens patriae was not unlimited. We said that 'the admonition to function in a 'parental' relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness.' With respect to the waiver by the Juvenile Court to the adult court of jurisdiction over an offense committed by a youth, we said that 'there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony--without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons' . . . We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication...