State ex rel. v. City of Maplewood, 24041.

• Decision Date: 08 December 1936
• Docket Number: No. 24041.,24041.
• Citation: 99 S.W.2d 138
• Parties: STATE EX REL. JAMES A. HANLON, HERBERT G. BARTH AND GEORGE LOELKES, RELATORS, v. CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, JOHN D. FELS, MAYOR, AND OSCAR R. HEGSTROM, JOSEPH E. KAVANAUGH AND HARRY MCCLURE, COUNCILMEN AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF SAID CITY, RESPONDENTS.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

99 S.W.2d 138 STATE EX REL. JAMES A. HANLON, HERBERT G. BARTH AND GEORGE LOELKES, RELATORS,
v.
CITY OF MAPLEWOOD, JOHN D. FELS, MAYOR, AND OSCAR R. HEGSTROM, JOSEPH E. KAVANAUGH AND HARRY MCCLURE, COUNCILMEN AS MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL OF SAID CITY, RESPONDENTS. No. 24041. St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri. Opinion filed December 8, 1936. Motion for rehearing overruled December 23, 1936.

[99 S.W.2d 139]

Original proceeding in mandamus.

ALTERNATIVE WRIT QUASHED.

Alroy S. Phillips and Michael J. Mulvoy for appellants.

(1) The enforcement of the civil service provisions of Section 6919, Revised Statutes 1929, is mandatory on respondents. (a) Because of the use of the word "shall" in connection with their application. Secs. 6919, 6919 (f), 6920, R.S. 1929; 59 C.J. 1079-80; State ex rel. Stevens v. Wurdeman, 295 Mo. 566, 586. (b) Because the act gives both public and private rights to civil service. 59 C.J. 1075, 1076-77; Supervisors v. United States, 4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 435, 446-47; State ex rel. Carpenter v. St. Louis, 318 Mo. 870, 907, 2 S.W. (2d) 713, 727. (c) Because the civil service provisions go to matters of essence, or substance, and not of form. 59 C.J. 1074; State ex rel. Ellis v. Brown, 326 Mo. 627, 633, 33 S.W. (2d) 104, 107. (d) Because by the terms of the act the powers and duties of civil service commissioners devolve on the council if it fails to appoint such commissioners. Sec. 6919, R.S. 1929; U.S. Constitution, Article II, Sec. 1; Missouri Constitution, Art. V, Section 16; State ex rel. Crittenden v. Walker, 78 Mo. 139, 144; Chadwick v. Barnhardt, 11 Ore. 389, 4 Pac. 1180, 1181; Fitzpatrick v. McAllister, 121 Okla. 83, 248 Pac. 569, 572-73. (e) Because civil service is essential to the general purposes of the act to eliminate partisan politics and the spoils system, and a discretionary construction would defeat such purposes. 59 C.J. 958, 961-62, 966-68, 1072-73; Decker v. Diemer, 229 Mo. 296, 324; State v. Toombs, 324 Mo. 819, 837, 25 S.W. (2d) 101, 109; State ex rel. Ellis v. Brown, 326 Mo. 627, 633, 33 S.W. (2d) 104, 107; Secs. 6907, 6909-13, R.S. 1929; Barnes v. City of Kirksville, 266 Mo. 270, 282; Secs. 6918, 6920, 6919 and 6919 (a), R.S. 1929; 43 C.J. 633, note 35; State ex rel. Kansas City v. Coon, 316 Mo. 524, 547, 296 S.W. 90, 99, (2) The holding of civil service examinations is mandatory. (a) Because the act makes examinations mandatory by using the word "shall." Sec. 6919 (b) R.S. 1929; Authorities supra, under point 1 (a)-(c). (b) Because examinations are indispensable to the civil service system. 43 C.J. 633; People ex rel. Ryan v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y. State 656, 657; Gregory v. Kansas City, 244 Mo. 523, 545; State ex rel. Kansas City v. Coon, 316 Mo. 524, 547, 296 S.W. 90, 99; Authorities supra, under point 1 (e). (3) It is mandatory to hold regular civil service examinations on the first Tuesdays of April and October, and special examinations whenever the civil service list is exhausted. Sec. 6919 (b), R.S. 1929. (4) The position of member of the fire department is under civil service. (a) Because it is an occupation requiring special skill and fitness and is not specially named in Section 6913. Secs. 6913, 6919 (f), R.S. 1929. (b) Because the proviso as to existing employees refers to those at the time the city adopted the act and not to the present temporary incumbents. Secs. 6919 (f), 649, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. Otto v. Kansas City, 310 Mo. 542, 561-64. (c) Because the general power to appoint given the Council in Sections 6913 and 6915, R.S. 1929, is limited by the special and subsequent civil service provisions. Secs. 6913, 6915 and 6919, R.S. 1929; 59 C.J., 993-1001; State ex rel. Gorman v. Offutt, 223 Mo. App. 1172, 1175, 26 S.W. (2d) 830, 831; State ex rel. Greene County v. Gideon, 273 Mo. 79, 87; State ex rel. American Yeoman, 287 Mo. 169, 174. (5) Mandamus is a proper remedy to enforce mandatory civil service provisions. 5 R.C.L. 616; 38 C.J. 590-92; State ex rel. Hawes v. Mason, 153 Mo. 23, 55-56; Huey v. Waldrop, 141 Ala. 318, 37 So. 380, 381; People ex rel. Ryan v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y. State 656, 657. (6) In a proper case the issuance of a writ of mandamus is mandatory. (a) Much has been said of the writ being discretionary. 38 C.J., 541, 544; State ex rel. Laclede Bank v. Lewis, 76 Mo. 370, 379-82; State ex rel. Dawson v. Caster, 321 Mo. 863, 869, 12 S.W. (2d) 462, 465. (b) But the true rule is that mandamus is a civil remedy which must be afforded in a proper case. Sections 1532-41, R.S. 1929; State ex rel. City of Marshall v. Hackman, 274 Mo. 551, 558; State ex rel. Francis Realty Co. v. Homer, 150 Mo. App. 325, 329. (7) As to matters of public right there is no discretion as to the issuance of the writ of mandamus, and every citizen has the right to invoke the writ to enforce the law. 38 C.J. 548, 839-40; Tapping on Mandamus, 287 (337); State ex rel. Ins. Co. v. Doyle, 40 Wis. 220; State ex rel. Gay v. Reyburn, 158 Mo. App. 172, 176-78; State ex rel. Thomas v. Hoblitzelle, 85 Mo. 620, 625-28; State ex rel. Morris v. Hannibal etc. R.R., 86 Mo. 13, 16-17; State ex rel. Wear v. Francis, 95 Mo. 44, 48; State ex rel. Rutledge v. St. Louis School Board, 131 Mo. 505, 514; State ex rel. Kelleher v. St. Louis Public Schools, 134 Mo. 296, 304; State ex rel. Titus v. Wabash R.R. Co., 206 Mo. 251, 258; State ex rel. Halliburton v. Roach, 230 Mo. 408, 422. (8) Relators have a private and special right to invoke mandamus. (a) Because the right to seek and obtain employment is a personal right of the highest kind. 12 C.J. 926, 934, 945, 948-49, 951; 39 C.J. 55-56; Missouri Constitution, Article II, Section 4; State v. Loomis, 115 Mo. 307, 313-16, 319-20; State v. Miscicek, 225 Mo. 561, 568, 570; Ex parte Smith, 231 Mo. 111, 120; Hughes v. K.C. Motion Picture Operators, 282 Mo. 304, 322. (b) Because they cannot obtain the employment without passing examinations and the purpose of the writ is to compel the giving of examinations. People ex rel. Ryan v. Wheeler, 2 N.Y. State 656, 657.

Charles E. Altenbernd and Brackman & Versen for respondents.

(1) A writ of mandamus is a discretionary writ and not a writ of right. Lawrence v. Crossett, 14 S.W. (2d) 627; State ex rel. Dawson v. Cater, 12 S.W. (2d) 462; State ex rel. v. Baird, 278 S.W. 416, 217 Mo. App. 362; State ex rel. v. Doe Run Lead Co., 178 S.W. 298; State ex rel. Hyde v. Jackson Medical Society, 243 S.W. 341, 295 Mo. 144. (2) The use of the words "may" and "shall" in a statute is not controlling on question whether statute is mandatory or directory, since either word may be held mandatory or directory, and courts will consider language used, subject matter, importance of provisions and object intended to be secured, and ascertain legislative intent. State ex rel. v. City of St. Louis, 2 S.W. (2d) 713, l.c. 727, 318 Mo. 870; State ex inf. v. Talty, 166 Mo. 529, l.c. 559; Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 219; State v. Christianson, 229 N.W. 313. (3) The intention of an act will prevail over the literal sense of its terms. Sutherland on Statutory Construction, Sec. 219; State ex inf. v. Talty, supra. (4) Where a statute makes that legal and possible which otherwise there would be no authority to do the word "shall" is construed to be permissive. 58 C.J. 1086; Carpenter v. Newland, 156 N.Y.S. 438. (5) The words "shall have the powers and duties" are words which may be declared mandatory or permissive depending entirely upon the intent of the Legislature. 59 C.J. 1076-1078, inclusive. (6) It has been held that where the word "shall," respecting powers or duties, is used in a statute and no provision is made for failure to execute said powers and duties, the statute is merely directory. Hudgins v. Moorsville School District, 278 S.W. 769, 312 Mo. 1; State v. Bird, 244 S.W. 938, 295 Mo. 344; Bituminous Paving Co. v. McManus, 144 Mo. App. 593, l.c. 607; Ousley v. Powell, 12 S.W. (2d) 102. (7) In construction of statutes by the courts other sections of the act are reviewed and the language compared. Public Service Commission of Missouri v. City of Kirkwood, 4 S.W. (2d) 773. (8) The executive authority of the City of Maplewood and other cities similarly situated have long construed the statute to be merely permissive or directory. Such construction is entitled to special consideration though not binding on the courts. State ex rel. National Life Insurance Co. of...