State ex rel. Brotherhood of American Yeoman v. Reynolds

• Decision Date: 01 April 1921
• Citation: 229 S.W. 1057,287 Mo. 169
• Parties: THE STATE ex rel. BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICAN YEOMAN v. GEORGE D. REYNOLDS et al., Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

229 S.W. 1057

287 Mo. 169

THE STATE ex rel. BROTHERHOOD OF AMERICAN YEOMAN v. GEORGE D. REYNOLDS et al., Judges of St. Louis Court of Appeals

Supreme Court of Missouri

April 1, 1921

Record quashed.

John D Denison and Lehmann & Lehmann for relator.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals is in direct conflict with the controlling decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Hanford v. Massachusetts Mutual Benefit Association, 122 Mo. 50. Sec. 6940, R. S. 1909, is a remedial statute, and prior to the enactment thereof, the tender of premiums received was not a condition precedent to the defense of misrepresentation. Loehrner Mutual Ins. Co., 17 Mo. 247; Mers v. Franklin Ins. Co., 68 Mo. 127; Hanford v. Mass. Benefit Assn., 122 Mo. 50; Schuerman v Ins. Co., 165 Mo. 641; Aloe v. Mutual Life Assn., 147 Mo. 561; Aloe v. Ins. Co., 164 Mo 675; Kern v. Legion of Honor, 167 Mo. 471; Jenkins v. Ins. Co., 171 Mo. 375.

Joseph Reilly for respondents.

(1) The answer of the relator filed in the circuit court fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the plaintiff's cause of action; the certificate of relator fails to meet the requirements of the law. Brassfield v Maccabees, 92 Mo.App. 102; Brassfield v. Woodmen, 88 Mo.App. 208; Gruwell v. National Council, 126 Mo.App. 496; Barker v. Railroad, 91 Mo. 94; State ex rel. v. Vandiver, 213 Mo. 198; Odelheide v. Modern Brotherhood of America, 268 Mo. 347; Toomey v. Supreme Lodge, 147 Mo. 129; Aloe v. Life Assn., 164 Mo. 675; Christian v. Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 460; Richey v. Ins. Co., 104 Mo.App. 149; Sec. 6405, R. S. 1919; Laws 1911, p. 284. (2) The opinion of the Court of Appeals is not in conflict with the opinion of this court in the case of Hanford v. Insurance Co., 122 Mo. 50. (3) The opinion of the Court of Appeals follows the law of Missouri as it is now and always has been. Siple v. Robinson, 129 Mo. 208; Long v. Abstract Co., 252 Mo. 158; Drucker v. Insurance Co., 223 S.W. 990; Jarrett v. Norton, 44 Mo. 277; Estes v. Reynolds, 75 Mo. 563; Kern v. Insurance Co., 167 Mo. 487; Bishop on Contracts, secs. 679-683; 13 C. J. p. 620.

OPINION

In Banc.

Certiorari.

WALKER C. J.

Certiorari is here invoked to quash the record of the St. Louis Court of Appeals in Wilson v. Brotherhood of American Yeomen, 223 S.W. 992. In the original action the plaintiff had brought suit against the defendant, a fraternal beneficiary association, to recover for a disability, payment for same having been provided for in the policy or certificate of membership. At the trial defendant sought to interpose the defense of misrepresentation on the part of the plaintiff in securing the policy. Objections to this defense were sustained on the ground that the premiums received had not been returned or tendered to the plaintiff. There was a judgment for the plaintiff, which, upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, was affirmed. The character of the association is conceded. There is no dispute as to the facts. The only question involved is one of law, viz.: is it a prerequisite to the right of the defendant to interpose the defense of misrepresentation that premiums received by it be returned or tendered to the plaintiff? The Court of Appeals so held.

Governed by elementary rules of construction with the relevant statutes before us, this question need not be difficult of solution. Under a general law it is provided that "in suits brought upon life policies, heretofore or hereafter issued, no defense based upon misrepresentation in obtaining or securing the same shall be valid, unless the defendant shall, at or before the trial, deposit in court for the benefit of the plaintiff the premiums received on such policies." [Sec. 6940, R. S. 1909; Sec. 6145, R. S. 1919.]

The regulation of the business of life insurance is, under our statute, variously subdivided, in that each article authorizes the organization, defines the nature and prescribes the manner of conducting the business of a certain class or kind of companies distinct from the others, and subject, in many particulars, on account of their character, to the law of their creation alone. These separate statutes, however, do not prevent the application, in the absence of exceptions, of the above statute in regard to misrepresentations to any class of policies.

In ruling upon a statute (Sec. 6937, R. S. 1909; Sec. 6142, R. S. 1919) defining the materiality of misrepresentations as affecting the validity of policies we have held that this section applied to all companies not specifically excepted and to all policies written since its enactment. [Christian v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 143 Mo. 460, 45 S.W. 268.] By parity of reasoning and in harmony with the canons of construction, the rule thus announced may be held applicable to the statute above quoted. [Sec. 6145, supra.] This ruling would, without more, render fraternal beneficiary associations subject to that section, or, more specifically, make it a prerequisite for a defendant to tender or return the premiums received to the plaintiff before being allowed to interpose the defense of misrepresentations. However, we find, upon an examination of Article XV of the Insurance Law concerning fraternal beneficiary associations, the following section: "Except as herein provided, such societies shall be governed by this article and shall be exempt from all provisions of the insurance laws of this State, not only in governmental relations with the State, but for every other purpose, and no law hereafter enacted shall apply to them unless they be expressly designated therein." [Sec. 5, Laws 1911, p. 285; Sec. 6401, R. S. 1919.]

The language of this section is such that it would be difficult to employ words more comprehensive of the legislative purpose to exempt this class of associations from the provisions of the general insurance law, and to restrict their operations to the statute of their creation. In harmony, therefore, with the rules of construction which, in our opinion, are in accord with right reasoning, there is no escape from this conclusion. That the ruling of the Court of Appeals is in error in holding to the contrary there does not seem to be any question. But as we said, in effect, in State ex rel. Peters v. Reynolds, 214 S.W. 121, "this court is not to determine whether the St. Louis Court of Appeals erred in its application of rules of law to the facts in the record before it, but only whether in announcing the law of the case upon the facts as stated in its opinion it failed to follow the last previous rulings of this court."

This ruling, which is but a repetition of others to a like effect, was not intended and does not limit the right of Courts of Appeals to authoritatively construe any statute. Their right in this regard is final and unlimited except where their construction contravenes a decision of this court. Until such contravention is found to exist, our interference by certiorari is unauthorized, because our supervisory jurisdiction is founded solely upon the fact that a Court of Appeals has not followed our last previous ruling. [Art. VI, sec. 6, Mo. Const.; State ex rel. Gilman v. Robertson, 264 Mo. 661, 175 S.W. 610; State ex rel. Tiffany v. Ellison, 266 Mo. 604, 182 S.W. 996.]

Under the foregoing clearly defined...