State ex rel. Vana v. Maple Heights City Council

• Decision Date: 10 October 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-160,89-160
• Citation: 561 N.E.2d 909,54 Ohio St.3d 91
• Parties: , 63 Ed. Law Rep. 615 The STATE, ex rel. VANA et al., Appellees, v. MAPLE HEIGHTS CITY COUNCIL et al., Appellants.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 91

54 Ohio St.3d 91

561 N.E.2d 909, 63 Ed. Law Rep. 615

The STATE, ex rel. VANA et al., Appellees, v. MAPLE HEIGHTS CITY COUNCIL et al., Appellants.

No. 89-160.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 19, 1990.

Decided Oct. 10, 1990.

Syllabus by the Court

A provision in a city charter that prohibits an elected official from simultaneously holding other public office or other public employment does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions. (State, ex rel. Platz, v. Mucci [1967], 10 Ohio St.2d 60, 39 O.O.2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 238, approved and followed.)

Relator Joseph M. Yoder was elected to the City Council of Maple Heights ("the council") in November 1985. In the November 1987 election, respondent Gerard "Jerry" Zgrabik defeated Yoder and replaced Yoder on the council. Zgrabik was reelected in 1989, during the pendency of this litigation, and is currently in office. At all times relevant to this litigation, Zgrabik was employed by the Board of Education of the Maple Heights City School District as its supervisor of purchasing and food service.

Relators, Alice Vana and Joseph M. Yoder, brought this action in mandamus and quo warranto in the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County against the council and its members, including Zgrabik. Relators alleged that Zgrabik was unqualified to hold office by virtue of Section 4, Article III of the Charter of the City of Maple Heights, which states in pertinent part:

"No * * * elective officer [other than the mayor and president of council, who are permitted to serve on regional committees,] shall hold any other public office or public employment except that of Notary Public; a member of the State Militia; a member of the Military Reserve Corps of the United States not on active duty; or a teacher employed in any public school system outside of the City of Maple Heights, and no other elective officer shall be interested in the profits or emoluments of any contract, work or service for the Municipality."

Relators sought writs compelling Zgrabik to vacate his seat on the council, and reinstating Yoder. Respondents claimed, inter alia, that Section 4, Article III is unconstitutional. The court of appeals granted the writs.

This cause is now before the court upon an appeal as of right.

Friedman, Gilbert & Berezin and Alec Berezin, for appellees.

Joseph W. Diemert, Law Director, Reddy, Grau & Meek, Francis X. Reddy, Jr., and Paul A. Grau, for appellants Maple Heights City Council, et al.

Sindell, Rubenstein, Einbund, Pavlik, Novak & Celebrezze and Frank D. Celebrezze, for appellant Gerard Zgrabik.

MOYER, Chief Justice.

In the case before us, appellant Zgrabik concedes that Section 4, Article III of the Maple Heights Charter prohibits him from holding office. He contends, however, that this provision violates the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions because it lacks a rational basis and infringes on rights of political expression. Since Zgrabik challenges the charter classification under the Equal Protection Clauses, we must first determine the appropriate standard of review.

Legislation enacted by a municipality ordinarily is presumed to be valid and the enacting body is presumed to have acted constitutionally. Xenia v. Schmidt (1920), 101 Ohio St. 437, 130 N.E. 24. Under a traditional equal protection analysis, class distinctions in legislation are permissible if they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. Departures from traditional equal protection principles are permitted only when burdens upon suspect classifications or abridgments of fundamental rights are involved. Clements v. Fashing (1982), 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843-44, 73 L.Ed.2d 508.

Zgrabik does not contend, and we do not find, that he is a member of a suspect classification which, as such, would justify a departure from the traditional equal protection principles. Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has not recognized candidacy as a fundamental right invoking a "rigorous standard of review." Bullock v. Carter (1972), 405 U.S. 134, 142-143, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-856, 31 L.Ed.2d 92. For, as this court previously noted, " * * * there is no fundamental right to run for public office." State, ex rel. Keefe, v. Eyrich (1986), 22 Ohio St.3d 164, 165, 22 OBR 252, 489 N.E.2d 259, 260.

Thus, since neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right is involved, the charter restriction must be upheld " * * * if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. * * * In a rational-basis analysis, we must uphold the statute unless the classification is wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state's purpose." (Footnote deleted.) Menefee v. Queen City Metro (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 27, 29, 550 N.E.2d 181, 183.

Applying the rational relationship test to the Maple Heights City Charter, the charter is easily able to withstand the proper standard of review. Even though it is not possible to glean from the charter itself all the reasons it was adopted, it is apparent that by prohibiting elected officers from having an interest in "the profits or emoluments of any contract, work or service for the Municipality," the electors of the city were concerned with actual or potential conflicts of interest as well as the appearance of impropriety by city council members. The city may properly determine that it wants to avoid the appearance of impropriety caused by permitting its council members to receive a salary from two public payrolls. See Bennett v. Celebrezze (1986), 34 Ohio App.3d 260, 518 N.E.2d 25. It is also within the authority of the city to determine that it chooses not to have its council members receive salaries from two entities that are supported by public tax monies, State, ex rel. Platz, v. Mucci (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 60, 39 O.O.2d 48, 225 N.E.2d 238, and that permitting one person to hold two governmental positions would accumulate too much power in one person. By adopting this provision of the charter, the citizens of Maple Heights believed that this restriction was the best method to assist members of council in avoiding potential conflicts of interest. Bennett, supra.

The discussion above belies the suggestion that there was no reasonable basis for the city to have adopted the restrictive language of its charter. There may be other methods, perhaps even better methods, for the city to achieve its stated goals; however, "[u]nder traditional equal protection principles, a classification is not deficient simply because the State could have selected another means of achieving the desired ends. * * * Neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the First Amendment authorizes this Court to review in cases such as this the manner in which a State has decided to govern itself. * * * Our view of the wisdom of a state constitutional provision may not color our task of constitutional adjudication." Clements, supra, 457 U.S. at 969, 972-973, 102 S.Ct. at 2848-2849.

Appellant Zgrabik suggests that allowing a teacher employed outside the Maple Heights school district to serve on the council negates the Maple Heights Charter restrictions. We disagree. The city may reasonably find that the appearance of impropriety or danger of potential conflict is greater when the council member is on the payroll of both the city and the city school district. It is not unreasonable to believe that more opportunities for conflicts arise between the city and its school district than between the city and an outside school district. The provision in the Maple Heights Charter that prohibits an elected official from simultaneously holding other public office or other public employment does not violate the Equal Protection Clauses of the Ohio and United States Constitutions, and carving out an additional exception to the public employment prohibition does not serve to invalidate the charter restrictions. See Mucci and Bennett, supra.

Distinctions among various classifications for public officeholders are permissible if based upon a rational predicate. "The Equal Protection Clause allows the states considerable leeway to enact legislation that may appear to affect similarly situated people differently * * *. Classifications are set aside only if they are based solely on reasons totally unrelated to the pursuit of the State's goals and only if no grounds can be conceived to justify them." (Emphasis added.) Clements, supra, at 962-963, 102 S.Ct. at 2843.

The charter is not required to restrict all classes of impermissible public employment because it restricts some classes of impermissible public employment. It is only necessary that the classification be conspicuous, rest on reasonable grounds and affect all persons in the class equally. Xenia, supra. No ambiguity exists in the Maple Heights Charter: public officers and those in public employment, except teachers employed outside the school district, are prohibited from serving on the city council. All persons in each classification are treated equally: no public officers, no employees within the Maple Heights school district and no other public employees, except teachers employed outside the school district, may become council members.

In Clements, supra, a Texas state constitutional provision required certain officeholders to resign their posts prior to running for other elective office. In upholding the state's right to impose certain basic qualifications upon those seeking public office, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that it was not necessary for the state to treat all officeholders similarly: "That the State did not go further in applying the automatic resignation provision to those officeholders whose terms were not extended * * *, absent an invidious purpose, is not the sort of malfunctioning of the State's lawmaking process forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause * * *. A regulation is not devoid of a rational...