STATE EX REL. WA, 20010081.
Citation | 2002 UT 127,63 P.3d 607 |
Decision Date | 20 December 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 20010081.,20010081. |
Parties | STATE of Utah in the interest of W.A., a child under eighteen years of age. D.A., Appellant, v. State of Utah, Appellee. |
Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Carol L.C. Verdoia, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for petitioner.
Martha Pierce, Salt Lake City, Guardian Ad Litem.
Jim C. Shirley, Salt Lake City, for respondent.
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals
¶ 1 This appeal concerns the termination of parental rights. The State of Utah and W.A., acting through a guardian ad litem, filed a motion to terminate the rights of both of W.A.'s parents. A juvenile court granted this joint motion, reasoning that the parents were unfit and had abandoned W.A. On appeal, W.A.'s mother presents four main arguments. First, she claims that the juvenile court lacked personal jurisdiction over her under both Utah and federal law. Second, she argues that the juvenile court incorrectly admitted evidence of a conviction obtained by a nolo contendere plea. Third, she contends that the juvenile court incorrectly admitted evidence of a juvenile court adjudication. Finally, she asserts that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to amend the termination order. We affirm.
¶ 2 W.A., a juvenile, is the biological son of D.A. and E.A. In December 1993, the State of Oklahoma filed felony charges against both his mother, D.A., and his father, E.A. Thereafter, a Kentucky court granted temporary custody and guardianship of W.A. to his sister, D.D.
¶ 3 On July 2, 1996, D.A. pleaded nolo contendere to sexually abusing a minor child and was sentenced by an Oklahoma court to ten years in prison. That same day, E.A. pleaded nolo contendere to lewd molestation of a child and sexual abuse of a minor. As a result of this plea, an Oklahoma court sentenced E.A. to a term of twenty years for the first charge and a term of life imprisonment for the second.
¶ 4 Sometime between 1995 and 1998, D.D. moved to Utah with W.A. In February of 1998, D.D. contacted the Division of Child and Family Services ("the State") and informed it that she could no longer care for W.A. The State then filed a dependency petition regarding W.A. A juvenile court adjudicated W.A. a dependent child on February 25, 1998, and it awarded the State temporary custody and guardianship.
¶ 5 On October 8, 1998, the State and W.A.'s guardian ad litem filed a motion to terminate D.A.'s and E.A.'s parental rights. Both parents moved to dismiss, reasoning that Utah's long-arm statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (2002), did not afford the juvenile court personal jurisdiction over them, and even if it did, such an assertion of jurisdiction violated the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The juvenile court disagreed, concluding that the parents had sufficient contacts with the State of Utah to allow it to exercise personal jurisdiction under subsections 78-27-24(3) and (6) of the Utah Code. Alternatively, the court reasoned that it had personal jurisdiction over the parents under the status exception because a parental termination proceeding involves the "status" of a child vis-a-vis its parents.
¶ 6 Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both D.A. and E.A., concluding that they were unfit under sections 78-3a-407(3), -408(2)(e), and -408(4)(a) of the Utah Code, and had abandoned W.A. pursuant to sections 78-3a-407(1) and -408(1)(c) of the Utah Code.1 D.A. appealed,2 and the Utah Court of Appeals certified her appeal to us pursuant to rule 43 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. We have jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(b) (2002).
¶ 7 On appeal, D.A. argues that the juvenile court erred in four respects. First, she claims that the juvenile court incorrectly concluded that it had personal jurisdiction over her. Second, she argues that the juvenile court improperly admitted into evidence her Oklahoma conviction because it was obtained through a nolo contendere plea. Third, she contends that the juvenile court incorrectly admitted into evidence the February 25, 1998, adjudication order because it violated her constitutional right to confront her accusers. Finally, she asserts that the juvenile court erred in denying her motion to amend its termination order because (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's findings under sections 78-3a-407(1), -408(1)(c), and -408(2)(e) of the Utah Code, (2) the court improperly used her sexual abuse conviction to reach its conclusion under 78-3a-408(4)(a) of the Utah Code, and (3) subsection 78-3a-408(2)(e) of the Utah Code is unconstitutional.
¶ 8 When reviewing a termination petition, "we will disturb the findings and conclusions of the juvenile court only if the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings as made or the court has abused its discretion." In re S.R., 735 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1987). Whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant under Utah law and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution is a question of law, which we review for correctness, State Dep't of Soc. Serv. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989), though we will review the trial court's underlying findings of fact using the "clearly erroneous" standard, see Kamdar & Co. v. Laray Co., 815 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah Ct.App.1991). A similar standard of review applies in determining whether evidence is admissible under rules 410 and 803 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1378 (Utah 1995) ; see also State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, ¶ 29, 44 P.3d 805 ().
¶ 9 Where our review "requires us to examine statutory language, we look first to the plain meaning of the statute." Young v. Salt Lake City Sch. Dist., 2002 UT 64, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1230. Moreover, we "may affirm a judgment, order, or decree appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though that ground or theory was not identified by the lower court as the basis of its ruling." Boud v. SDNCO, Inc., 2002 UT 83, ¶ 10, 54 P.3d 1131 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
¶ 10 D.A. first challenges the juvenile court's conclusion that it had jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights. In particular, she asserts that Utah law did not afford the court personal jurisdiction over her as a nonresident defendant, and even if it did, the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution barred the court from exercising personal jurisdiction over her. We disagree.
¶ 13 We have even opined that whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant depends exclusively on the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment because "any set of circumstances that satisfies due process will also satisfy [Utah's] long-arm statute." SII MegaDiamond, Inc. v. Am. Superabrasives Corp., 969 P.2d 430, 433 (Utah 1998); see also Arguello v. Indus. Woodworking Mach. Co., 838 P.2d 1120, 1122 (Utah 1992) ( ); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) ( ).
¶ 14 We now clarify the law regarding this issue. The proper test to be applied in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists over a nonresident defendant involves two considerations. First, the court must assess whether Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant. This means that a court may rely on any Utah statute affording it personal jurisdiction, not just Utah's long-arm statute. Second, assuming Utah law confers personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant, the court must assess whether an assertion of jurisdiction comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment.
¶ 15 This test is merely a refinement of our previous tests governing the assertion of personal jurisdiction. It recognizes that the legislature may provide for the extension of personal jurisdiction over an individual in statutes other than the long-arm statute. There is nothing talismanic about the...
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