State ex rel. Walker v. Jenkins, 13430

• Decision Date: 19 March 1974
• Docket Number: No. 13430,13430
• Citation: 157 W.Va. 683,203 S.E.2d 353
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. Russell WALKER et al. v. Robert JENKINS, Director of Clinical Services at Spencer State Hospital, et al.

Page 353

203 S.E.2d 353

157 W.Va. 683

STATE ex rel. Russell WALKER et al. v. Robert JENKINS, Director of Clinical Services at Spencer State Hospital, et al.

No. 13430.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted Jan. 30, 1974.

Decided March 19, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Except to the extent that the State is entitled summarily to commit an individual charged with a crime for a reasonable time for the purpose of determining his capacity to stand trial, and to continue his commitment for a further reasonable period of time for the purpose of restoring his competency to stand trial, Chapter 62, Article 3, Section 9, as amended, and Chapter 27, Article 6, Section 8, as amended, of the Code of West Virginia, 1931, are unconstitutional.

2. A 'reasonable time' in the context of involuntary commitment to mental institutions is a period, rather short in duration, necessary to accomplish the legitimate state purpose.

3. Regardless of prior criminal violations, a person who has not been convicted of a crime cannot be involuntarily committed to a mental institution except for the purposes of determining competency to stand trial or to restore competency to stand trial, unless the State can demonstrate that he is either dangerous to himself or dangerous to others by evidence which is clear, cogent, and convincing.

4. Persons held for longer than a reasonable time pursuant to Chapter 62, Article 3, Section 9 of the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended, must either be committed under the civil commitment statutes or released.

5. Except for the purposes of determining competency to stand trial or detention for a reasonable time to restore competency to stand trial, a person may not be committed to a mental institution without full procedural due process protection, including adequate notice, a hearing before an impartial body, representation by counsel, the right to confront and call witnesses, and an adequate appeal.

Daniel F. Hedges, Charleston, for relators.

Chauncey H. Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen., Phillip D. Gaujot, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for respondents.

NEELY, Justice:

This original proceeding in Habeas corpus was brought by petitioner Russell Walker and eight other petitioners to challenge the constitutional validity of their confinement in various mental institutions of the State of West Virginia. Upon submission of the case, counsel for petitioners moved that the petitioner, Garland C. Hudson, be dismissed from the proceeding for the reason that he had already been discharged from his confinement and also moved that the petitioner, Paul Beegle, be severed from the instant proceeding and his case treated separately. These motions to dismiss or sever were granted. As the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings in Habeas corpus (Rule 81, R.C.P.), Rule 23, R.C.P., authorizing class actions, does not apply to proceedings in Habeas corpus. Accordingly, all of the petitioners, except Russell Walker, i.e., Willard Miller, Harry Skidmore, Lloyd Skidmore, Robert Bell, Lorene Holiday, Garland C. Hudson, and Arlie Deal are dismissed from this proceeding without prejudice, and Robert Jenkins is therefore dismissed as a party defendant.

Petitioner Russell Walker is currently confined in Weston State Hospital pursuant to an April 1973 court order by the Circuit Court of Lewis County which committed petitioner under Chapter 62, Article 3, Section 9 of the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended, which relates to the commitment and discharge of mentally ill or mentally defective persons charged with a crime. The petitioner is a seriously retarded individual who was charged with the crime of breaking and entering, but the State does not contradict that he entered a residence from which his family had recently moved under the misapprehension that he was entering his own house.

The court's determination to commit the petitioner was made exclusively on the basis of two reports by physicians. The petitioner is thirty-one years old and had lived with his family all of his life. Two members of his family are psychiatric aides at Weston State Hospital and are, therefore, qualified to take care of the petitioner; however, in spite of the innocuous nature of the alleged crime, and the ideal family situation to which petitioner may return, the petitioner remains committed to the Weston State Hospital. Petitioner alleges that his commitment pursuant to Code, 62--3--9, as amended, is in effect a lifetime commitment, as that section authorizes discharge only upon recovery, and the petitioner is so severely retarded that he will never recover. The petitioner squarely challenges the constitutional validity of Chapter 62, Article 3, Section 9, as amended, and Chapter 27, Article 6, Section 8, as amended, of the Code of West Virginia, 1931. Code, 62--3--9, as amended, provides as follows:

'Whenever any person charged with or convicted of a crime, or acquitted thereof because of his mental condition, is thought to be mentally ill or mentally defective, the judge of the court of record in which he was so charged, convicted, or acquitted, may on his own motion inquire into the mental condition of such person. The judge of such court or the judge of any other court of record of the county in which such person may be found, shall make such inquiry upon the application of an inferior court not of record in which such person was so charged, convicted, or acquitted, or upon the application of the official in charge of any penitentiary, prison, jail or lockup in which such person may be confined. The judge shall appoint two physicians to examine such person and report in writing on his mental condition. If on the basis of the reports the judge is satisfied that such person is mentally ill or mentally defective, he may order that such person be committed to a State institution. The sheriff or other officer in charge of such person shall immediately deliver him to the superintendent of the institution to which he was committed, and it shall be the duty of the superintendent to admit and care for him. When any person committed as provided in this section has been found by the superintendent not to be mentally ill or mentally defective, or whenever such person has recovered, the superintendent shall give notice thereof to the judge of the court by whose order he was committed and shall deliver him to the proper officer upon the order of the court. If a person committed as provided in this section is awaiting indictment or trial, or has been arraigned or is being tried, proceedings against him shall be stayed until his recovery. Upon his recovery the court shall order that he be returned for the disposition of the charges against him. Thereupon the court shall proceed to dispose of the case as if there had been no commitment. If the person committed is a prisoner serving sentence, the time during which he is in the institution shall be computed as part of the time for which he was sentenced.'

Code, 27--6--8, as amended, provides as follows:

'When any person charged with crime confined in a state hospital...