Beverly, In re

• Citation: 97 A.L.R.3d 767,342 So.2d 481
• Decision Date: 27 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 47747,47747
• Parties: In re Preer BEVERLY.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 481

342 So.2d 481

97 A.L.R.3d 767

In re Preer BEVERLY.

No. 47747.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Jan. 27, 1977.

Phillip A. Hubbart, Public Defender, and Paul Morris, Asst. Public Defender, for Preer Beverly.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Margarita Esquiroz, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State of Florida.

ADKINS, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from the Circuit Court of Dade County which held that Section 394.467, Florida Statutes (1973), was constitutional. We have jurisdiction. Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

The pertinent portions of the statute under attack read as follows:

'394.467 Involuntary hospitalization

(1) Criteria.--A person may be involuntarily hospitalized if he is mentally ill and because of his illness is:

(a) Likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or

(b) In need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf.

(2) Admission to a treatment facility.--A patient may be hospitalized in a treatment facility, after notice and hearing, upon recommendation of the administrator of a receiving facility where the patient has been admitted for examination or evaluation. When a patient is not an inpatient in a receiving facility, the administrator of a designated receiving facility may make a recommendation for involuntary hospitalization of a patient who has been given an examination, evaluation, or treatment by staff of the receiving facility or a private physician. The hearing may be waived in writing by the patient. The recommendation must be supported by the opinions of two physicians who have personally examined the patient within the preceding five days that the criteria for involuntary hospitalization are met. . . .'

On June 20, 1975, the designee of the Administrator of the Jackson Memorial Hospital Institution filed a petition for the involuntary hospitalization of respondent. A hearing on the involuntary hospitalization petition was held on June 26, 1975, and resulted in an order requiring respondent to be hospitalized involuntarily. The judge specifically upheld the constitutionality of Section 394.467(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1973).

Appellant first says that the statute is so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must guess at its meaning, and therefore violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9, Florida Constitution. Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1925); State v. Barquet, 262 So.2d 431 (Fla.1972). Specifically, appellant says that under the statute a person who is 'mentally ill' may be involuntarily hospitalized, and that this term is unconstitutionally vague. Appellant argues that the vagueness impediment is not overcome by the definition in Section 394.455(3), Florida Statutes (1973), which reads:

"Mentally ill' means having a mental, emotional, or behavioral disorder which substantially impairs the person's mental health.'

Appellant also contends that the statute is overbroad in that it authorizes the involuntary hospitalization of the non-dangerous mentally ill person with no need of a showing that the individual cannot survive safely in freedom. Appellant says that the statute does not require the trial court to explore the possible alternatives to involuntary commitment. In other words, the court may require the involuntary hospitalization without satisfying itself that nothing less onerous than commitment would best serve the patient. This is known as the 'least restrictive alternative' approach. Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 264, 364 F.2d 657 (1966); Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 35, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (1969).

Appellant relies upon Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, 234 Pa.Super. 155, 339 A.2d 764 (1975), which held that the language of the Pennsylvania involuntary hospitalization statute was unconstitutionally vague, in that it failed to give fair warning of the conduct proscribed by law and there was an absence of standard restricting the discretion of governmental authorities or courts in enforcing the law.

The Pennsylvania statute allowed a petition for commitment to be filed when 'a person is believed to be mentally disabled and in need of care or treatment of such mental disability.' The Pennsylvania statute defined 'mentally disabled' as:

'(A)ny mental illness, mental impairment, mental retardation, or mental deficiency, which so lessens the capacity of a person to use his customary self-control, Judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations as to make it necessary or advisable for him to be under care as provided in the act.' 339 A.2d 764 at 775.

In holding that the definition was unconstitutionally vague, the Court said:

'Mental illness has been attached as a criterion for commitment because it is usually defined in terms of deviation from the 'norm' and thus is dependent upon what the examining psychiatrist believes the 'norm' to be. If, however, the term 'mental illness' is given sufficient legal meaning so as not to be unconstitutionally vague, . . . the difference of opinion among psychiatrists as to what constitutes the 'norm' becomes much less important. Thus, if the statute has only a vague standard, the trier of fact must rely almost totally on the expert opinions. . . .

'The commitment procedure . . . has asked too much of psychiatrists. The psychiatrist is not merely asked to report, his diagnosis and evaluation to the court, he is asked to draw legal conclusions--is the subject mentally ill and does he need confinement? These conclusions have severe legal consequences and should be answered by the judicial system. That can be accomplished by requiring a strict burden of proof, and by defining 'mental illness' in a manner which prevents the court from exercising unfettered discretion (i.e., blindly relying on the conclusion drawn by the examining psychiatrist) and which indicates the type of conduct for which commitment is an appropriate sanction. If the standards are sufficiently precise, confinement will be less dependent upon the examining psychiatrist's personal conception of normal social behavior.

'The narrow issue presented by appellant's vagueness argument, therefore, is whether the requirement that the subject's mental illness render him 'in need of care' is sufficient to withstand a constitutional attack of impermissible vagueness. Clearly it is not. 'In need of care' is so broad as to be virtually meaningless. Furthermore, once a finding of mental illness is made, it would be impossible not to find that the individual is in need of care.' 339 A.2d 764 at 777--78.

It is elementary that statutes may properly authorize the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill when the term 'mentally ill' is given a satisfactory Legal meaning. Section 394.467(1), Florida Statutes, quoted above, imparts a sufficient Legal meaning to the term 'mental illness' by setting criteria. Under the statute the pertinent inquiry is whether the person is mentally ill and Because of his illness is (1) likely to injure himself or others if allowed to remain at liberty, or (2) is in need of care or treatment and lacks sufficient capacity to make a reasonable application on his own behalf. These statutory standards are more precise than those discussed in Commonwealth ex rel. Finken v. Roop, supra, as the Florida statutory language is adequate to warn that a person is subject to involuntary hospitalization only if he or she is likely to harm himself or others, or if he or she requires treatment and does not have the capacity to decide for himself. The appellant's vagueness challenge to the statute is without merit.

The statutory authority for the judge to involuntarily hospitalize if the person lacks 'sufficient capacity to make a responsible application on his own behalf' is grounded on the Parens patriae power which is vested in the states. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1971). The Parens patriae doctrine is used as a basis for state laws which protect the interests of minors, establish guardianships and provide for the involuntary commitment of the mentally ill. See In re W., 29 Cal.App.3d 623, 105 Cal.Rptr. 736 (1972). Recent decisions have recognized the propriety of using the Parens patriae power for involuntary commitment to include those who are incapable of making their own treatment decisions. As stated in Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F.Supp. 378 (M.D.Ala.1974).

'Commitment on account of dangerousness to others serves the police power, while commitment for dangerousness to self partakes of the Parens patriae notion that the state is the ultimate guardian of those of its citizens who are incapable of caring for their own interests. (Citations omitted). Valid exercise of the Parens patriae power presumes an incapability to manage one's affairs that approximates, if it is not identical with, legal incompetence to act. Consequently, in order to deprive a person alleged to be a danger to himself alone of the right to choose between treatment and liberty, the state must first demonstrate that, because of his mental illness, he lacks the capacity to weigh for himself the risks of freedom and the benefits of hospitalization.

'A finding of dangerousness indicates the likelihood that the person to be committed will inflict serious harm on himself or on others. In the case of dangerousness to others, this threat of harm comprehends the positive infliction of injury--ordinarily physical injury, but possibly emotional injury as well. In the case of dangerousness to self, both the threat of physical injury and discernible physical neglect may warrant a finding of dangerousness. Although he does not threaten actual violence to himself, a person may be properly commitable under the dangerousness standard if it can be shown that he is mentally ill, that his mental...