State ex rel. Warrington v. Community School Dist. of St. Ansgar, 48988

• Decision Date: 26 July 1956
• Docket Number: No. 48988,48988
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, ex rel. Fred J. WARRINGTON, Lewis Reis, Glen Hernan, Lawrence Ask, Lloyd Feldt, Irvin Wilde, Elmer Wilde, Rudolph Tribbensee, Norval C. Jensen, William H. Hanson, Harry W. Hanson, George Lambaere, Charles Church, Ray Weber, Pauline Theobald, Ambrose Theobald, William Milton, V. M. Hofmeister, Ervin Schulze, Dwight Seaton, Ray Kramer, Wilmer Landherr, C. C. Hansen, Clarence M. Hemann, John N. Hemann, Raymond Mauer, F. J. Zemanek, Appellants, v. COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF STANSGAR, Iowa: Roland Eske, Ross Decker, Glen Crowel, Donald Whitcomb, Luther Tollefson, Fern Hockens, L. P. Ortale, Lawrence Dieterich, Robert Van Nice, L. R. Falk, Darwin Rhoades, Arthur C. Hollatz, Jessie M. Parker and their successors in office, Appellees.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 86

78 N.W.2d 86

247 Iowa 1167

STATE of Iowa, ex rel. Fred J. WARRINGTON, Lewis Reis, Glen Hernan, Lawrence Ask, Lloyd Feldt, Irvin Wilde, Elmer Wilde, Rudolph Tribbensee, Norval C. Jensen, William H. Hanson, Harry W. Hanson, George Lambaere, Charles Church, Ray Weber, Pauline Theobald, Ambrose Theobald, William Milton, V. M. Hofmeister, Ervin Schulze, Dwight Seaton, Ray Kramer, Wilmer Landherr, C. C. Hansen, Clarence M. Hemann, John N. Hemann, Raymond Mauer, F. J. Zemanek, Appellants, v. COMMUNITY SCHOOL DISTRICT OF STANSGAR, Iowa: Roland Eske, Ross Decker, Glen Crowel, Donald Whitcomb, Luther Tollefson, Fern Hockens, L. P. Ortale, Lawrence Dieterich, Robert Van Nice, L. R. Falk, Darwin Rhoades, Arthur C. Hollatz, Jessie M. Parker and their successors in office, Appellees.

No. 48988.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 26, 1956.

Supplemental Opinion Aug. 30, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1956.

Elwood, Anderson & Elwood, Cresco, and W. H. Salisbury, Osage, for appellants.

Zastrow, Noah & Smith, Charles City, and L. E. Plummer, Northwood, for appellees.

LARSON, Justice.

A quo warranto action was commenced to test the validity of the Community School District of St. Ansgar, Iowa. The trial court found the reorganization valid, and plaintiffs appeal. The record discloses the following facts. Petitions were filed in the Mitchell County school superintendent's office asking the formation of the St. Ansgar School District; notices were published and a hearing on the proposal was held on the 2nd day of February, 1954. At the time of this hearing the president of the board, Mr. Eske, who resided in the area proposed for incorporation, presided. Boundary changes having been made, an adjourned hearing was set and notices given thereof. At that meeting, which Mr. Eske did not attend, final boundaries were determined. Notice of the election was then published and the election conducted. Fourteen of the eighteen districts, or portions of districts involved, voted favorably and the new district was organized.

Embodied in the proposed plan was the town of St. Ansgar which has over two hundred in population. Plaintiffs contend defendants wrongfully required all voters to come to St. Ansgar to cast their votes; that the election notice was fatally defective; that a partial judge alone was improperly allowed to aid an aged lady in voting; that plaintiffs were denied unjustly the right to have challengers at the polls; and that one polling place was improperly changed on the day of election. Much reliance for error is predicated upon the contention that, although separate ballot boxes were furnished for each of the districts, the officers failed to place the ballot boxes in each of the existing school districts as required by section 275.20, Code of Iowa 1954, I.C.A.

Perhaps plaintiffs' principal complaint is that after the election the Otranto Consolidated District, which was one of the four districts that rejected the proposition, separated a small territory lying north of it from the principal part of the territory to the south. In other words, the territories involved no longer had a common boundary or adjoined at any point, and to pass from one part to the other one must cross over another existing school district, i. e., the Otranto Consolidated District.

Although plaintiffs also complain of the trial court's action in striking Division II of their petition asking for a determination of the constitutionality of chapter 275 of the 1954 Code of Iowa, I.C.A., the nub of this case is found in these two difficult but obvious questions of law, i. e. (1) Is the requirement found in section 275.20 that '* * * the voters residing upon the territory outside the limits of such school corporation [within a town] shall vote separately in each existing school district affected or portion thereof upon the proposition to create such new corporation * * *', a mandatory requirement and essential to the formation of the valid new district? (2) Must the territory of a newly formed school district be contiguous, or does a separation due to a rejection by a connecting district or portion thereof vitally affect its establishment?

I. It may be well to set out here the pertinent portions of section 275.20, Code of Iowa 1954, I.C.A., which provides:

'When it is proposed to include in such district a school corporation containing a city, town, or village with a population of two hundred or more inhabitants, the voters residing upon the territory outside the limits of such school corporation shall vote separately in each existing school district affected or portion thereof upon the proposition to create such new corporation. School districts affected or portion thereof shall be defined to mean that area to be included in the plan of the proposed new school district. Where there are more than three districts or poritions of districts voting on a reorganization program, the proposition must carry by a majority vote in seventy-five percent of the districts involved; provided, however, that those districts voting against the proposition shall not be included in the newly formed district. * * *' (Emphasis supplied.)

Standing alone, the provisions of this section as to the place of voting are perfectly clear. 'In each existing school district affected' seems as clear an expression as is possible under the English language as to where something must be done. We have often held that words used by the legislature are unambiguous when the meaning of the words can be found in the section itself, and although it would here seem unnecessary to seek further proof of their intendment and meaning, yet a careful research of the legislative history and purpose strengthens its clear mandatory provision. Grimes v. Northwestern Legion of Honor, 97 Iowa 315, 324, 64 N.W. 806, 66 N.W. 183, and cases cited therein; Hindman v. Reaser, 246 Iowa 1375, 72 N.W.2d 559, 562; 2 Horack's Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction 339 (3rd ed. 1943). Also see Opinions of Attorney General of March 18, 1955. In Jones v. Thompson, 240 Iowa 1024, 1036, 38 N.W.2d 672, 678, we said:

'The only legitimate purpose of statutory construction and interpretation is to ascertain the legislative intent. And when the language of the statute is so clear, certain, and free from ambiguity and obscurity that its meaning is evident from a mere reading, then the canons of statutory construction are unnecessary, because there is no need of construction * * *. We need not search beyond the wording of the statute.' (Citing cases.)

From the legislative journals we find that the 55th General Assembly (1953) gave special attention to the language used in section 275.20. See Acts of the 55th G. A., chapter 117, section 20, House File 229, House Journal 807, and Senate Journal 949-950, 55th G. A. (1953). 'In each existing school district affected or portion thereof' was an amendment to House File 229 by the House Committee, adopted by the House by a large vote, and an attempt to strike it in the Senate failed by a narrow margin, thus clearly indicating that the legislature gave special attention to this language which clearly modified the provisions for separate voting in old sections 276.13-276.16, Code of 1950, I.C.A., from which it was originally taken.

See discussion in 39 Iowa Law Review 570, at 594. The author of this well-written article on Reorganization of Iowa School Districts concludes at page 596:

'Section 275.20 quite clearly requires a separate vote in each district or portion thereof affected if there is included in the proposed district a 'school corporation containing a city, town or village with a population of two hundred or more inhabitants.''

Defendants argue that section 275.22 must be read in conjunction with section 275.20 and if plaintiffs' contention is correct then section 275.22 becomes meaningless. This conclusion is not sound. As was pointed out in 39 Iowa L.Rev., page 594, section 275.21 provides for a situation where separate voting only is required. In such instance section 275.22 is applicable and provides: 'The judges of election shall provide separate ballot boxes in which shall be deposited the votes cast by the qualified electors from their respective territories.' (Emphasis supplied.) They are not meant to cover identical situations. In such instances as do not fall squarely under the provisions of section 275.20 previously related, central voting in separate ballot boxes is permitted. Such pronouncements are found in prior legislation which we have previously considered. Smaha v. Simmons, 245 Iowa 163, 60 N.W.2d 100; State ex rel. Little v. Owens, 244 Iowa 1356, 60 N.W.2d 521. It must be conceded the provisions of these two sections are not in conflict, for each requires separate ballot boxes for existing districts. Each may exist and perform a function, depending upon the composition of the proposed reorganization. 3 Drake L.Rev. 57, 67.

We do not know why the legislature decided to require separate voting in the districts in one case and not in another, but it is reason enough if the legislature in its wisdom decided in the situation set forth in section 275.20 that the voting places would be placed as close to the electors as possible. In general elections the places of voting are placed as close to the people as possible in wards and precincts, and it seems here some such idea was considered and expressed in this legislation. It is a sad fact that few people will travel far or exert a proper effort to exercise their rights of franchise even though it may concern them vitally. Thus it is seen the legislature had a definite purpose in the specific provision that the voting be held in each school district. Here the record discloses that it was about 12 miles from the farthest point in the proposed district to the voting places in St. Ansgar. Thus in the matter before us appears a substantial deviation from the statutory requirement, 'in each...