Kruck v. Needles

• Decision Date: 14 July 1966
• Docket Number: No. 52268,52268
• Citation: 144 N.W.2d 296,259 Iowa 470
• Parties: Warren J. KRUCK, Appellee, v. Gene L. NEEDLES, Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 296

144 N.W.2d 296

259 Iowa 470

Warren J. KRUCK, Appellee, v. Gene L. NEEDLES, Commissioner of Public Safety, Appellant.

No. 52268.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 14, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 20, 1966.

Lawrence F. Scalise, Atty. Gen., Timothy McCarthy, Solicitor Gen., and Michael McCauley, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

Mahoney, Jordan & Smith, Boone, for appellee.

GARFIELD, Chief Justice.

The question presented in this declaratory judgment action is whether section 321.442, Code, 1962, prohibits use of automobile tires containing metal inserts, referred to as safety spike winter tires. The trial court held it does not. We hold it does.

The statute provides: 'No tire on a vehicle moved on a highway shall have on its periphery any block, stud, flange, cleat, or spike or any other protuberances of any material other than rubber which projects beyond the tread of the traction surface of the tire, except that it shall be permissible to use farm machinery with tires having protuberances which will not injure the highway, and except also that it shall be permissible to use tire chains of reasonable proportions upon any vehicle when required for safety because of snow, ice, or other conditions tending to cause a vehicle to skid.'

Plaintiff's petition in equity alleges that on December 14, 1965, he owned an automobile on which he had placed 'safety spike winter tires'; defendant commissioner caused to be served upon him a summons alleging the tires were in violation of section 321.442 and ordering their removal; the tires do not constitute the violation alleged; if the statute is construed to apply to the tires in question it is unconstitutional as an unreasonable interference with interstate commerce. Plaintiff asked a declaratory decree adjudging the statute was not violated and enjoining defendant and his agents from issuing further summonses.

Defendant's answer admits plaintiff's use of the 'safety spike winter tires' and service of the summons upon him as alleged but denies the rest of the petition.

Following trial to the court at which plaintiff and a representative of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. were the only witnesses, the court held section 321.442 is constitutional, does not prohibit use of plaintiff's studded tires and defendant commissioner and his agents should be enjoined from issuing summons to plaintiff because of his use of the tires. Defendant has appealed.

I. Our review is de novo. Code section 624.4; Rules of Civil Procedure 267, 334. Especially when considering the credibility of witnesses we give weight to the fact findings of the trial court but are not bound by them. Authorities need not be cited for this. Rule 344(f)7, R.C.P.

The manner in which we review the evidence here is less important than in many appeals since there is no real or substantial conflict in it upon any vital question.

II. Plaintiff is a state senator who installed on the rear wheels of his passenger car Goodyear snow tires with about 100 so-called safety spikes in each tire. Similar tires for front wheels sometimes have only 80 to 90 spikes per tire. The tires are usually made with holes in which the metal spikes are inserted pneumatically. The spikes are made by another manufacturer--located in plaintiff's senatorial district. Purpose of the spikes is to decrease skidding and improve traction on snow-packed and icy streets and highways.

The spikes protrude from the tread of the tire about 1/16 inch and, according to plaintiff's witness Miller, should maintain this protrusion throughout its useful life under normal driving conditions. When the spikes come in contact with the paved surface 30 to 40 percent of the protrusion retracts into the tire--the remaining 60 to 70 percent of what protrudes from the tread continues to do so. About 98 percent of the portion of the tire that comes in contact with the road surface is rubber, natural and synthetic, and the remaining two percent of such portion consists of the spikes.

Mr. Miller testified the spiked tires require only half the stopping distance of regular tires and traction is improved 155 percent on ice; the spikes 'scratch into the ice.'

This witness also said the studs will come out as they get older before the end of the life of the tread of the tire and that under extreme conditions the studs may be ejected in only several hundred miles of driving. After the studs are placed in a tire the owner does not purposely remove them. A studded (or spiked) tire costs $8 to $10 more than the same tire without studs.

There is substantial evidence that use of studded tires causes significant wear and a certain amount of damage to highway surfaces, particularly at areas of frequent use of brakes. A detailed report of extensive tests by a state research bureau in Maryland considered it undesirable to give unlimited authority to use these tires until general observations have been made over a period of time.

A comparable report from our neighboring state of Illinois (introduced in evidence by plaintiff) said the wide use of these tires can be expected to cause abrasion on pavement surfaces, measurements indicated a concrete surface was abraded to a depth of almost 1/16 inch in 25 rapid starts followed by 25 emergency stops And that on dry pavements vehicles using studded tires require greater stopping distances than vehicles equipped with regular tires.

A similar report from Oregon, also offered by plaintiff, concluded that use of studded tires roughened the pavement surface fairly rapidly and some abraded areas could have developed into chuck holes if the tests were continued.

Results of some other tests differ from those above referred to. Tests in Minnesota showed little effect on concrete paving from normal starts and stops of vehicles using studded tires. What were referred to as panic stops left marks and scratches on the surface of concrete and caused significant damage to bituminous pavement. Similar damage to bituminous pavement was caused by rapid starts on studded tires. This report also showed evidence of loss of studs from tires subjected to abnormal abuse and wear but the studs were retained after 5000 miles of normal travel.

A report from New York following less extensive tests found studded tires did not cause significant pavement damage although the surface was scratched.

Much is claimed for a report from Finland, where studded tires have been used somewhat longer than here, which states the studs had not damaged paved roads there.

In general, the reports of tests received in evidence showed substantial decrease in required stopping distance and improvement in traction from use of studded tires on packed snow and ice but considerably less than testified to supra by Mr. Miller.

III. The trial court found as facts that when a studded tire is used within normal limits, not skidding or spinning, the studs will not protrude beyond the rubber surface but recede into the tire and are not stationary; the intent of the legislature in enacting section 321.442 was to prohibit use of a tire with a fixed, rigid protrusion; use of studded tires will wear the highway surface faster than others, but their safety features are more beneficial than wear on the highways is detrimental.

As conclusions of law the court held that where language of a statute is of doubtful meaning or adherence of its strict letter would lead to injustice or absurdity it is the court's duty to ascertain the statute's true meaning; considering conditions existing when the law was adopted and the necessity therefor, effect should be given its spirit rather than its letter; the statute is constitutional but if the studded tire is prohibited thereby it would be unconstitutional under Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 79 S.Ct. 962, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003.

We must conclude the finding that the studs do not protrude beyond the rubber tread but recede into the tire when normally used lacks substantial support in the evidence and is contrary thereto. As before indicated, it appears the spikes protrude from the tread about 1/16 inch, only 30 to 40 percent of the protrusion recedes into the tire when the spikes come in contact with the paved surface and the remaining 60 to 70 percent stays protruded.

It is obvious plaintiff is in a difficult position in contending these spikes do not project 'beyond the tread of the traction surface of the tire' while proclaiming the benefits from their use in stopping and traction on snow-covered and icy surfaces.

It is implicit in the trial court's conclusions of law that he regarded the language of section 321.442 as ambiguous and of doubtful meaning, thus justifying resort to what were thought to be proper rules of construction in order to determine legislative intent. The three Iowa precedents the court relied on and plaintiff cites involve statutory language found to be ambiguous and of doubtful meaning: Case v. Olson, 234 Iowa 869, 14 N.W.2d 717; Smith v. Sioux City Stock Yards Co., 219 Iowa 1142, 260 N.W. 531; Glass v. City of Cedar Rapids, 68 Iowa 207, 26 N.W. 75.

Nothing in the findings, conclusions or decree indicates what injustice or absurdity would result from adherence to what the court refers to as the strict letter of the statute.

IV. We cannot agree the language of section 321.442 is here ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The language applicable to the present controversy is, 'No tire * * * shall have on its periphery any * * * protuberances * * * other than rubber which projects beyond the tread of the traction surface of the tire, except' for permissible use on farm machinery of tires having protuberances which will not injure the highway and use of tire chains when required for safety. We think too the evidence clearly shows a violation under this language.

The statute seems to be as clear as words can make it. It should be held to mean what it says, not something it does not say--for example, that the...