State ex rel. Wilkerson v. Murray

• Decision Date: 08 February 1971
• Docket Number: No. 1,No. 55340,55340,1
• Citation: 471 S.W.2d 460
• Parties: STATE ex rel. John H. WILKERSON and Barbara Wilkerson, his wife, Relators-Appellants, v. David E. MURRAY, Director of Public Works, and St. Louis County, Missouri, aBody Corporate and Politic, Respondents
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 460

471 S.W.2d 460

STATE ex rel. John H. WILKERSON and Barbara Wilkerson, his wife, Relators-Appellants, v. David E. MURRAY, Director of Public Works, and St. Louis

County, Missouri, aBody Corporate and Politic, Respondents.

No. 55340.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

Feb. 8, 1971.

As Modified on Court's Own Motion March 8, 1971.

Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc or for Rehearing Denied

March 8, 1971.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 12, 1971. See 92 S.Ct. 87.

Shaw, Hanks & Bornschein, Clayton, for relators-appellants.

Joseph B. Moore, St. Louis County Counselor, Thomas W. Wehrle, Deputy County Counselor, Morton I. Golder, Associate County Counselor, Clayton, for respondents.

HOLMAN, Judge.

Relators, John H. and Barbara Wilkerson, husband and wife, are the owners of a lot located in R--5 Residence Zoning District of St. Louis County. They were denied a permit to locate and occupy a house trailer on their lot to be used as a residence. In this mandamus action they attack the constitutionality of the ordinance precluding such use of their property. In the trial court the alternative writ of mandamus was quashed and peremptory writ denied. Relators have appealed from the judgment entered. We have appellate jurisdiction because, among other grounds, St. Louis County is a party.

The stipulated facts include the following: 'The property owned by Relators as described in Relators' second amended petition is located within the 'R--5' Residence District. A single family dwelling is a permitted use in said district when situated on tracts of land providing at least 6,000 sq. ft. lot area for each dwelling unit. The property owned by Relators as described in Relators' second amended petition is 100 193 ft., containing 19,300 sq. ft. in area. Said property is located in the unincorporated area of St. Louis County and is subject to and under the jurisdiction of St. Louis County. * * * Respondents refuse to issue a permit to Relators for the occupancy of a mobile home on the property owned by Relators for the reason that a house trailer or mobile home as a place of abode on the real estate in question is not a permitted use or conditional use under the provisions of § 1003.119 SLCRO 1964, as amended, the 'R--5' Residential District Regulations. * * * The Zoning Ordinance of St. Louis County defines 'single family dwelling' in such a manner as to prohibit the occupying of trailers and mobile homes in places other than mobile home parks. The mobile home sought to be occupied by Relators was to be occupied by one family * * *.' The ordinance in question permits use of the land in R--5 District for single family dwellings and defines a 'dwelling' as 'any building, or portion thereof, used exclusively for human habitation, except hotels, motels, or house trailers.'

If the ordinance before us is valid it is conceded that relators are prohibited from locating and occupying a house trailer on their lot. They contend, however, that the ordinance is unconstitutional because in violation of the due process and equal protection provisions of Art. I, § 10, Missouri Constitution, V.A.M.S., and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. They say that they have complied with all health and other zoning requirements and should not be prohibited from using their trailer as a single family dwelling by reason of an ordinance which was enacted for aesthetic reasons only and hence is an improper and unconstitutional use of the police power.

At the outset of our consideration of this question we should have before us certain general rules relating to the subject of zoning. 'The zoning powers vested in charter counties by the Constitution are in the public interest and designed to promote the public health and welfare the same as zoning provisions of cities.' St. Louis County v. City of Manchester, Mo.Sup., 360 S.W.2d 638, 642. 'The legislative body, in this instance the St. Louis County Council, has the duty to determine the use classification to be given any particular area. Unless it should appear that the conclusion of that body is clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, the court cannot substitute an opinion for that of the Council in zoning the property in question and establishing the boundary lines. If the Council's action in zoning a property is fairly debatable, the court cannot substitute its opinion as to appropriate zoning. Landau v. Levin, 358 Mo. 77, 213 S.W.2d 483, 485(2, 3). The Zoning Ordinance in question having been enacted by the legislative body is presumed to be valid and appellants, having challenged the reasonableness of the ordinance as applied to specific property, have the burden of proving its unreasonableness. Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. City of Ladue, 362 Mo. 1025, 246 S.W.2d 771, 778(6).' Desloge v. County of St. Louis, Mo.Sup., 431 S.W.2d 126, 131, 132. And, although there are exceptions, 'it is the general rule that when a legislative body enacts a statute or ordinance which prescribes the meaning to be given to particular words or terms used by it, such meaning is binding on the courts even though at variance with the common and ordinary understanding of the words or terms.' State ex rel. Housing Authority of St. Louis County v. Wind, Mo.App., 337 S.W.2d 554, 560.

We have concluded that the ordinance here in question bears a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare; that it is not clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, and hence is not unconstitutional. There does not appear to be any case in this state which has decided this particular question but our view is in accord with the great weight of authority elsewhere in this nation. It has been said that '(m)obile homes, as defined in most ordinances and as characterized by most courts, are dwellings. They are residential uses which possess special characteristics which warrant their separate regulation. Thus, they may be confined to mobile home parks, or may be excluded from residential districts. * * * They may be so excluded on the ground that they tend to stunt the growth potential of the land, or on the ground that they involve potential hazards to public health. Absent exceptional circumstances, the...