State ex rel. Williamson v. Evans

• Decision Date: 04 December 1957
• Docket Number: No. 37889,37889
• Parties: STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. Mac Q. WILLIAMSON, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Mac Q. Williamson, Bob Chambers and Earl Ward, Trustees of the W. A. Graham Public Improvements Trust Estate, and Mac Q. Williamson and Earl Ward, Petitioners, v. Josh J. EVANS, Judge of the District Court of Mayes County, Oklahoma, W. T. Gooldy and C. W. Trout, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1112

319 P.2d 1112

1957 OK 304

STATE of Oklahoma ex rel. Mac Q. WILLIAMSON, Attorney General of Oklahoma, and Mac Q. Williamson, Bob Chambers and Earl Ward, Trustees of the W. A. Graham Public Improvements Trust Estate, and Mac Q. Williamson and Earl Ward, Petitioners, v. Josh J. EVANS, Judge of the District Court of Mayes County Oklahoma, W. T. Gooldy and C. W. Trout, Respondents.

No. 37889.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

Dec. 4, 1957.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the limits and bounds prescribed for them by law, and its use in proper cases should be upheld and encouraged, since it is a vital importance to the due administration of justice that every tribunal vested with judicial functions should be confined to the exercise of those powers with which it has been by law intrusted.

2. On application of prohibition the only inquires permitted are whether the inferior court is exercising a judicial power not granted by law, or is attempting to make an excessive and unauthorized application of judicial force in a cause otherwise properly cognizable by it, and consequently, this court will not investigate the merits of the cause before the inferior court.

3. When a district judge makes an unwarranted, and therefore unlawful application of judicial power, he may be and should be prohibited.

4. A statute which is enacted for the primary purpose of dealing with a particular subject, and which prescribes the terms and conditions of that particular subject matter, prevails over a general statute which does not refer to the particular subject matter, but does contain language which might be broad enough to cover the subject matter if the special statute was not in existence.

Application by petitioners for writ of prohibition against respondent district judge and purported successor trustees of W. A. Graham Improvements Trust Estate. Writ Granted.

Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., James P. Garrett, Asst. Atty. Gen., Wallace, Wallace & Owens, Miami, for petitioners.

H. Tom Kight, Jr., Claremore, George H. Jennings Sapulpa, for respondents.

CORN, Vice Chief Justice.

This matter presents another chapter in the involved affairs of the estate of W. A. Graham, deceased. Considered herein is an application for this court to assume original jurisdiction and to grant a writ of prohibition against the respondent district judge, and parties named by such judge as trustees of the W. A. Graham Public Improvements Trust Estate. In the interest of brevity no effort shall be expended in recitation of the entire factual background from which evolved the circumstances upon which this application is based. The basis of this case is founded upon the establishment of the public trust estate, and a satisfactory understanding of the factual background may be derived from examination of our prior decisions in State ex rel. Williamson v. Longmire, Okl., 281 P.2d 949; Mitchell v. Williamson, Okl., 304 P.2d 314.

After the latter decision the bulk of decedent's residuary estate was set over to the statutory trustees, who undertook preservation and management of the assets pending final disposition according to terms of the trust. Under the statutory authority granted the trustees (60 O.S.Supp.1955 § 381 et seq.) and particularly under Sec. 395, the trustees considered it their sole authority to determine the various public improvements to be made within the terms of the trust. Eventually the trustees developed a plan for constructing the following public improvements in the discharge of their trusteeship:

'1. W. A. Graham Memorial Chapel, on the grounds of the Whitaker State Orphan Home, at Pryor, Oklahoma.

'2. Mayes County Agricultural Center on the grounds of the Mayes County Free Fair, near Pryor.

'3. Remodeling and renovating the City Hall of Pryor.

'4. Public Library for Pryor.

'5. City Auditorium in Pryor.

'6. Completely remodeling and renovating the Mayes County Courthouse.

'7. In addition, some $450,000.00 has been tentatively allocated for projects for the benefit of communities outside of the city of Pryor in Mayes County. Such projects as community buildings, sewer systems, water systems, public meeting places and a school gymnasium are being considered.'

To carry out the program architects were employed and plans made for these projects. However, the trustees saw fit in many instances to file applications for authority to proceed with respondent. In some instances approval was given, but in others the respondent took no action. On January 18, 1957 the trustees applied to the court for approval of the plans for the Agricultural Center, and on March 18, 1957 application also was made to approve final working drawings on the Memorial Chapel. Respondent took no action upon either application. Apparently in effort to discharge their duties the trustees, on May 29, 1957, filed what was denominated an 'Interim Report' with respondent, setting forth that the trustees thereafter intended to follow the statutes in performing their duties, but would keep respondent advised of matters by furnishing him a copy of the minutes of the trustees' meetings.

Following this plan the trustees had scheduled receiving of bids and letting of construction contracts for the Memorial Chapel and Agricultural Center on July 2-3, 1957. On June 7th, following receipt of the Interim Report, respondent ordered a hearing in the matter, which was continued until July 1, 1957. After a prolonged statement and discussion which, in respect to many matters relating to trust affairs, charged the trustees with bad faith in handling the trust estate, respondent made numerous orders disapproving, or taking under advisement, the matters of vouchers regularly issued by the trustees, particularly as respected handling of various parcels of real estate owned by the trust and on which the trustees had paid for repairs or charges for insurance. Respondent further disallowed claims for expenses relative to the proposed Memorial Chapel and expressly disapproved the trustees' decision to erect such edifice, disallowed and disapproved receipt of bids and letting of contracts for construction both of the chapel and agricultural center. Respondent also ordered removal of the statutory trustees, Williamson and Ward, enjoined them and the remaining trustee from signing vouchers, and announced his intention to appoint 'successor trustees.' An order entered thereafter appointed the named respondents as such trustees.

July 3, 1957 petitioners applied to this court for writ of prohibition, setting forth that: Petitioners as trustees, brought this action pursuant to direction of the Governor; from inception of the trust respondent had attempted to exercise direction and control of the trustees in determining the public improvements to be made; determination of public improvements by respondent was unauthorized, same being the trustees' sole responsibility under provisions of the statute, 60 O.S.Supp.1955, § 395; to avoid conflict with respondent trustees had filed certain applications with respondent and, though some had been approved, applications for construction of the chapel and agricultural center had not been acted upon; respondent's failure to act necessarily resulted in delay of other projects and for this reason petitioners had filed the interim report; on June 7th respondent had entered an order requiring petitioners to appear with counsel, auditors and architects on June 7, 1957 to report on the general affairs of the Public Improvements Trust, but impossibility of appearing on short notice required the matter to be continued but no other order or notice advising trustees of the nature of hearing was entered; on July 1st respondent had conducted a hearing and requested documentary information which trustees had furnished the following day; after introduction of exhibits and extensive questioning and remarks by respondent the following orders were entered:

'Disapproving and disallowing the construction of a Memorial Chapel to be built on the grounds of the Whitaker State Orphan Home as a living memorial to the memory of W. A. Graham.

'Plans for this Chapel had been approved by the Governor, the State Board of Affairs and the Superintendent of said home. Bids for the construction of said chapel were to have been received on July 2, 1957, at 11:00 o'clock a.m. A contract for the construction of said Chapel would have been awarded shortly thereafter but for this order of the District Judge.'

Petitioners alleged such purported orders to be contrary to law, and to constitute an excessive, arbitrary and illegal abuse of judicial authority, against which petitioners were without an adequate remedy at law because: An attempted appeal from such of the orders as are appealable would result in extensive delay and delay liquidation of the trust estate and construction of the public improvements; threatened appointment of new trustees is not appealable and if not prohibited would result in unauthorized persons controlling the trust estate. Alternative writ of prohibition issued, enjoining respondent and the newly appointed trustees from further action. Motions to dissolve the alternative writ and the application to assume jurisdiction, were denied. On July 23, 1957 an order was made directing petitioners (statutory trustees) to pay salaries, utility bills and provide necessary emergency repairs to property from trust estate funds.

The matter is presented here by the pleadings and extensive briefs wherein numerous questions are raised by both sides in support of their respective positions. The basis of the argument relied upon by respondents is that the court, in the exercise of equitable jurisdiction, was vested with the duty and the power to safeguard the trust estate, and to accomplish this the court had authority to inquire into whether the...