State ex rel. Willman v. St. Joseph Hosp.

• Decision Date: 07 November 1984
• Docket Number: No. WD,WD
• Citation: 684 S.W.2d 408
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Charles WILLMAN, M.D., Respondent, v. ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL, Appellant. 35665.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 408

684 S.W.2d 408

STATE of Missouri, ex rel. Charles WILLMAN, M.D., Respondent, v. ST. JOSEPH HOSPITAL, Appellant.

No. WD 35665.

Missouri Court of Appeals Western District.

Nov. 7, 1984.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Overruled and Denied

Dec. 26, 1984.

Application to Transfer Denied

Feb. 26, 1985.

Thomas G. Kokoruda (argued), Jennifer A. Gille and Suzanne Shank, Kansas City, for appellant.

John C. Milholland (argued), Kansas City, for respondent.

Before KENNEDY, P.J., and NUGENT and BERREY, JJ.

NUGENT, Judge.

St. Joseph Hospital appeals from the circuit court's judgment on the pleadings and issuance of a peremptory writ of mandamus directing it to reinstate the hospital and staff privileges of Dr. Charles Willman which were revoked by the hospital's governing body, such revocation being a breach of contract. We reverse the judgment of the circuit court and affirm the hospital's revocation of Dr. Willman's hospital and staff privileges.

St. Joseph hospital is a not for profit corporation organized under the laws of Missouri. Dr. Willman is a medical practitioner who has hospital and staff privileges with the appellant hospital. On November 8, 1983, the hospital's board of directors revoked the doctor's privileges by affirming earlier decisions or recommendations of various medical staff committees. The doctor complains that the procedures employed by the hospital in revoking his privileges were not in accord with the hospital's corporate bylaws and the "medical staff bylaws." He does not raise any issue as to the substantive reasons leading to the revocation. The facts of this case are not in dispute.

In the fall of 1982, in accordance with the "medical staff bylaws," the hospital's board of directors requested that the medical staff review the doctor's work at the hospital. The doctor was notified of this request by letter in October of 1982. The executive committee of the staff conducted the review and recommended to the medical staff's credentials committee that corrective action be taken. The doctor was notified of this recommendation and appeared before the credentials committee where his case was discussed. The credentials committee reported to the executive committee recommending corrective action.

In May of 1983, the executive committee notified the doctor of the report, and the doctor was allowed to appear before the executive committee where once again his case was discussed. The committee unanimously voted to revoke his privileges. By a letter dated June 8, 1982, he was notified of that decision.

The major issue before us stems from the following language used in the June 8 letter: "At the conclusion of the Executive Committee meeting which you appeared before on June 7, 1983, the committee voted unanimously to revoke your hospital privileges in total, effective immediately." (Emphasis added.) The doctor contends and the trial court found that the staff bylaws authorize the executive committee only to recommend a revocation, that it is not authorized to revoke a practitioner's privileges. Power to revoke is vested solely in the hospital's board of directors. The June 8 letter also informed the doctor of his right to a hearing before an ad hoc committee of the medical staff.

The doctor exercised this right and the hearing was conducted on August 31, 1983. The ad hoc committee subsequently affirmed the executive committee's decision. The doctor was duly notified and informed of his appeal rights under the bylaws. He exercised those rights, and the hospital's board of directors appointed an appellate review committee. That committee reviewed the earlier decisions and recommended that the board affirm the earlier recommendations. The board of directors affirmed the committee's recommendation, and on November 8, 1983, notified the doctor that his privileges had been finally revoked.

On November 17, 1983, Dr. Willman filed a proceeding in mandamus in the circuit court. The court issued a preliminary writ, and in December of 1983 the doctor moved for a judgment on the pleadings. Rule 55.27(b). The court sustained the motion, entered judgment, and issued a peremptory writ of mandamus directing the hospital to reinstate the doctor. The court concluded that the staff bylaws constitute a contract between the doctor and the hospital, and that the procedures followed in revoking the relator's privileges were not in accord with the bylaws and, therefore, the hospital's revocation was a breach of contract. The court also held that mandamus was the proper remedy, since it was the doctor's only adequate legal remedy.

Following that decision, the hospital on January 9, 1984, moved that the circuit judge recuse himself on the ground that the judge had at one time been the doctor's patient. The court later denied the motion. On January 11, 1984, the hospital filed a motion to amend the judgment entry and peremptory writ of mandamus. On January 31, 1984, the court denied that motion and the hospital appealed. Rules 81.04; 81.05; and 78.04.

The hospital raises several points on appeal, but its last point is controlling and is the basis of our decision; we need not address appellant's other points. We assume for purposes of this decision but do not hold that the bylaws are a contract and mandamus is the correct remedy.

The circuit court granted Dr. Willman's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The scope of our review is set forth in McIntosh v. Foulke, 360 Mo. 481, 228 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (1950), where the court held that

such a motion is sustainable only where, 'under the conceded facts, a judgment different from that pronounced could not be rendered notwithstanding any evidence which might be produced. In other words, it cannot be sustained unless, under the admitted facts the moving party is entitled to judgment, without regard to what the findings might be on the facts upon which issue is joined.'

The problem in this case is that the undisputed facts do not support a judgment for Dr. Willman on any ground. The circuit court erred in its reading of the hospital bylaws and in finding that the bylaws were violated so as to constitute a breach of contract.

The trial court's judgment was based solely upon its finding that the staff bylaws do not authorize an executive committee of the hospital's medical staff to revoke a practitioner's privileges, that the committee is authorized only to recommend revocation to the board of directors, and the board is the only hospital body authorized to make such a decision. The trial court found that the executive committee's letter of June 8, stating that the doctor's privileges were...