Willman v. Heartland Hosp. East

• Decision Date: 19 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 89-0785-CV-W-9.,89-0785-CV-W-9.
• Parties: Charles R. WILLMAN, M.D., Plaintiff, v. HEARTLAND HOSPITAL EAST, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

836 F. Supp. 1522

Charles R. WILLMAN, M.D., Plaintiff, v. HEARTLAND HOSPITAL EAST, et al., Defendants.

No. 89-0785-CV-W-9.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, W.D.

October 19, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

George M. Bock, Slagle, Bernard & Gorman, Kansas City, MO, David W. Harlan, Gallop, Johnson & Neuman, St. Louis, MO, Julian O. Von Kalinowski, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, Los Angeles, CA, J. Bennett Clark, Senniger, Powers, Leavitt & Roedel, St. Louis, MO, for plaintiff.

Thomas G. Kokoruda, George E. Leonard, Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, MO, for defendants Heartland Hosp. East, Heartland Hosp. West and Heartland Health System, Inc.

R. Dan Boulware, Watkins, Boulware, Lucas, Miner, Murphy & Taylor, St. Joseph, MO, for defendants Richard Craig, Ernest Weinand, M.D., Edward Andres, M.D., James McMillen, M.D., Orlyn Lockard Jr., M.D., Charles Mullican, M.D. and Wallace McDonald, M.D.

Matthew R. Davis, Reed O. Gentry, Field, Gentry & Benjamin, P.C., Kansas City, MO, R. Dan Boulware, Michael L. Taylor, Watkins, Boulware, Lucas, Miner, Murphy & Taylor, St. Joseph, MO, for defendant Edward Beheler, M.D.

R. Dan Boulware, Mark R. Woodbury, Michael L. Taylor, Watkins, Boulware, Lucas, Miner, Murphy & Taylor, St. Joseph, MO, for defendant Robert Stuber, M.D.

ORDER

BARTLETT, District Judge.

Alleging a per se violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Count I), restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Count II), monopoly leveraging and abuse of an essential facility in violation of the Sherman Anti-trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Count III) and intentional interference with business expectancy (Count IV), plaintiff Charles R. Willman seeks reinstatement of his admission privileges at defendant hospitals, costs of litigation, attorney fees and damages. Defendants Heartland Health Systems, Heartland Hospital East and Heartland Hospital West (hereafter "the defendant hospitals") and Richard Craig, Ernest Weinand, Edward Beheler, Edward Andres, Steven Krueger, James McMillen, Robert Stuber, Orlyn Lockard, Charles Mullican and Wallace McDonald (hereafter "defendant doctors") move for summary judgment on Counts I, II, III and IV of the Complaint.

In addition to denying the claims asserted by plaintiff, defendants have asserted a Counterclaim against plaintiff for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. Plaintiff moves for summary judgment against defendants on the Counterclaim.

I. Facts

Plaintiff Dr. Charles Willman began practicing medicine in St. Joseph in 1959. Plaintiff practiced general surgery and provided general medical services in Buchanan County, Missouri, and surrounding areas. Willman had endoscopy facilities in his office and planned to construct a one-day surgical center. Defendant hospitals also had endoscopy facilities.

Defendant Heartland Hospital East is a Missouri Corporation. Prior to June 26, 1985, it operated under the name St. Joseph Hospital. Defendant Heartland Hospital West is also a Missouri corporation. Prior to June 26, 1985, it operated under the name Methodist Medical Center. In 1983 the Hospitals created a corporation, Heartland Health Affiliates, to coordinate the operation and services of the hospitals. Defendant Heartland Health System, Inc. is the successor to Heartland Health Affiliates.

Defendant Richard Craig, M.D. practices general surgery. Craig was Chief of the Department of Surgery at Methodist Hospital and was a member of the Executive Committee.

Defendant Ernest Weinand, M.D. practices general surgery. Weinand was a member of Methodist's credentials Committee and of St. Joseph's Executive Committee.

Defendant Edward Beheler, M.D. practices general surgery. Beheler was a member of Methodist's Critical Care Committee, Methodist's Board of Trustees and of St. Joseph's Executive, Credentials and Critical Care Committees.

Defendant Edward Andres, M.D. practices General Surgery. He was a member of St. Joseph's Critical Care, Ad Hoc and Credentials Committees.

Defendant Steven Krueger, M.D. practices primary care/internal medicine. He was a member of Methodist's Credentials and Critical Care Committees and of St. Joseph's Executive, Credentials and Critical Care Committees.

Defendant James McMillen, M.D. practices primary care/internal medicine. He was a member of Methodist's Executive and Credentials Committees and was President of General Staff at Methodist. McMillen also participated in proceedings before the St. Joseph Hospital Board of Trustees.

Defendant Robert Stuber, M.D. practices internal medicine/primary care. He was a member of Methodist's Critical Care and Executive Committees and the Board of Directors of St. Joseph Hospital.

Defendant Orlyn Lockard, M.D. practices endoscopy. He was a member of Methodist's and St. Joseph's Executive Committee. He was also President of the General Staff at St. Joseph's.

Defendant Charles Mullican, M.D. practices primary care/internal medicine. He was a member of Methodist's Executive and Critical Care Committees and of St. Joseph's Executive Committee.

Defendant Wallace McDonald, M.D. practices primary care/internal medicine. He was a member of Methodist's Executive Committee.

In February 1982, the Critical Care Committee of Methodist Hospital reviewed Willman's care of patient Bobby Fanning. After this review, Willman's privileges were limited by adding a consultation requirement. Willman's privileges were suspended at Methodist Hospital in February 1983. A hearing was held in June 1983, that resulted in a recommendation to the Board of Trustees at Methodist to revoke Willman's privileges. The Board suspended his privileges in July 1983. The Board denied Willman's reapplication for privileges in 1984 and a new application for privileges in 1986.

St. Joseph Hospital reviewed the Fanning case in 1983. In May 1983, the Credentials Committee recommended revocation of Willman's privileges and the recommendation was approved by the executive committee in June 1983. The Board of Trustees voted to revoke Willman's privileges. At Willman's request, the Circuit Court of Buchanan County in 1983 issued a writ of mandamus requiring St. Joseph Hospital to restore his privileges. Willman practiced general surgery at St. Joseph Hospital for slightly less than 15 months, until the writ was dissolved in 1985. St. Joseph Hospital denied Willman's 1985 application for privileges for the year 1986.

In 1983 or 1984, Willman applied for privileges at Atchison Hospital, but was told that he should consider withdrawing his application because of the suspension of privileges at Methodist and St. Joseph Hospitals.

Willman applied for privileges at Spelman Memorial Hospital in 1985 and his application was rejected after Spelman received a copy of the Ad Hoc committee report dated October 19, 1983, from St. Joseph Hospital.

Willman's malpractice insurance with Momedico was cancelled in July 1982. Willman was insured by St. Paul Fire & Marine from 1982 to August 17, 1985. St. Paul cancelled Willman's insurance because his privileges had been suspended at Methodist and St. Joseph Hospitals.

II. Standard for Summary Judgment

Rule 56(c), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that summary judgment shall be rendered if the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, it is the court's obligation to view the facts in the light most favorable to the adverse party and to allow the adverse party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1608, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Inland Oil and Transport Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991, 100 S.Ct. 522, 62 L.Ed.2d 420, (1979).

If there is no genuine issue about any material fact, summary judgment is proper because it avoids needless and costly litigation and promotes judicial efficiency. Roberts v. Browning, 610 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir.1979); United States v. Porter, 581 F.2d 698, 703 (8th Cir.1978). The summary judgment procedure is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut." Rather, it is "an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see also City of Mt. Pleasant v. Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., 838 F.2d 268, 273 (8th Cir.1988). Summary judgment is appropriate against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish that there is a genuine issue for trial about an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.

The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating by reference to portions of pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, the absence of genuine issues of material fact. However, the moving party is not required to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. (emphasis added).

The nonmoving party is then required to go beyond the pleadings and by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment cannot simply rest on allegations and denials in his pleading to get to a jury without any significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a...