State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Lawson
| Decision Date | 19 May 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. C6-86-1697,C6-86-1697 |
| Citation | 406 N.W.2d 20 |
| Parties | STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY COMPANY, Appellant, v. George W. LAWSON, Glenda Lawson, individually and as mother and natural guardian of Dustin Seiler, Shane Seiler and Katie Seiler, Phyllis S. Ostensoe, as guardian ad litem for Dustin Seiler, Respondents. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
A young child, while in the custody of his mother, was not a resident of his grandfather's house for insurance purposes when the mother and child's presence was intended to be of brief duration and the circumstances suggest the status of guest rather than an "intimate and informal relationship" with the policyholder.
Elton A. Kuderer, Fairmont, for State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.
William P. Scott, Pipestone, for George W. Lawson.
DePaul D. Willette, Olivia, for Glenda Lawson.
Clarance E. Hagglund, David Oskie, Granite Falls, for Phyllis S. Ostensoe.
Heard, considered and decided by LESLIE, P.J., and SEDGWICK and HUSPENI, JJ.
State Farm sought a declaratory judgment that Dustin Seiler, injured in a shooting accident in his grandfather's house, was a resident of the house and consequently excluded from insurance coverage. State Farm appeals the trial court's finding that Dustin was not a resident of George Lawson's household, and was therefore covered by his insurance policies. We affirm.
On May 5, 1985, Dustin Seiler, then almost eight years old, was injured in a shooting accident. While playing in their grandfather's basement, Dustin and his brother loaded and fired a twelve-gauge shotgun which struck Dustin in the chest and arm. At the time, Dustin was staying at his grandfather's house with his mother Glenda Lawson and his two siblings while they looked for a new apartment. State Farm alleges their stay constitutes residency, which qualifies as a coverage exclusion under George's policies.
Glenda, a recently divorced mother entirely dependent on AFDC payments, was in the process of moving. To save a month's rent, she asked her father, George Lawson, if she could stay at his house while he was visiting in Texas.
George and Glenda had a strained relationship and had little contact in recent years. Glenda moved in April 26. She testified she had her father's permission to stay in the house until the end of May. George's testimony was in agreement:
Well she asked--she said that she was moving. I said * * * how long is it going to be, a month or what * * *. She said, "Yes." I said, "That is fine."
Q. Okay, so a month was discussed?
A. Yes, it was. I don't remember exactly. I can't point to anything because it was just me and her and I said that if it is up to a month that is fine and dandy * * *.
Q. Was there any discussion about her staying there for the summer?
A. I don't let nobody stay there for the summer. She never discussed it with me and I wouldn't let her stay there for the summer period.
Q. So you are saying that when you talked with her on the telephone there wasn't any discussion about her staying all summer?
A. She knew that. She didn't have to ask. She knew that I didn't get along with her and I just did that in the kindness of my heart.
George testified he will help his kids out, but they are not to live with him and that Glenda was to be out by the time he returned. Because of the accident, George returned early; several days later father and daughter quarreled. Glenda moved out soon after.
Does the evidence support the trial court's finding that mother and son were not "residents," for insurance purposes, of George Lawson's house?
Whether a relative resides in the insured's household at the time of an accident is a question of fact. Fruchtman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 274 Minn. 54, 55, 142 N.W.2d 299, 300 (1966). The trial court's findings are evaluated under the clearly erroneous standard. Minn.R.Civ.P. 52.01; Skarsten v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 381 N.W.2d 16, 18 (Minn.Ct.App.1986), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 27, 1986).
George Lawson's State Farm homeowner's policy defined "insured" as
you and the following residents of your household:
a. your relatives;
b. any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care of any person named above.
The exclusions section of liability coverages provided that
Personal Liability * * * and Medical Payments to others do not apply to:
* * *
g. bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part (a) or (b) of the definition of insured.
The policy provides no definition for residence or household. Such policy terms are not ambiguous and are interpreted to effect their plain meaning. Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d 704, 706 (Minn.1982).
Minnesota analyzes "residency in a household" questions according to the test utilized in Pamperin v. Milwaukee Mutual Insurance Co., 55 Wis.2d 27, 37, 197 N.W.2d 783, 788-89 (1972).
(1) living under the same roof; (2) in a close intimate and informal relationship; and (3) where the intended duration is likely to be substantial, where it is consistent with the informality of the relationship, and from which it is reasonable to conclude that the parties would consider the relationship " * * * in contracting about such matters as insurance or in their conduct in reliance thereon."
Firemen's Insurance Co. v. Viktora, 318 N.W.2d at 706 (quoting Pamperin ).
Minnesota equates the first two factors which define "household," as synonymous with "family" for insurance purposes--"those who dwell together as a family under the same roof." Skarsten v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 381 N.W.2d at 19 (citations omitted). Another important factual consideration is "the duration of stay." Id. No single factor controls. Rather, they all merge to create either a portrait of a relationship akin to household membership or one more transient in character.
Although Glenda Lawson resided with her children under her father's roof, he was not present and evidence indicates father and daughter did not get along. While Glenda and her children had free run of the house, they...
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