State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Pildner

• Decision Date: 31 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 73-989,73-989
• Citation: 40 Ohio St.2d 101,69 O.O.2d 509,321 N.E.2d 600
• Parties: , 69 O.O.2d 509 STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., Appellant, v. PILDNER et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 101

40 Ohio St.2d 101

321 N.E.2d 600, 69 O.O.2d 509

STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY CO., Appellant, v. PILDNER et al., Appellees.

No. 73-989.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Dec. 31, 1974.

Syllabus by the Court

Where, in a declaratory judgment action seeking to determine a liability insurer's duty to defend a civil action against an insured, the complaint in the civil action against the insured alleges negligent injury within the scope of coverage of the insurer's policy, the insurer is required to defend the insured regardless of the ultimate outcome of the litigation or the liability of the insurer ot the insured under the terms of the policy.

The following facts were alleged in appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment and are uncontradicted.

On June 19, 1971, appellee Richard C. Pildner, a Florida homeowner insured under a homeowner's insurance policy issued by the appellant, State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, shot and seriously injured appellee Harry William Bryan, while in the city of Massillon, Ohio. Pildner was indicted by the Stark County grand jury for the felony of 'shooting with intent to wound' and, on July 12, 1972, was convicted of that felony and subsequently sentenced to a term of 1-20 years in the Ohio State Reformatory at Mansfeld.

On April 7, 1972, while the criminal charge was pending against Pildner, appellees Mr. & Mrs. Bryan filed a civil suit against Pildner in the Court of Common Pleas, the complaint alleging that Pildner 'negligently injured the plaintiff by firing a rifle shot which took effect in the body of said plaintiff.'

Appellee Pildner subsequently made demand upon appellant, State Farm, to defend the civil action filed by the Bryans and to pay, up to the coverage limit, any judgment rendered against Pildner in the civil action.

Appellant, State Farm, refused to defend the action on the basis that under the terms of the policy the insurer was not obligated to defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of bodily injury from causes to which the insurance does not apply. Appellant maintains that intentional wounding was excluded from coverage under the following terms of the policy:

'This policy does not apply:

'* * *

'(f) to bodily injury or property damage which is either expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.'

State Farm filed a declaratory judgment action in the Court of Common Pleas after refusing to defend Pildner in the Bryans' suit against him, joining Pildner and the Bryans.

Pildner filed a motion to dismiss this declaratory judgment action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. He asserted tht the Bryans' complaint contained no allegation that Pildner intended to wound Bryan and that, where there has never been an admission of guilt by a defendant, a criminal conviction for intentional shooting is not admissible evidence in the civil action, and Pildner has a right to be defended agaisnt a claim of negligence under the terms of the policy.

The Court of Common Pleas sustained Pildner's motion to dismiss and subsequently sustained a similar motion by the Bryans. The Bryans' motion raised the same arguments as did that filed by Pildner, and the Court of Common Pleas, in dismissing appellant's complaint, based dismissal upon the fact that a criminal conviction is not conclusive evidence in a civil case on the same issue. It was from this dismissal that an appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals.

Two questions of law were raised in that court: (1) Is a criminal conviction a fact which cannot be considered by a court in a declaratory judgment action, and (2) does the doctrine of mutuality of estoppel or any other doctrine bar the use of a prior criminal conviction in every civil proceeding?

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas on the ground that the complaint in this action did show the existence of a justiciable controversy and that a determination of rights, whether or not favorable to the complainant, would terminate at least part of the uncertainty concerning the duty to defend. The Court of Appeals, however, declared Ohio law '* * * to be that the sole fact of a Common Pleas Court conviction and sentence of the insured for the crime 'shooting with intent to wound' is not, in and of itself, finally determinative in law of the separate issues of whether the injury or damage was expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.'

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of appellant's motion to certify the record.

Carson, Vogelgesang, Sheehan & Banas and Philip E. Howes, Canton, for appellant.

Ross & Ross, Joseph W. Calabretta, Grant & Steiner and Donald C. Steiner, Canton, for appellees.

CORRIGAN, Justice.

Appellant, State Farm & Casualty Company, maintains that the suit against its insured, Pildner, is excluded from coverage under its homeowner's policy because the injury suffered by the appellee Bryan was intentionally inflicted by the insured. Appellant urges that the insured's conviction of the crime of intentional wounding is admissible to prove the exclusion from coverage, and appellant asks, therefore, that this court declare that appellant is not obligated to defend the insured in the suit giving rise to this action.

It is not necessary for this court to consider the question of the admissibility of the insured's conviction of 'intentional wounding.' The duty of an insurer, under a policy of liability insurance, to defend an action against an insured is dependent upon the scope of the allegations of the complaint in the action against the insured. Where the allegations of the complaint bring the action within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is required to defend,...