State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Lewis

• Decision Date: 06 May 1987
• Citation: 236 Cal.Rptr. 807,191 Cal. App. 3d 960
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Karen LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. C000114.

Page 807

236 Cal.Rptr. 807

191 Cal.App.3d 960

STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY CO., Plaintiff and Respondent, v.Karen LEWIS, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. C000114.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

May 6, 1987.

Friedman, Collard, Poswall & Virga, John M. Poswall, and Georgann B. Johnston, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

Matheny, Poidmore & Sears, Douglas A. Sears, and Michael A. Bishop, Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

SIMS, Associate Justice.

DefendantKaren Lewis(Karen) appeals from a judgment declaring that plaintiffState Farm Fire and Casualty Co.(State Farm) has no duty under a homeowner's insurance policy to defend or indemnify the estate of her late husband, Wesley Lewis(Wesley), either for injuries Karen sustained or for the wrongful deaths of the Lewis' two minor children.

On appeal Karen concedes the policy excludes coverage for her own physical bodily injuries.¹She contends, however, that the policy's exclusionary clause does not unambiguously exclude coverage for her children's wrongful deaths because, as is generally understood, a cause of action for "wrongful death" is not a cause of action for "bodily injury."She urges that the policy be construed in her favor as not excluding coverage for wrongful death.

We conclude the policy unambiguously fails to insure against the damages sought by Karen and therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The factual predicate to this case is concededly tragic.

Wesley shot and killed the two minor children of the marriage who resided with Karen and him.Wesley later attacked Karen with a pipe, causing her bodily injury.Wesley thereafter took his own life.

Karen filed an action against Wesley's estate for her own injuries and for her children's wrongful deaths.At the time of the killings, Wesley was insured by a homeowners' insurance policy issued by State Farm.²

The policy provided in pertinent part: "COVERAGE L--PERSONAL LIABILITY [p] If a claim is made or suit is brought against any insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, we will: [p] a. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and [p] b. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice...."The policy defined "insured" as "you and the following residents of your household: [p] a. your relatives; ..."(Emphasis added.)The policy defined "bodily injury" as "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including required care, loss of services and death resulting therefrom."(Emphasis added.)

Under "SECTION II--EXCLUSIONS" the policy provided in pertinent part that "Coverage L--Personal Liability ... [does] not apply to: [p] ... g. bodily injury to you or any insured within the meaning of part (a) ... of insured [as quoted above]."

State Farm filed this action seeking a declaration that the policy excluded coverage for Karen's injuries and her children's wrongful deaths.The trial court concluded, "Coverage for injury or death to Karen Lewis and her children is clearly excluded in the homeowners insurance policy of Wesley Lewis."

DISCUSSION

The interpretation of an insurance policy, like any other contract, is a matter of law as to which a reviewing court must make its own independent determination.(Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators, Inc.(1985)172 Cal.App.3d 564, 571;Boogaert v. Occidental Life Ins. Co.(1983)150 Cal.App.3d 875, 879, 198 Cal.Rptr. 357.)Our Supreme Court recently concluded, "It is a basic principle of insurance contract interpretation that doubts, uncertainties and ambiguities arising out of policy language ordinarily should be resolved in favor of the insured in order to protect his reasonable expectation of coverage.[Citations.]It is also well established, however, that this rule of construction is applicable only when the policy language is found to be unclear.[Citations.]' "A policy provision is ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable."[Citation.]Whether language in a contract is ambiguous is a question of law.[Citation.]We are also guided by the principle that words in an insurance policy must be read in their ordinary sense, and any ambiguity cannot be based on a strained interpretation of the policy language.[Citation.]' "(Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co.(1986)41 Cal.3d 903, 912, 226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920, italics in original.)

We perceive no material ambiguity in the insurance policy at issue.The policy does not provide an unlimited universe of coverage.State Farm's obligations are triggered where a claim is made or suit is brought "for damages because of bodily injury ... to which this coverage applies, ..."³This language unambiguously means that the damages must be caused in some manner by bodily injury covered by the policy.

Not all kinds of bodily injury are covered.A conspicuous exclusion says personal liability coverage does not apply to "bodily injury to ... any insured within the meaning of part (a)...."An insured "within the meaning of part (a)" includes relatives of the insured who were residents of the insured's household.Karen and the children satisfied these criteria and were therefore insureds.Bodily injury to them is not covered by the policy."Bodily injury" is defined to include "bodily harm ... and death resulting therefrom."Consequently, State Farm had no obligation to defend or indemnify Karen "for damages because of bodily injury" to her or to the children, or because of the children's deaths.

Karen contends, however, the insurance policy's exclusion contains an ambiguity because it does not state whether the term "bodily injury" as used in the exclusion for "bodily injury to ... any insured" includes wrongful death.Karen claims a cause of action for "wrongful death," as commonly understood, is not a cause of action for "bodily injury" but a distinct cause of action for economic loss which belongs to the decedent's survivors.(See, e.g., Krouse v. Graham(1977)19 Cal.3d 59, 66-72, 137 Cal.Rptr. 863, 562 P.2d...