State in Interest of A.B.
| Decision Date | 03 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 960205-C,960138-CA,s. 960205-C |
| Citation | 936 P.2d 1091 |
| Parties | 314 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF A.B., a person under eighteen years of age. A.B., Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellee. STATE of Utah, IN the INTEREST OF R.M., a person under eighteen years of age. R.M., Appellant, v. STATE of Utah, Appellee. |
| Court | Utah Court of Appeals |
Linda M. Jones and Mark R. Moffat, Salt Lake City, for Appellant A.B.
Robert K. Heineman, Deborah Kreeck Mendez, Linda M. Jones, and Mark R. Moffat, Salt Lake City, for Appellant R.M Jan Graham, J. Kevin Murphy, and Laura B. Dupaix, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before DAVIS, P.J., and BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ.
This case is a consolidation of appeals of A.B. and R.M., both juveniles, from judgments of the Third District Juvenile Court binding each over to district court to be tried as adults. The juveniles challenge the constitutionality of the serious youth offender statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602 (1996). The serious youth offender statute creates a narrow, judicially-mediated exception which permits juveniles to rebut the presumption that, in certain prescribed circumstances, juveniles will be bound over for criminal prosecution in district court. Once probable cause is found, the juvenile court retains jurisdiction only if the accused serious youth offender proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that the following three juvenile court "retention factors" exist:
(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;
(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the minor appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and
(iii) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(3)(b) (1996). In both cases, the juvenile courts denied the juveniles' motions that the serious youth offender statute is unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the juveniles' rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 7, 12, and 24 of the Utah Constitution. After a preliminary hearing, the juvenile courts ordered the juveniles bound over and held to answer their respective charges in district court. We affirm.
The following facts are summarized from the juveniles' preliminary hearings:
R.M.
At the time of his alleged offense, R.M. was seventeen years of age. He was charged with discharge of a firearm from a vehicle in connection with a drive-by shooting in which two bullets were fired into an occupied bedroom, and a third into the homeowners' vehicle. R.M. allegedly fired the gunshots because members of a rival gang had been "talking shit" about him and his friends.
R.M. had no prior adjudications for dangerous weapons felonies. He was unable, however, to satisfy either of the other two retention factors--relatively low culpability compared to his coperpetrator, or non-violent, non-aggressive, non-premeditated action. The juvenile court accordingly transferred jurisdiction to the district court.
A.B.
A.B., who was sixteen years of age at the time, was accused of aggravated robbery, with a dangerous weapon enhancement. Allegedly A.B., wearing a mask and wielding a gun, entered a Salt Lake City bank with an accomplice. A.B. handcuffed several tellers and customers, and stole money and a customer's car keys. The police apprehended A.B. and the accomplice as they fled the bank. A.B. confessed to his involvement in the robbery.
After the juvenile court found probable cause to believe that A.B. committed the armed robbery, it considered the juvenile court retention factors. The juvenile court concluded that although A.B. had no prior dangerous weapon felony adjudications, he failed to prove the other two retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. The juvenile court found that even though A.B. was somewhat less culpable than his coperpetrator, A.B. had, nonetheless, actively participated in the aggravated robbery. The court further determined that A.B's actions were "very aggressive," violent, and most significantly, highly premeditated (A.B. had purchased the handcuffs in anticipation of the robbery). As such, the juvenile court determined that A.B. failed to rebut the district court bindover presumption and waived jurisdiction over A.B.
This case raises the following issues: (1) Are the juvenile court retention factors rationally related to the legislative purpose of the serious youth offender statute, so as not to violate article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution or the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) Does the serious youth offender statute violate the juveniles' federal and state constitutional right against self-incrimination, in requiring the juveniles to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, their mental state with respect to the offense charged; and (3) Does Utah's serious youth offender statute, which requires the juvenile court to transfer its original jurisdiction over designated juveniles to the adult criminal court system, satisfy federal and state constitutional due process requirements?
The issue of whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, with no deference given to the trial court. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 995 (Utah 1995). A statute, however, carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, with doubts resolved in favor of its constitutionality. See id.; State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397-98 (Utah 1989).
To adequately address the juveniles' challenges to the serious youth offender statute and understand Utah's scheme for handling juvenile offenders, it is appropriate to examine the context of this statute in relation to the other two interrelated juvenile offender statutes, even though they are not at issue in this case. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-3a-601, -602, -603 (1996).
Certification Statute.
Section 78-3a-603 of the Utah Code, the certification statute, provides that juveniles fourteen and fifteen years of age charged with felonies may be "certified" for trial in the district court upon a request by the prosecution and after a special hearing. The prosecution bears the burden of proving, in addition to probable cause, that it is "contrary to the best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(2) (1996). In determining whether the prosecution has met its burden of proof, the juvenile court must consider a number of factors, but may make its decision on finding one or more of the factors. See id. § 78-3a-603(3). The factors are similar to those constitutionally approved, but not required, by the United States Supreme Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1060, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). Among the factors considered are the juvenile's record, previous history, and "the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the juvenile court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-603(3)(f), (g) (1996).
Direct File.
Section 78-3a-601 of the Utah Code, the direct file provision, grants the district court "exclusive original jurisdiction" over juveniles sixteen years of age or older if the prosecutor charges murder or aggravated murder, or charges any felony and such juvenile has a prior commitment to a "secure" facility. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-601 (1996). Notably, the amenability of the juvenile to rehabilitation is not an issue under these circumstances; the prosecution must file in district court. See id.
Serious Youth Offender Statute.
Section 78-3a-602 of the Utah Code, the serious youth offender statute, addresses juveniles sixteen and seventeen years of age charged with nine enumerated violent felonies, plus a tenth category of juveniles accused of committing dangerous weapon offenses that would be felonies if committed by adults, and who have been adjudicated or convicted for such offenses by a juvenile court on a prior occasion. 1 See Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-602(1) (1996). Under these circumstances, the prosecution must file a criminal information in the juvenile court. See id. The juvenile court then holds a preliminary hearing in which the State must establish that an enumerated offense has been committed and that there is probable cause to believe the juvenile committed it. 2 If the juvenile court finds probable cause, the juvenile is presumptively bound over for trial in the district court, unless the juvenile can prove all three of the retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. See id. § 78-3a-602(3)(b). The three retention factors do not consider the juvenile's amenability to rehabilitation or prior record; rather, the factors address the circumstances surrounding the offense charged. See id. § 78-3a-602(3)(b). There is a strong presumption of district court jurisdiction. See id.
We now turn to the juveniles' facial challenges to the serious youth offender statute.
The juveniles argue that the serious youth offender statute violates article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution, which states, "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." Utah Const. art. I, § 24. 3 Article I, section 24 protects against two types of discrimination:
First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class. Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment given the classes must be based on differences that have a reasonable tendency to further the objectives of the statute.
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984) () (citations omitted); accord State v. Mohi, 901...
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