State Of Ariz. v. Organ

• Decision Date: 17 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 1 CA-CR 09-0141.,1 CA-CR 09-0141.
• Citation: 225 Ariz. 43,234 P.3d 611
• Parties: STATE of Arizona, Appellee,v.Daniel Roy ORGAN, Appellant.
• Court: Arizona Court of Appeals

225 Ariz. 43

234 P.3d 611

STATE of Arizona, Appellee,v.Daniel Roy ORGAN, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 09-0141.

Court of Appeals of Arizona Division 1, Department E.

June 17, 2010.

Terry Goddard, Attorney General by Kent E. Cattani, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals/Capital Litigation Section and Sarah E. Heckathorne, Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Appellee.

The Law Office of Richard D. Coffinger by Richard D. Coffinger, Glendale, Attorney for Appellant.

OPINION

WEISBERG, Judge.

¶ 1 Daniel Roy Organ (“Defendant”) appeals his convictions for possession of narcotic drugs, possession of dangerous drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions to suppress the drugs and drug paraphernalia found in his vehicle. For reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 On December 18, 2007, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Officer Lamb of the Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) was patrolling southbound on the Beeline Highway in an unmarked vehicle. He observed Defendant's automobile stopped on the shoulder of the northbound lanes with its four-way emergency flashers activated. The officer continued southbound until he could turn around safely and then headed back to the stopped vehicle to perform a welfare check and determine if the motorist was stranded and needed assistance.

¶ 3 When he was within 300 feet of the vehicle, Officer Lamb turned on his rear emergency lights. As he did so, the officer noticed that the emergency flashers were off and Defendant was driving slowly on the shoulder. The officer activated his front emergency lights to alert Defendant that he was a law enforcement officer.

¶ 4 Defendant stopped on the side of the highway and the officer approached him. When Officer Lamb asked Defendant if everything was alright, Defendant told the officer that he had stopped on the side of the road because he was tired and sleepy. The officer observed that Defendant had a lethargic speech pattern consistent with someone who could be sleep-deprived. In accordance with his routine practice when encountering drivers who may be sleepy, the officer had Defendant exit his vehicle and walk around to ensure he was not driving impaired and could drive home safely.

¶ 5 While speaking with Defendant, Officer Lamb became suspicious of his female passenger after Defendant said he did not know her name, but also told him he had known her for a couple of days. The passenger did not have any identification. Based on statements she made that were inconsistent with those made by Defendant and her admission that she had a prior conviction for prostitution, the officer believed he had encountered a “prostitution situation.” Officer Lamb asked Defendant if he would consent to a search of his vehicle, but Defendant declined. The officer stated he would have a K-9 unit sniff around his vehicle, and Defendant responded that he had no problem with that.

¶ 6 The officer ran a check on Defendant's driver's license and determined that it had been suspended. When the officer asked about the reported suspension, Defendant admitted his license was suspended due to his failure to appear in court. The officer informed Defendant that he had to impound his vehicle and told him he was not free to go. Pursuant to DPS policy, Officer Lamb conducted an inventory search of the vehicle prior to having it towed. In the front center console, the officer found a “stem or crack pipe” containing what was later confirmed to be crack cocaine, together with a baggie of methamphetamine and a small plastic container with additional crack cocaine.

¶ 7 Defendant was charged with possession of narcotic drugs, a class 4 felony; possession of dangerous drugs, a class 4 felony; and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class 6 felony. Prior to trial, Defendant filed separate motions to suppress evidence, alleging that the drugs and drug paraphernalia were obtained as a result of both an unlawful seizure and an illegal search. Following an evidentiary hearing at which both Officer Lamb and Defendant testified, the trial court denied the motions. The court found that the initial stop was a proper exercise of the community caretaking function and that the search was a valid inventory search.

¶ 8 Defendant submitted the issue of guilt to the trial court on a stipulated record and was found guilty on all three counts as charged. The trial court suspended Defendant's sentences and placed him on probation for two years, with a deferred jail term of six months and fines totaling $4,520.

¶ 9 Defendant timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-4033(A)(4) (2010).

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 A trial court's denial of a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 284, 908 P.2d 1062, 1069 (1996). In conducting our review, we defer to the trial court's findings of fact underlying its ruling. State v. Lopez, 198 Ariz. 420, 421, ¶ 7, 10 P.3d 1207, 1208 (App.2000). If the trial court has not articulated specific findings, we will infer those factual findings reasonably supported by the record that are necessary to support the trial court's ruling. State v. Russell, 175 Ariz. 529, 533, 858 P.2d 674, 678 (App.1993). We view the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in the light most favorable to upholding the trial court's ruling. State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, 116, ¶ 9, 14 P.3d 303, 307 (App.2000).

The Stop

¶ 11 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment does not forbid all searches and seizures, only those that are unreasonable. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). As a general rule, in order to be reasonable, a search or seizure must be made upon probable cause and pursuant to a legally issued warrant. Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970). However, “because the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,” those requirements are subject to certain exceptions. Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403, 126 S.Ct. 1943, 164 L.Ed.2d 650 (2006). See also

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (stating that Fourth Amendment's requirement of valid warrant supported by probable cause “subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions”).

¶ 12 In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), the United States Supreme Court recognized that because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles by states and localities and the frequency with which vehicles can become disabled or involved in an accident, local law enforcement may appropriately and lawfully engage in what the Court described as “community caretaking functions.” Such “police-citizen” contacts relating to public safety are “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute.” Id.

¶ 13 In Cady, after an accident, a Chicago police officer was arrested for drunken driving, later became comatose, and his vehicle was towed to a nearby garage. Local police officers conducted a search of the trunk because they had reason to believe that it contained a service revolver belonging to the driver. Id. at 442-43, 93 S.Ct. 2523. The Supreme Court held that based on the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement, the warrantless search of the trunk of the vehicle to retrieve the revolver was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment in order to protect “the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle” and it fell into improper hands. Id. at 447, 93 S.Ct. 2523.

¶ 14 In a context unrelated to vehicles, but involving an issue of public safety, in In re Tiffany O., 217 Ariz. 370, 376, ¶ 21, 174 P.3d 282, 288 (App.2007), this court acknowledged the existence of the police's community caretaking function as an exception to a warrantless search, although we held it inapplicable under the facts of the case. Id. at 377-78, ¶¶ 26-32, 174 P.3d at 289-90. As stated in Tiffany O., the community caretaking function permits a warrantless intrusion on privacy interests when the intrusion is:

suitably circumscribed to serve the exigency which prompted it.... The officer's ... conduct must be carefully limited to achieving the objective which justified the [search]-the officer may do no more than is reasonably necessary to ascertain whether someone is in need of assistance [or property is at risk] and to provide that assistance [or to protect that property.]

Id. at 376, ¶ 21, 174 P.3d at 282 (quoting People v. Ray, 21 Cal.4th 464, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 981 P.2d 928, 937 (1999)).

¶ 15 In Ray, the California Supreme Court set forth a standard approved by this court in Tiffany O., for determining whether there had been a proper exercise of the community caretaking function. The court held that:

The appropriate standard under the community caretaking exception is one of reasonableness: Given the known facts, would a prudent and reasonable officer have perceived a need to act in the proper discharge of his or her community caretaking functions? ... [A]s in other contexts, “in determining whether the officer acted reasonably, due weight must be given not to his unparticularized suspicions or ‘hunches,’ but to the reasonable inferences

...