State of California ex rel. Public Works Bd. v. Bragg
| Decision Date | 29 July 1986 |
| Citation | 183 Cal.App.3d 1018,228 Cal.Rptr. 576 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The STATE of California ex rel. PUBLIC WORKS BOARD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Patricia BRAGG, Defendant and Respondent. B010038. |
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Richard D. Martland, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Marvin Goldsmith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Robert H. Francis and Marsha S. Miller, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.
Alfred Fadel, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff and appellant State of California, acting by and through the State Public Works Board (Board), appeals from a judgment awarded defendant and respondent Patricia Bragg (Bragg) in an eminent domain action.
For reasons hereinafter expressed, the judgment is reversed.
On April 22, 1982, the Board filed an eminent domain action to condemn parcels of land in the Santa Monica Mountains. As owner of one of the parcels, Bragg filed an answer. The only issue set for trial was the fair market value of the parcel.
A local rule of the Los Angeles Superior Court pertaining to eminent domain, 1 "Exhibit A Requirements for Valuation Data" (Exhibit A), governs the preparation, filing and exchange of appraisal reports and their use at trial.
The deputy attorney general, who was handling his first condemnation case, did not timely file a complete appraisal report. The appraisal reports were nonetheless ordered exchanged.
On February 15, 1984, Bragg's counsel informed the deputy attorney general the Board's appraisal report was incomplete. On February 16, 1984, the deputy attorney general messengered to Bragg's counsel an allegedly complete appraisal report.
At the February 17, 1984 settlement conference, the deputy attorney general personally served a copy of the report on Bragg's counsel, and offered to continue the trial date. Bragg's counsel made an oral motion to exclude both the Board's completed appraisal report and its appraiser's testimony at the trial. The judicial officer in Department 43 reserved a ruling to the time of trial. 2
On the March 28, 1984 scheduled trial date, Bragg made a motion in limine to exclude the report on the grounds that the Board did not comply with the pre-trial order and Exhibit A and that the Board's proposed evidence would be highly prejudicial. Bragg's motion sought exclusion of: the appraisal of the subject property; testimony of the Board's expert as to the value of the subject parcel based on information in the report; evidence of a comparable sale designated in a February 23, 1984 letter from the Board to Bragg; and the testimony of two other proposed experts. The Board's report valued Bragg's property at $70,000, and indicated its highest and best use as a mountain retreat.
On March 29, the trial court granted Bragg's motion as to all items. After this ruling, the Board, through the deputy attorney general, did not in any way participate in the trial.
Bragg testified in her opinion, the fair market value of her property was between $175,000 and $180,000. Her expert appraiser opined that the fair market value of the property was $122,500 and that its highest and best use was as a single family residence, and Bragg's expert's appraisal report was admitted into evidence.
The jury found the fair market value of Bragg's property to be $145,000. She was also awarded litigation costs of $10,426, which included appraisal and attorney's fees.
The Board filed a motion for a new trial which was denied, and this appeal followed.
The Board contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting Bragg's motion in limine because there was no showing of prejudice due to the late filing of its complete appraisal report, and because the law favors a trial on the merits. It also contends the penalty thus imposed "adversely affect[ed]" the Board's cause of action in contravention of Code of Civil Procedure section 575.2, subdivision (b). 3
Although section 575.2 was enacted in 1982, it has never been interpreted and/or applied. In this case of first impression, we hold that section 575.2, subdivision (b) is applicable, and when counsel did not invoke it to protect his client, the trial court should have done so on its own motion.
Any sanctions imposed should have been limited to counsel because counsel, not the client, was responsible for filing the incomplete appraisal report in violation of the local rules.
The sanctions imposed "adversely affect[ed]" the client contrary to section 575.2, subdivision (b); therefore, the case is reversed and remanded.
The circumstances of this case contain all of the elements set out in section 575.2 and its application would be consistent with legislative intent.
The Board is contending on appeal that section 575.2, subdivision (b), circumscribes the only penalty available for its counsel's failure to comply with Exhibit A. The Board urges that the trial court's grant of Bragg's motion in limine in its entirety as a sanction, adversely affected the Board's cause of action and constituted prejudicial error.
An appellate court ordinarily will not consider procedural defects or erroneous rulings in connection with either relief sought or a defense asserted when an objection could have been but was not made to the lower court. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 311, p. 321.) But here, only a question of law is presented on the facts appearing in the record. (Barton v. Owen (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 484, 491, 139 Cal.Rptr. 494.) The Board is not arguing a new theory of the case, and it is basic horn-book law that the function of an appellate court is to review errors of law. (9 Witkin, supra, § 241, p. 246; Ernst v. Searle (1933) 218 Cal. 233, 240, 22 P.2d 715; 9 Witkin, supra, § 316, p. 327.) The interpretation and applicability of a statute is a question of law (9 Witkin, supra, § 242, p. 247). 5
Sections 575.1 and 575.2 were added in 1982 and are located within Title 7A, Pretrial Conferences, in the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 575.1 allows each superior court in the state to promulgate local rules "to expedite and facilitate the business of the court[,]" and "provide for the supervision and judicial management of actions from the date they are filed." 6
Section 575.2 discusses the effects of noncompliance, and subdivision (a) thereof provides for sanctions of striking all or any part of any pleading filed by the delinquent counsel or party, dismissal of a part or all of the action or proceeding, or entry of a judgment by default, or the imposition of any lesser penalty, including the moving party's attorney's fees.
However, subdivision (b) of section 575.2 circumscribes subdivision (a) by proclaiming that when counsel and not the party is responsible for the failure to comply with the local rules, any penalty "shall be imposed on counsel and shall not adversely affect the party's cause of action or defense thereto." (Italics added.)
(1) Statutory construction necessary.
When there is no ambiguity, uncertainty or doubt about the meaning of a statute and its words unequivocally express a certain definite thought, there is no need to apply rules of statutory construction. (Stockton Sav. & Loan Bank v. Massanet (1941) 18 Cal.2d 200, 207, 114 P.2d 592; 58 Cal.Jur.3d, Statutes, § 84, p. 434.)
While section 575.2, subdivisions (a) and (b), when read separately appear clear on their face, when read together, the two subdivisions are incongruent and conflicting. Subdivision (a) allows for a broad spectrum of penalties, but subdivision (b) sharply limits penalties in instances of attorney negligence.
(California Teachers Assn. v. San Diego Community College Dist. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 692, 698, 170 Cal.Rptr. 817, 621 P.2d 856, italics added.)
To harmonize the apparent discord in subdivisions (a) and (b), we examine the legislative history of section 575.2.
(2) Legislature history of sections 575.1 and 575.2. 7
Section 575 was adopted in 1955 and permits the Judicial Council to promulgate rules governing pretrial conferences in civil cases in the superior, municipal and justice courts. Also, since 1953, under Government Code section 68070, every court has been able to make rules for its own internal government, as long as the rules are not inconsistent with law or with those promulgated by the Judicial Council.
However, the superior courts lacked authority to enact rules governing pretrials. AB 3784, which was enacted in 1982 as sections 575.1 and 575.2, gave superior courts authority to draft rules aimed at expediting and facilitating the business of the court and to provide penalties for noncompliance. 8
(3) Intent clear that counsel's failure to comply with local rules was not to be imputed to the client.
AB 3784 was amended in the Senate Committee on Judiciary in response to the question whether "parties [should] suffer for the negligence of their lawyers." The recommendation that "[t]he bi...
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