State of Ind. v. HOBBS
| Decision Date | 30 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 19S01-1001-CR-10.,19S01-1001-CR-10. |
| Citation | 933 N.E.2d 1281 |
| Parties | STATE of Indiana, Appellant (Plaintiff below), v. James S. HOBBS, IV., Appellee (Defendant below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Cynthia L. Ploughe, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Steven E. Ripstra, Jasper, IN, Attorney for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 19A01-0904-CR-187
The defendant was arrested at a public restaurant for an unrelated crime. A drug dog called to sniff the defendant's car in the restaurant's parking lot indicated narcotics in the car. We hold that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a warrantless search of an operational vehicle found in a public place if the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime. We also hold that the search was reasonable and did not violate the Indiana Constitution because the defendant was already under arrest and the dog's alert gave the officers probable cause to believe the car contained contraband.
This is an appeal by the State from the trial court's order dismissing charges for lack of probable cause. The entire record consists of the court's ruling and the probable cause affidavit by the arresting officer. The facts recited in the officer's affidavit are as follow.
On March 13, 2009, state troopers positioned themselves across the street from a Pizza Hut in DuBois County seeking to execute a Pike County felony arrest warrant for James Hobbs whom they believed to be employed at the restaurant. Shortly before 9:15 p.m., the officers observed Hobbs leave the building and place an object in his automobile. Traffic prevented the officers from making an immediate arrest, and by the time the troopers reached the parking lot Hobbs had returned to the restaurant. The arrest was made inside the restaurant and a drug dog was summoned after Hobbs refused consent to search his vehicle. The dog alerted, indicating illegal narcotics, and the troopers then searched the vehicle and discovered a cooler containing two scales, a box of sandwich bags, rolling papers, and marijuana.
Hobbs was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of paraphernalia, both as Class A misdemeanors. At the initial hearing on these charges, the trial court found probable cause, but the next day the court sua sponte ruled that there was no probable cause to detain Hobbs on these charges because the evidence from Hobbs's car had been illegally seized. Specifically, the trial court found that the dog's alert provided probable cause to obtain a search warrant but because no warrant was obtained, the evidence was illegally seized. The trial court ordered the evidence excluded and Hobbs released on those charges. The State appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the dog sniff provided probable cause that supported a warrantless search of Hobbs's vehicle, and the seizure therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. There was no violation of Article I, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution because Hobbs was already under arrest, and the dog's alert gave strong indication of the presence of contraband in the vehicle. Under these circumstances, the balance of minimal intrusion against strong basis to believe evidence of a crime rendered the search reasonable. State v. Hobbs, 915 N.E.2d 197, 200, 202 (Ind.Ct.App.2009). We granted transfer.
We review issues of law incident to rulings on suppression of evidence de novo. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146, 1150 (Ind.2005). The trial court's factual determinations after an evidentiary hearing are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard, but rulings based solely on a paper record are reviewed de novo. Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 804-05 (Ind.Ct.App.2010).
I. Fourth Amendment Claims
Hobbs contends that the warrantless search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Unless one of several established exceptions applies, law enforcement officers must obtain a warrant based on probable cause before executing a search or a seizure.
The parties address several potential exceptions to this requirement. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the “automobile exception” applied here, but the “search incident to arrest” did not.
Hobbs contends that because the arrest occurred inside the Pizza Hut restaurant, away from his vehicle and there was no threat to officer safety, the search of his car was not authorized as a search incident to arrest. We agree. This exception to the warrant requirement was articulated in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), where the Court identified the “exigencies” attending an arrest that permit law enforcement officers to search the “area into which an arrestee might reach”: the need to preserve evidence that might otherwise be destroyed, and concern for the safety of an officer making an arrest. These considerations have specifically been cited to justify warrantless searches of automobiles because the smaller confines of an automobile are “generally, even if not inevitably” within reach of the arrestee. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981). More recently, in Arizona v. Gant, ---U.S. ----, 129 S.Ct. 1710, 1723, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the court made clear that the preservation of evidence justified a warrantless search only if the officer has a reasonable belief that the automobile contains evidence of the crime for which the suspect is being arrested. Here, we agree with Hobbs that neither officer safety nor preservation of evidence justified the search of Hobbs's car as one conducted incident to arrest. Hobbs had already been secured and was not close to the car, so he presented no threat to officer safety. And because the arrest was for a different crime in another county, there was no reasonable belief that evidence of the “crime of arrest” would be found. The exception for searches incident to arrest is therefore inapplicable.
The “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement allows police to search a vehicle without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a crime will be found in the vehicle. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). This doctrine is grounded in two notions: 1) a vehicle is readily moved and therefore the evidence may disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and 2) citizens have lower expectations of privacy in their vehicles than in their homes. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). One reason for this diminished expectation of privacy in a car and its contents is that cars travel along public highways and are subject to pervasive government regulation. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Most cases addressing the automobile exception arise in the context of an arrest or an investigatory stop of a motorist that gives rise to probable cause, but the exception is grounded in the mobility of the vehicle and its location in a public area, not on whether the issue arises in the context of an arrest or a traffic stop.
As the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Carney, the exception applies to vehicles that are readily mobile and are found in a non-residential area. 471 U.S. at 392-93, 105 S.Ct. 2066. The clear implication is that an operable vehicle found in a residential area may not be searched under this exception, but one located in a non-residential area, whether by reason of a police stop or not, is subject to the exception. The theory underlying the exception for vehicles is that the vehicle is “being used for transportation.” Id. at 394, 105 S.Ct. 2066. Put another way, a public parking lot is typically an interim destination, but a home's driveway is often the end of that day's travels. We recognize that police might anticipate finding an automobile at a suspect's home. However, permitting the exception to apply where the vehicle may be expected to be found would open the door to warrantless searches where there is no reason to avoid the judicial oversight contemplated by the Fourth Amendment. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-64, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
The defendant contends he “was not in any position to control any aspect of the vehicle.” But the automobile exception does not require that there be an imminent possibility the vehicle may be driven away. Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 466-67, 119 S.Ct. 2013, 144 L.Ed.2d 442 (1999) (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982)). Under the exception, an operational vehicle is inherently mobile, whether or not a driver is behind the wheel or has ready access. See Myers, 839 N.E.2d at 1152. With probable cause, this inherent mobility is enough to conduct a warrantless search under the automobile exception. Id. Nothing in the record indicates that Hobbs's vehicle was not operational. Because Hobbs's admittedly mobile vehicle was in the parking area of a restaurant, it was subject to the automobile exception and no warrant was required to search the vehicle if the officers...
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