Myers v. State

• Decision Date: 21 December 2005
• Docket Number: No. 20S03-0411-CR-00494.,20S03-0411-CR-00494.
• Citation: 839 N.E.2d 1146
• Parties: James Thomas MYERS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 1146

839 N.E.2d 1146

James Thomas MYERS, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).

No. 20S03-0411-CR-00494.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

December 21, 2005.

Nancy A. McCaslin, McCaslin & McCaslin, Elkhart, for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Joby Jerrells, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee.

ON PETITION FOR TRANSFER FROM THE INDIANA COURT OF APPEALS, NO. 20A03-0310-CR-00398.

DICKSON, Justice.

The defendant, James Thomas Myers, challenges the admission of evidence resulting from a warrantless search of his car based on a police canine sniff sweep of the car following a routine traffic stop. He was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in excess of three grams with intent to deliver, a Class A felony. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Myers v. State, 812 N.E.2d 146 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). We granted transfer and now affirm the trial court.

Separately claiming violation of both the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against unreasonable search and seizure, the defendant's appeal contends (a) that the warrantless canine sniff test of his vehicle was impermissible because it was not done until after the stop had been completed; (b) that, even if the canine sweep occurred before the traffic stop concluded, there was no probable cause to authorize either the exterior vehicle canine sniff or the resulting interior search; and (c) that because his vehicle was not mobile, the warrantless search of the interior of the defendant's vehicle was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

This case arises from the following events. About 1:00 a.m. on March 14, 2002, in Goshen, Indiana, police officer Shawn Turner noticed the defendant's vehicle because as it was driving towards him, it was passing two other vehicles that were also driving towards him, and its engine was "roaring" above the engines of the other two vehicles. Appellant's App'x 127. Officer Turner then observed the vehicle turn onto a street without signaling. Because of the failure to signal and the "speed contest," id. at 128, 149, Officer Turner activated his emergency lights and followed the defendant who proceeded into the driveway of his residential mobile home, stopped, and began to exit his car. The officer pulled into the driveway, stopping the police vehicle about fifteen to twenty feet behind the defendant's car. Officer Turner then ordered the defendant back to his car and requested his driver's license and registration. Officer Turner walked up to the defendant's car and observed a mist and a strong scent of cologne in the passenger compartment. As the defendant handed Officer Turner his driver's license and registration, the defendant's hands were shaky, and he appeared very nervous, talking very fast and excitedly, and exhibiting constricted pupils. Upon identifying the defendant, Officer Turner became more suspicious because the Goshen Drug Unit had previously informed members of the police department that the defendant was suspected of drug activity. Officer Turner was aware that cologne was often used to mask lingering odor of contraband and that people influenced by certain types of drugs have constricted pupils even in the darkness. Id. at 130-31, 155. Officer Turner returned to his patrol car, radioed for license and registration verification, requested a canine unit to assist with the stop, and began filling out a traffic violation warning ticket. Id. at 132-33. At 1:32 a.m., about thirteen minutes after the traffic stop began, Deputy Mike McHenry, a canine officer, arrived with his narcotics detection dog. The parties dispute whether the canine sniff search of the vehicle's exterior occurred before the traffic stop concluded. Officer Turner testified that he called the defendant out of the car and was discussing the violation and warning ticket with him and "where we were going to go from there" while Deputy McHenry's canine was conducting an exterior sniff of the vehicle, which Deputy McHenry reported took about a minute to a minute and a half. Id. at 133, 159. When the dog reacted to the exterior passenger side of the vehicle, the officers opened the door and had the dog sniff the interior of the vehicle, again reacting and leading the officers to the trunk. The officers then performed their own warrantless search of the inside of the car, discovering cologne in the console; methamphetamine in the glove compartment; and marijuana, methamphetamine, a ledger, and scales in the trunk. Id. at 134-35. Officer Turner testified that he placed the defendant in handcuffs "when we first started discovering evidence within the vehicle." Id. at 145.

The defendant's motion to suppress the items found in the vehicle was overruled, and he objected to their admission at trial.

I. Fourth Amendment Claim

A. Propriety of Vehicle Dog Sniff Following Traffic Stop

The defendant does not dispute the propriety of the traffic stop but argues that the traffic stop was completed before any reasonable suspicion arose, and that the police therefore lacked any valid basis to conduct the dog sniff of his vehicle.

The use of narcotics sniffing dogs by police has recently been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. Deciding "[w]hether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detention dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic stop," the Court declared that the use of a narcotics-detection dog "generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests." Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 125 S.Ct. 834, 837, 838, 160 L.Ed.2d 842, 846, 847 (2005). It reasoned that "[o]fficial conduct that does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy is not a search subject to the fourth Amendment," that "government conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband compromises no legitimate privacy interests," and that "the expectation that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities is not the same as an interest in privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable." Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837-38, 160 L.Ed.2d at 847 (included quotations omitted). The Court held that "conducting a dog sniff would not change the character of a traffic stop that is lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable manner. . . ." Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837-38, 160 L.Ed.2d at 848. The Court did note, however, that a "seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become unlawful if it if prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete that mission." Caballes, 125 S.Ct. at 837, 160 L.Ed.2d at 846.

The defendant does not contend that the canine sniff prolonged his own detention by the police. Rather, his claim is that, once the stop was complete, his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the police thereafter conducting the canine sweep of his vehicle. This claim fails for two independent reasons. First, as explained in Caballes, a canine sweep of the exterior of a vehicle does not intrude upon a Fourth Amendment privacy interest. Second, the trial court properly determined that the canine sweep was conducted before the traffic stop was completed.

Noting that "[t]his short time period [from the commencement of the traffic stop at 1:19 a.m. to the canine sniff beginning at 1:32 a.m.] did not reflect any delay on the part of Sgt. Turner and supports the State's contention that the traffic stop was ongoing," the trial court also found that "at the time the canine was performing its sniff of the exterior of the vehicle, Sgt. Turner was engaged in the process of explaining the traffic citation to the Defendant" and that Officer Turner "had not completed the traffic stop prior to the time of the canine sweep of the vehicle." Appellant's App'x 76-77.

While the determination of reasonable suspicion and probable cause requires de novo review on appeal, a trial court's determination of historical fact is entitled to deferential review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695-99, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1661-63, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 918-20 (1996). Both the defendant and the State agree that the court on appeal does not reweigh the evidence but considers the evidence most favorably to the trial court's ruling. See Duncan v. State, 799 N.E.2d 538, 542 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); Sullivan v. State, 748 N.E.2d 861, 865 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). A trial court's factual findings will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Fair v. State, 627 N.E.2d 427, 434 (Ind.1993). Because it is supported by the facts and inferences from the record, we find no error in the trial court's determination of historical fact that the canine sniff test occurred while the traffic stop was ongoing.

B. Canine Sniff Test and Probable Cause

The defendant next contends that, even if conducted in the course of the traffic stop, the canine sniff search and the ensuing search of the vehicle's interior were constitutionally improper because of the absence of probable cause. As noted above, however, the United States Supreme Court has determined that the use of such narcotics-detection dogs to sniff the exterior of an automobile does not implicate Fourth Amendment privacy interests. Probable cause is thus not a prerequisite to the use of this police investigative technique.

We are persuaded that the positive reaction of the narcotics-detection dog to the exterior of the defendant's vehicle, however, especially in light of the defendant's dilated pupils, his extreme nervousness, and the presence of heavy cologne mist, constituted probable cause for further police investigation regarding the contents of the vehicle's interior.

C. Vehicle Mobility and Warrantless Vehicle Search

The defendant also urges that because his vehicle was not mobile, the warrantless search of the interior of his vehicle was not justified by the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. He...