State Of Iowa v. Johnson

• Decision Date: 09 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 08-0533.,08-0533.
• Citation: 784 N.W.2d 192
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee,v.Andrew Russell JOHNSON, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

784 N.W.2d 192

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,v.Andrew Russell JOHNSON, Appellant.

No. 08-0533.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

July 9, 2010.

Gary D. Dickey, Jr. of Dickey & Campbell Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Cristen O. Douglass (until withdrawal) and then Elisabeth S. Reynoldson, Assistant Attorneys General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Steven M. Foritano, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

TERNUS, Chief Justice.

This matter comes to us on further review of the court of appeals' decision affirming the second-degree murder conviction of appellant, Andrew Russell Johnson. The court of appeals rejected Johnson's claims that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress and in determining he was competent to stand trial. The court of appeals also held there was substantial evidence in the record to support Johnson's conviction. Finally, the court of appeals refused Johnson's request to preserve his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on trial counsel's failure to assert that Johnson was a victim of selective prosecution because Johnson had failed to articulate this claim on appeal with the requisite specificity.

We granted Johnson's application for further review to consider two issues: (1) the court of appeals' review of the trial court's determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial for correction of errors of law, and (2) the court of appeals' decision that Johnson's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was too general to preserve. See Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005) (“On further review, we can review any or all of the issues raised on appeal or limit our review to just those issues brought to our attention by the application for further review.”); State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 2004) (declining to exercise discretion on further review to consider all issues raised on appeal, deciding instead to consider only the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim). Upon our review, we vacate the court of appeals' decision on both issues,¹ affirm the district court's judgment and preserve the defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for postconviction relief.

I. Competency to Stand Trial.

A. Standard of Review. Before we review the trial court's determination that Johnson was competent to stand trial, we address Johnson's contention the court of appeals applied an incorrect standard of review. The court of appeals reviewed the trial court's decision on this issue for correction of errors of law. Johnson asserts review of a competency decision should be de novo because a claim the defendant is not competent to stand trial implicates the defendant's due process rights. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 1376, 134 L.Ed.2d 498, 505-06 (1996).

This issue was addressed in a recent decision in which we held the constitutional basis of a claim the defendant is not competent to be tried requires a de novo review on appeal. State v. Lyman, 776 N.W.2d 865, 873 (Iowa 2010). Therefore, we will review the trial court's decision on the issue of the defendant's competency de novo.

B. Applicable Legal Principles. In Lyman, we reviewed the legal principles that govern a defendant's claim of incompetency to stand trial:

At common law, the State could not try a criminal defendant if that person's mental condition was such that he or she lacked the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing a defense. The Supreme Court has stated the test to determine if a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial is whether the person “ ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with [counsel] with a reasonable degree of rational understanding-and whether [the person] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings.’ ” In Iowa, we define the test as whether “the defendant is suffering from a mental disorder which prevents the defendant from appreciating the charge, understanding the proceedings, or assisting effectively in the defense.” The common thread running through these tests is that a criminal defendant must be able to effectively assist counsel in his or her defense.

We presume a defendant is competent to stand trial. The defendant has the burden of proving his or her incompetency to stand trial by a preponderance of the evidence. If the evidence is in equipoise, the presumption of competency prevails.

Id. at 873-84 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825 (1960) and Iowa Code § 812.3(1) (2005)) (citations omitted).

Here, the defendant does not contest his ability to appreciate the charge against him and understand the proceedings. Rather, he asserts his borderline personality disorder prevented him from assisting effectively in his defense.

C. Discussion. About two months before Johnson's scheduled trial on a first-degree murder charge, he requested a hearing on his competency to stand trial. A hearing was held, at which both parties presented expert testimony.

Johnson's expert, psychologist Dr. Jeffrey Kline, conducted a thorough review of Johnson's long history of treatment for mental disorders, administered various psychological tests to Johnson, and extensively interviewed the defendant. Dr. Kline opined that Johnson suffered from a borderline personality disorder that creates “an almost constant interference” with his relationship with his attorneys. Johnson's illness, according to Dr. Kline, manifests itself in emotional variability and paranoia. Dr. Kline noted that Johnson exhibited distrust of his lawyers and often thought they were conspiring against him. As a result, Dr. Kline believed Johnson “[a]t times ... may not be able to consider rationally the advice of counsel.” Dr. Kline concluded “Johnson is unable to effectively assist in his own defense and therefore [is] incompetent to proceed in this matter.”

The State's expert, psychiatrist Dr. James Dennert, spent less time in assessing Johnson's competency to stand trial, but reviewed pertinent documents, including Dr. Kline's reports, and interviewed the defendant for several hours. Dr. Dennert opined that Johnson did not suffer from a mental illness that would prevent him from assisting in his own defense. Dr. Dennert's opinion was based to some extent on his conclusion that “a good deal of what [Johnson] told [him] is best interpreted as being self-serving.” Dr. Dennert believed Johnson repeated to him and others what he had read in Dr. Kline's reports and elsewhere “as a means of trying to help his case.” Dr. Dennert concluded Johnson was “perfectly capable of assisting his attorneys effectively.” He noted Johnson may not choose to do so, but his failure to assist his attorneys was a matter of choice.

We also have the benefit of the trial court's observations of the defendant at the competency hearing. In concluding Johnson was competent, the trial court noted Johnson's demeanor in the courtroom was appropriate, and he consulted with one or both of his attorneys at various times during the proceeding. The court also observed in its ruling that there were no professional statements by the defendant's attorneys or other evidence that Johnson's attorneys were unable to communicate with him “regarding his case and any other issues in a rational and logical manner.”

After reviewing the record, we are persuaded by the testimony of Dr. Dennert and the trial court's observations and conclude that Johnson failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was not competent to stand trial. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court on this issue.

II. Ineffective-Assistance-of-Counsel Claim.

A. Background Facts and Proceedings. Johnson was charged with first-degree murder in the death of Matthew Stegman. Several individuals participated to some degree in Stegman's murder. Of those involved, all but Alexandra Habeck were charged with first-degree murder. On appeal, Johnson claims the prosecution's decision not to charge Habeck constituted a violation of his right to equal protection under the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. See generally Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S.Ct. 501, 506, 7 L.Ed.2d 446, 453 (1962) (holding selectivity in prosecution violates the Equal Protection Clause when the decision was “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification”). Johnson claims that he was less culpable than Habeck, given that Johnson did not assault or kill the victim and left the scene during the commission of the murder while Habeck actively assisted in the physical assault of the victim and held the shirts of two other defendants to keep blood from getting on their clothes during the murder.

Johnson's trial counsel did not make a selective-prosecution claim in the district court. On appeal, Johnson's appellate counsel suggested in his brief that trial counsel's failure to raise this claim could have resulted from a belief that the county attorney's charging decisions were not yet final or could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this uncertainty, appellate counsel asserted the record was not sufficient to determine on direct appeal whether trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance and this claim should be preserved for a postconviction-relief proceeding. The court of appeals refused to preserve the claim on the ground that it was “too general in nature” because the defendant had not specified “which, if any, impermissible classification the prosecutor allegedly based the charging decision on, nor [had the defendant made] any other specific argument with regard to this issue.”

B. Governing Legal Principles. Iowa Code chapter 822 (2007) provides a procedure for persons “convicted of, or sentenced for, a public offense” to assert a claim for postconviction...