State Of Minn. v. Hester
| Decision Date | 03 August 2010 |
| Docket Number | A09-1784,File No. 64-CR-08-829 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Brian Noel Hester, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Emerald Gratz, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota;
Patrick R. Rohland, Redwood County Attorney, Redwood Falls, Minnesota (for respondent)
Allen P. Eskens, Eskens, Gibson & Behm Law Firm, Chtd., Mankato, Minnesota (for appellant)
Redwood County District Court
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge; Lansing, Judge; and Shumaker, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
A jury found Brian Hester guilty of test refusal under the Minnesota Impaired Driving Code, Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.01-.78 (2008). Following conviction he moved for a new trial on the grounds that the arresting peace officer from the Lower Sioux Indian Community Police Department lacked the authority to administer a preliminary breath test or request additional chemical testing. Because the Lower Sioux Indian Community substantially complied with the statutory requirements to appoint peace officers and the appointed peace officers are authorized to enforce the impaired-driving code's testing requirements, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hester's motion for a new trial.
Brian Hester drove his truck into a ditch near Jackpot Junction Casino in December 2008. A peace officer of the Lower Sioux Indian Community Police Department responded to a motorist-assistance call and, following a brief investigation, administered a preliminary breath test. The results indicated that Hester's blood alcohol content was.13. The officer took Hester to the Redwood County Law Enforcement Center and administered three field sobriety tests. Based on Hester's performance, the officer read Hester the implied-consent advisory and asked Hester to take a urine or blood test. Hester refused and was charged with felony driving while impaired (DWI) and felony test refusal.
The felony test-refusal charge proceeded to a jury trial. Hester did not challenge the arresting officer's qualifications as a peace officer before or during trial. But two weeks after the jury returned its guilty verdict, Hester moved to vacate the judgment or for a new trial, arguing that the Lower Sioux peace officers were not authorized to administer a preliminary breath test or invoke the implied-consent advisory.
Hester submitted additional argument in support of his motion, and the state submitted argument and evidence in opposition. Hester's challenge was two-fold. First, Hester argued that Lower Sioux peace officers were not authorized by the DWI code to administer a preliminary breath test or request the additional chemical test. Second, he claimed that even if the DWI code could include Lower Sioux peace officers, the Lower Sioux Indian Community failed to comply with the statutory requirements to qualify as a law-enforcement agency and therefore lacked authority to appoint peace officers.
The district court noted that the Lower Sioux Indian Community did not strictly comply with all of the statutory requirements to appoint peace officers, but it concluded that the Lower Sioux Indian Community substantially complied with the requirements. The district court denied Hester's new-trial motion, reasoning that the Minnesota statutes granted the Lower Sioux peace officers the same powers as the Redwood County Sheriffs Department and that these powers include enforcing the DWI statutes.
Hester appeals, renewing his statutory claims and arguing that the district court erred in applying the doctrine of substantial compliance to the statutes governing the Lower Sioux Indian Community's authority to appoint peace officers. The state argues that Hester waived his challenges to the Lower Sioux peace officers' authority by notraising the issue before trial and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hester's new-trial motion.
The state argues that Hester's posttrial challenge to the authority of the Lower Sioux peace officers was waived by his failure to raise the issue before trial. At the time Hester was charged and tried, rule 10.01 of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure stated that "[d]efenses, objections, issues, or requests which are capable of determination without trial on the merits shall be asserted or made before trial by a motion to dismiss or to grant appropriate relief." Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.01 (2008). Rule 10.03 provided that "[f]ailure to include [all defenses, objections, issues and requests available before trial] in the motion constitutes waiver thereof, but the court for good cause shown may grant relief from the waiver." Minn. R. Crim. P. 10.03 (2008).
In his posttrial motion, Hester did not provide a reason for his failure to raise his claims before trial. Hester's challenge is directed to the validity of the arrest and complaint, which would be best addressed before, rather than after, a jury trial in which the state successfully proved that the test-administering officer was a peace officer, that the officer had probable cause to believe Hester was driving his truck while impaired, and that Hester refused to submit to a chemical test after being advised of his rights under Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 () and §.51, subd. 2 () (2008).
But the state also failed to raise its waiver argument when Hester made his posttrial motion and therefore the state did not properly preserve the issue for appeal. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (). Because the district court did not consider the state's waiver claim and the case raises fundamental questions related to the Lower Sioux Indian Community Police Department's authority, we will review the merits of Hester's challenges in the interest of justice. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 11 ().
Hester appealed from the district court's denial of his motion for a new trial. This form of relief, however, does not readily fit Hester's claims. Hester is arguing that the charge is invalid because he did not refuse a test administered by a peace officer. This is not a trial error, and a new trial would not provide a remedy. Consequently, we review Hester's challenge as an appeal from his judgment of conviction that essentially raises an issue of statutory interpretation. Minn. R. Crim. P. 28.02, subd. 3 ().
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Reider v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist. No. 11, 728 N.W.2d 246, 249 (Minn. 2007). If the language of the statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. Am. Tower, L.P. v. City of Grant, 636 N.W.2d 309, 312 (Minn. 2001). We must consider sections of a statutetogether to determine meaning. Chanhassen Estates Residents Ass'n v. City of Chanhassen, 342 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Minn. 1984).
The DWI test-refusal statute requires that a defendant's refusal must be in response to the testing request of a peace officer. Minn. Stat. §§ 169A.20, subd. 2,.51, subd. 1 (2008); 10A Minnesota Practice, CRIMJIG 29.28 (2006). If the testadministering officer was not a peace officer for the purposes of the DWI-testing statutes, Hester's refusal would not constitute a crime.
Hester argues first, that the Lower Sioux peace officers cannot enforce the DWItesting laws because they are not included in the statutory definition of a "peace officer" in the DWI chapter. Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 1 (2008), states that "unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the terms defined in this section have the meanings given." The term "peace officer" means "(1) a [s]tate [p]atrol officer; (2) University of Minnesota peace officer; (3) police officer of any municipality, including towns having powers under section 368.01, or county; and (4) for purposes of violations of this chapter in or on an off-road recreational vehicle or motorboat, or for violations of section 97B.065 or 97B.066, a state conservation officer." Minn. Stat. § 169A.03, subd. 18 (2008).
To make his argument, Hester relies heavily on State Dep't of Highways v. O'Connor, which held that a police officer of Eagan Township was not a peace officer as defined in the DWI chapter because the term "municipality" excludes townships in other statutes and in its general usage. 289 Minn. 243, 245-46, 183 N.W.2d 574, 576 (1971). Hester contends that the decision in O'Connor means that the list of individualsconsidered peace officers in the DWI statute is exclusive. But the O'Connor court did not decide this question and Hester's interpretation ignores significant changes in the statutes since O'Connor was decided.
A definition of "peace officer" has been added to the chapter covering training and licensing of law-enforcement officials that specifically includes "a peace officer who is employed by a law enforcement agency of a federally recognized tribe... and who is licensed by the [Board of Peace Officer Standards and Training]." Minn. Stat. § 626.84, subd. 1(c)(2) (2008). The Minnesota legislature has also adopted provisions which allow federally recognized tribes to appoint peace officers and enforce state criminal laws within the boundaries of its reservation. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. §§ 626.90 (),.93 (granting peace officers of any federally recognized tribe power to enforce state criminal law) (2008). The legislature specifically provided that if the Lower Sioux Indian Community meets certain requirements, it "is authorized to appoint peace officers, as defined in section 626.84, subdivision 1, paragraph (c), who have...
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