State Of Minn. V. Nieves

Decision Date29 June 2010
Docket NumberA09-954
PartiesState of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Moises Aguilar Nieves, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Thomas R. Ragatz, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

David W. Merchant, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Villalva Lijo, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant) Affirmed

Larkin, Judge

Ramsey County District Court File No. 62-CR-08-14396

Considered and decided by Larkin, Presiding Judge; Shumaker, Judge; and Bjorkman, Judge.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LARKIN, Judge

On appeal from his conviction of second-degree murder, appellant argues that the district court erred by (1) determining that his Miranda waiver was valid, (2) failing to

suppress the statements that he made after he allegedly invoked his right to remain silent, and (3) communicating with the deliberating jury outside of his presence and without his consent. We affirm.

FACTS

On October 21, 2008, a body, later identified as S.E., was discovered near an intersection in Saint Paul. A medical examination revealed that S.E. had died from extensive trauma to his lower abdominal wall and upper thighs, including a laceration to the right inguinal region1 that resulted in extensive bleeding. During the investigation of S.E.'s death, Saint Paul Police Sergeant John R. Wright interviewed S.E.'s ex-girlfriend, M.E., who lived near the scene of S.E.'s death. M.E. stated that S.E. had been struck by a car driven by appellant Moises Aguilar Nieves.

Sergeant Wright and Sergeant Tom Bergren, also of the Saint Paul Police Department, went to Nieves's home and asked him if he would speak to them. Nieves agreed to answer the officers' questions. He also agreed to accompany the officers to the police station for an interview. The officers denied Nieves's requests to be interviewed at his home and to drive his own vehicle to the station.

At the beginning of the ensuing interview at the police station, Sergeant Wright advised Nieves of his Miranda rights. Sergeant Wright read the Miranda warning to Nieves, in English, from a waiver form. Nieves initialed each of the rights on the form and signed it. Although Nieves spoke with a thick accent, Sergeant Wright did not offer, and Nieves did not request, an interpreter. Nieves admitted that he struck S.E. with his vehicle, and he was arrested at the conclusion of the interview.

The state charged Nieves with one count of intentional second-degree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(1) (2008), and one count of unintentional seconddegree murder under Minn. Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2008). Nieves moved to suppress his statement, claiming that his Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent, because it had been made without the benefit of an interpreter. Nieves also claimed that his statement was involuntary. The district court denied Nieves's motion, after concluding that Nieves was not disabled in communication and that his statement was "completely voluntary."2

The case was tried to a jury. At trial, Nieves testified that M.E., his friend and coworker, told him that S.E. had sexually assaulted her. On the night of S.E.'s death, M.E. asked Nieves to follow her home after work. While en route, Nieves witnessed S.E. approach M.E.'s vehicle, stand at the driver's door, and yell at M.E. Nieves testified that he drove his vehicle toward M.E.'s vehicle in an attempt to frighten S.E., but he lost control of the vehicle and struck M.E.'s vehicle, pinning S.E. between the two vehicles.

Pursuant to Nieves's request, the district court provided a jury instruction regarding the defense of others. During its deliberations, the jury submitted two written questions to the district court. The first question was: "Is 'election to defend' means the plaintiff intended action (as testified), or is it the plaintiff consequence of his action? Is 'defendants' action his intended (as testified) action, or is it his action of consequence?" The district court responded in writing: "The questions seem to involve a mixture of law and fact. You are the exclusive finders of fact. I cannot in any way intrude upon your area of responsibility. Can you clarify or restate your questions so that my response does not influence your fact-finding consequences?" The jury then submitted a second question: "Please define what the term 'election to defend' means." The district court responded in writing: "The words 'election to defend' mean making a choice to protect from danger." The record indicates that Nieves was not notified of these questions, or the district court's responses, until after the jury returned its verdict.

The jury found Nieves guilty of unintentional second-degree murder, and the district court sentenced Nieves to serve 180 months in prison. This appeal follows.

DECISION
I.

Nieves claims that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statement to the police, arguing that he did not validly waive his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Minnesota Constitution protect individuals from compelled self-incrimination. Because of the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation, a criminal suspect must be advised of certain rights, in what is commonly referred to as a Miranda warning, before any custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630 (1966).

A defendant may waive his rights, "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Id. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612. "Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1141 (1986) (quotation omitted). The state bears the burden of proving a valid waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1986); State v. Farrah, 735 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Minn. 2007). "[T]he state has carried its burden of proof if it shows that the [Miranda] warning was given and defendant stated that he understood his rights." State v. Ngoc Van Vu, 339 N.W.2d 892, 897 (Minn. 1983). But if there is other credible evidence indicating that the waiver was not knowing and intelligent, "the state must produce additional evidence and the [district] court must make a subjective factual inquiry to determine, on the basis of all the circumstances, whether the waiver was effective." Id. at 897-98. "Findings of fact surrounding a claimed Miranda waiver are reviewed for clear error; legal conclusions based on those facts are reviewed de novo." Farrah, 735 N.W.2d at 341.

Nieves's main contention is that his Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent because he does not understand English and the police did not provide him with an interpreter. "[T]he constitutional rights of persons disabled in communication cannot be fully protected unless qualified interpreters are available to assist them in legal proceedings." Minn. Stat. § 611.30 (2008). Pursuant to this policy, the legislature has "provide[d] a procedure for the appointment of interpreters to avoid injustice and assistpersons disabled in communication in their own defense." Id. The term "persons disabled in communication" includes a person who, "because of difficulty in speaking or comprehending the English language, cannot fully understand the proceedings or any charges made against the person,... or is incapable of presenting or assisting in the presentation of a defense." Minn. Stat. § 611.31 (2008). "Following the apprehension or arrest of a person disabled in communication for an alleged violation of a criminal law, the arresting officer... shall immediately make necessary contacts to obtain a qualified interpreter and shall obtain an interpreter at the earliest possible time at the place of detention." Minn. Stat. § 611.32, subd. 2 (2008).

While "[a] violation of the interpreter statutes does not necessarily require exclusion of a defendant's statements at trial," State v. Marin, 541 N.W.2d 370, 373 (Minn. App. 1996), review denied (Minn. Feb. 27, 1996), a defendant's language barrier may support a conclusion that the defendant's Miranda waiver was not valid. For example, in State v. Al-Naseer, the defendant's language barrier was a strong factor supporting a finding that he did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. 678 N.W.2d 679, 691 (Minn. App. 2004), rev'd on other grounds, 690 N.W.2d 744 (Minn. 2005). A videotape of the defendant's police interview showed that he had difficulty understanding English; he said his English was "not very good"; he repeatedly stated that he did not understand; he asked for clarification several times; and he struggled with pronunciation. Id. In addition, the defendant had no prior convictions, and he stated that he was unfamiliar with the criminal-justice system. Id. We concludedthat under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant did not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waive his constitutional rights. Id.

The facts of this case are readily distinguishable from those in Al-Naseer. After asking Nieves preliminary questions, such as his name, address, and date of birth, Sergeant Wright read Nieves the Miranda warning. After telling Nieves that he had the right to remain silent and could refuse to answer any questions, Sergeant Wright asked Nieves if he understood, and Nieves answered in the affirmative. Nieves also answered in the affirmative when Sergeant Wright asked him if he understood that he had the right to talk to an attorney, that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one, and that he could remain silent until he had talked to the lawyer....

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT