State of Minnesota ex rel. Wheeler v. Foley
| Citation | 15 N.W. 375,30 Minn. 350 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota ex rel. Caroline L. B. Wheeler v. J. G. Foley, County Auditor |
| Decision Date | 29 March 1883 |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Mandamus. The relator purchased at tax sales, for the years from 1858 to 1862, certain land in the county of Washington and paid the taxes thereon till 1878, when the tax sales were adjudged void by the district court of that county. Having made a formal demand upon respondent, as auditor of the county, that he draw an order on the county treasurer in her favor for the amount paid by her on such tax sales and for subsequent taxes, with interest at the rate of ten per cent per annum, which was refused, the relator and respondent entered into a stipulation admitting the above facts consenting that relator should apply for a writ of mandamus, and waiving all objections on the ground that such proceeding does not furnish the proper remedy, the only objections being "the non-applicability and unconstitutionality of the act in question." Upon the demand and stipulation, application was made to the district court for Washington county for a peremptory writ of mandamus directed to respondent, and respondent appeals from an order by Simons, J., (acting for the judge of the first district,) granting such application.
Ira W. Castle, for respondent, (appellant here.)
John H. Case, for relator.
The relator seeks by mandamus to enforce repayment from the treasury of Washington county of money paid by her for the purchase of lands in that county at tax sales made during the period from 1858 to 1862, and also taxes paid by her upon the same lands subsequent to her purchase at tax sale, and extending over the period from 1862 to 1876, inclusive, with interest upon all of such sums at the rate of 10 per cent. per annum. In 1878 the tax sales were duly adjudged to have been void and were annulled, the reason therefor being stated in the judgment. Any objections which might have been raised to the form of the remedy are waived, and it is conceded on the part of the respondent that the relator is entitled to recover the purchase price paid at the tax sales, with interest as demanded. As to the taxes paid from 1862 to 1876, the right of recovery is contested, it being claimed that such right exists only by force of Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 97, ( Gen. Laws 1881, c. 10, § 19,) and it seems to have been claimed in the court below that such act could not operate retroactively, so as to give a right of recovery not before existing, without violating constitutional guaranties. But, in the brief of the respondent now before us, the point is not distinctly made that that act is unconstitutional, and no allusion is made to the statute in force when the tax sales were made, or to the effect of such statute. The case, however, involves questions of such general interest and importance, that we deem it incumbent upon us to consider and decide the questions which are necessarily involved, although they have not been formally raised in the briefs.
The statute in force when the tax sales were made contains this provision, viz.: "If, after the conveyance of any land sold for taxes, it shall be discovered that the sale was invalid, the board of county commissioners shall cause the money paid therefor on the sale, and all subsequent taxes and charges paid thereon by the purchaser or his assigns, to be refunded, with interest on the whole amount at the rate of 7 per cent. per annum, upon the redelivery of the deed to be cancelled." Rev. St. 1851, c. 12, § 74; Pub. St. 1858, c. 9, § 95. This statute remained unaffected by subsequent legislation until 1866, when the legislature, by the general repealing provisions of Gen. St. 1866, c. 122, assumed to repeal that part of the Revised Statutes of 1851 which embraced this provision. We here assume that the statute recited, which was in operation for a period of 15 years, and, so far as we know, without question as to its validity, and which was afterwards followed by other statutes of a like nature, so far as constitutional objections could be involved, was constitutional. State v. Cronkhite, 28 Minn. 197, 9 N.W. 681; Fleming v. Roverud, ante, p. 273. By force of this statute the relator was clearly entitled to reimbursement of the taxes paid by her upon the faith of the existing law, and while it was still in force, -- that is, from 1862 to 1866, -- with interest at the prescribed rate of 7 per cent. Whether 10 per cent. interest is now recoverable upon such taxes will be considered further on.
Did the repeal of this law in 1866 affect the right of the relator to recover, by force of the original act, the taxes paid by her subsequent to such repeal? There was coupled with the general repealing clause above cited a provision to the effect that such repeal should "not affect any act done or any right accruing, accrued, or established." Gen. St. 1866, c. 121, § 4. If, by virtue of the prior statute, and her purchase at tax sale while it was in force, the relator had acquired a "right" to continue to pay the taxes as they should be charged upon the property, and have reimbursement in the event of the failure of her tax title, then, by the conditions of the repealing act, such case was excepted from its operation, and, so far as necessary to secure such right, the former statute remained in force. The relator did acquire such right. The purchase at the tax sale had the effect of a contract between the state and the purchaser, the terms of which are to be found in the law in force when the sale took place. Hillebert v. Porter, 28 Minn. 496, 11 N.W. 84; Fleming v. Roverud, ante, p. 273; Dikeman v. Dikeman, 11 Paige 484; Robinson v. Howe, 13 Wis. 341; Cooley on Taxation, 370. One of these conditions, having the force of a contract stipulation, was that which we have above recited, relative to the reimbursement of taxes which the purchaser should pay subsequent to the tax sale. This provision is also to be considered in connection with certain other statutory provisions then and ever since in force. By such statutes it was required that taxes be assessed yearly upon all land subject to taxation; the duty rested upon the owner to pay these taxes, and, upon default, the title, whether acquired by tax sale or otherwise, would be defeated by subsequent tax sale or by forfeiture to the state. It was thus a practical necessity that one purchasing at tax sale should, for the protection of his own title, pay the taxes subsequently assessed upon the property. Presumably every purchaser contemplated this necessity, imposed by the law, when he became a purchaser, but he contemplated also the concurrent protection from ultimate loss, in the event of the failure of his tax title, in the provision for reimbursement of the taxes he would be compelled to pay. This right of payment for the protection of his title, and of reimbursement in the event of its failure, were important elements in the contract, and would continue to be valuable to the purchaser so long as the state should continue to levy taxes and enforce payment against the land itself. We are, hence, of the opinion that this right was preserved unaffected by the general repeal of the statute. Madland v. Benland, 24 Minn. 372. For the same reason that the purchase under the prior statute had the effect of a contract, it would have been beyond the constitutional power of the legislature to impair this right of the purchaser by subsequent enactment. See cases above cited. The relator is hence entitled to recover the taxes in question, with interest at the rate of 7 per cent.
Can she recover interest at the rate of ten per cent.? This depends alone upon the provisions of Gen. Laws 1881, c. 10, § 19, amending the statute of 1878. The act has by its terms both a prospective and retrospective operation. It gives the right to the relator to recover 10 per cent. interest upon taxes paid by her from 1862 to 1876, if such legislation is not unconstitutional. The decision in State v. Cronkhite, 28 Minn. 197, 9 N.W. 681, in effect supports such right of recovery; but in that case the attention of the court was not invited nor given to the fact that the later act, (1878,) under which a recovery was awarded, provided for a higher rate of interest than was authorized by the statute in force when the tax sale took place. We hence feel at liberty to consider the question, as it is involved in this case, as one not hitherto decided.
The purpose for which the act of 1881 requires the payment of the additional 3 per cent. must be regarded as a private and not a public one. In its prospective operation the act is calculated to secure results in which the state has an interest; that is, it tends to promote the payment of taxes. But, in its retrospective operation, it neither offers an inducement to the paying of taxes, nor accomplishes any possible purpose connected with the administration of public affairs, or in which the state is concerned. It only bestows a gratuitous reward for the past payment of taxes which were due to the state, and the payment of which was no matter of favor to it, or of peculiar merit in the person paying. It neither assumes to impose a penalty, nor to...
To continue reading
Request your trial