State Of Neb. v. Casillas
| Decision Date | 07 May 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. S-09-660.,S-09-660. |
| Citation | 279 Neb. 820,782 N.W.2d 882 |
| Parties | STATE of Nebraska, appellee,v.Anthony A. CASILLAS, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Syllabus by the Court
1. Rules of Evidence. In proceedings where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make discretion a factor in determining admissibility.
2. Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. The standard for reviewing the admissibility of expert testimony is abuse of discretion.
3. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Appeal and Error. An appellate court reviews the record de novo to determine whether a trial court has abdicated its gatekeeping function when admitting expert testimony.
4. Judgments: Words and Phrases. An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision is based upon reasons that are untenable or unreasonable or if its action is clearly against justice or conscience, reason, and evidence.
5. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court's findings for clear error. But whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court's determination.
6. Jury Instructions. Whether jury instructions given by a trial court are correct is a question of law.
7. Constitutional Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. A seizure in the Fourth Amendment context occurs only if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he or she was not free to leave.
8. Constitutional Law: Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. A tier-one police-citizen encounter involves the voluntary cooperation of the citizen elicited through noncoercive questioning and does not involve any restraint of the liberty of the citizen involved.
9. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Search and Seizure. A seizure does not occur simply by reason of the fact that a police officer approaches an individual, asks him or her for identification, and poses a few questions to that individual, so long as the officer does not indicate that compliance with his or her request is required and the questioning is carried on without interrupting or restraining the person's movement.
10. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. If there is no detention or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, then the Fourth Amendment safeguard against an unreasonable search and seizure is not implicated and reasonable suspicion is not required.
11. Miranda Rights: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles. Persons temporarily detained pursuant to an investigatory traffic stop are not “in custody” for the purpose of Miranda.
12. Miranda Rights: Drunk Driving: Investigative Stops. Temporarily detaining a driver to submit to routine field sobriety tests does not ordinarily rise to the level of custody so as to implicate Miranda.
13. Criminal Law: Trial: Juries: Appeal and Error. In a jury trial of a criminal case, harmless error exists when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in reaching a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant.
14. Trial: Expert Witnesses. Under the principles set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), the trial court acts as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of an expert's opinion.
15. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Intent. The purpose of the gatekeeping function is to ensure that the courtroom door remains closed to “junk science” that might unduly influence the jury, while admitting reliable expert testimony that will assist the trier of fact.
16. Expert Witnesses. Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it.
17. Trial: Evidence. The trial court does not have the discretion to abdicate its gatekeeping duty.
18. Trial: Expert Witnesses. A pretrial hearing under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), is not always mandated, and the extensiveness of any such hearing is left to the discretion of the trial court.
19. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Proof. Fundamentally, it is the burden of the proponent of the evidence to establish the necessary foundation for its admission, including its scientific reliability under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001).
20. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Procedure. To sufficiently call specialized knowledge into question under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001), is to object with enough specificity so that the court understands what is being challenged and can accordingly determine the necessity and extent of any pretrial proceeding.
21. Trial: Expert Witnesses: Pretrial Procedure. The proponent of specialized evidence need not go through the exercise of re-proving reliability of the same evidence in every case.
22. Jury Instructions: Proof: Appeal and Error. In an appeal based on a claim of an erroneous jury instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant.
23. Sentences. When imposing a sentence, a sentencing judge should consider the defendant's (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense, and (8) the violence involved in the commission of the crime.
24. Sentences. In imposing a sentence, the sentencing court is not limited to any mathematically applied set of factors.
25. Sentences. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life.
Dennis R. Keefe, Lancaster County Public Defender, and John C. Jorgensen for appellant.
Jon Bruning, Attorney General, and George R. Love, Columbus, for appellee.
Anthony A. Casillas was charged with driving under the influence, third offense, and with the aggravated crime of driving with a concentration of more than .15 of 1 gram of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. Casillas was found drunk sitting on the driver's side of his parked vehicle after a 911 emergency dispatch call reported a similar vehicle being driven erratically in the same area. A Breathalyzer test showed a blood alcohol level of .267. Casillas' theory of defense at trial was that he was not operating his vehicle on the night in question, although, on appeal, he does not challenge the sufficiency of the jury's finding that he was. Casillas argues on appeal that the arresting officer's observations of his impairment should have been suppressed because they stemmed from an unlawful search and seizure, that his statements to the officer were made in violation of Miranda, and that the reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test conducted by the arresting officer should have been addressed in a separate evidentiary hearing before being allowed into evidence at trial. Casillas also challenges the jury instructions and asserts that his sentences were excessive.
On May 12, 2008, around 8:30 p.m., a woman driving north on 27th Street in Lincoln, Nebraska, became concerned about the vehicle in front of her. The witness testified that the vehicle, a blue Chevrolet pickup truck, was driving erratically and had driven up onto the curb a couple of times. The witness called 911 from her cellular telephone to report her observations to the police. Before losing sight of the truck, the witness saw it turn onto Y Street and then onto 28th Street. She could not identify the driver of the vehicle.
Officer Jon Rennerfeldt responded to the call and arrived at 28th and Y Streets at approximately 8:50 p.m. He saw a blue Chevrolet pickup truck parked along the curb on 28th Street, partially up the curb and on the grass. Casillas was sitting in the driver's seat. Rennerfeldt parked his police cruiser in the street and approached the truck on foot. He did not activate his police cruiser's overhead lights.
At trial, Rennerfeldt testified that as he approached, he observed exhaust coming from the tailpipe of the truck. He further testified that when he was near the truck, he saw the driver remove the keys from the ignition. On cross-examination, Rennerfeldt admitted that he had never before reported seeing exhaust coming from the tailpipe. He also admitted that in previous deposition testimony, he had said he did not recall for certain whether the truck was running when he approached.
Rennerfeldt testified that when he asked Casillas for his license, registration, and proof of insurance, Casillas “kind of slowly looked at me and said he didn't have a license, and he just kind of sat there” and did nothing. Rennerfeldt...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chesson
...In Re: Alford, 977 So.2d 811, 836–37 (La.2008); Sanders v. Wiseman, 29 So.3d 138, 141 (Miss.Ct.App.2010); State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 782 N.W.2d 882, 895–96 (2010); Andrews v. United States Steel Corp., 149 N.M. 461, 250 P.3d 887, 891 (2011); Christian v. Gray, 65 P.3d 591, 600 (Okla.2......
-
State v. Huff
...862 (2001). 110. Brief for appellant at 31. FN111. State v. Sellers, 279 Neb. 220, 777 N.W.2d 779 (2010). FN112. State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). FN113. Id. FN114. State v. Mason, 271 Neb. 16, 709 N.W.2d 638 (2006). FN115. Casillas, supra note 112. 116. Brief for appe......
-
State v. Ellis
...Therefore, Ellis' conviction and sentence are affirmed. Affirmed. 1. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29–2525 (Reissue 2008). FN2. State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). 3. Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 27–403 and 27–404(2) (Reissue 2008). FN4. State v. Epp, 278 Neb. 683, 773 N.W.2d 356 (2009). FN5.......
-
State v. Torres
...3.§ 29–2523(1)(e). 4.§ 29–2523(1)(d). 5.§ 29–2523(1)(a). 6.§ 29–2523(1)(d). 7.Neb. Const. art. II, § 1. 8.State v. Casillas, 279 Neb. 820, 782 N.W.2d 882 (2010). 9.Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27–403 (Reissue 2008). 10.State v. Epp, 278 Neb. 683, 773 N.W.2d 356 (2009). 11. See Middle Niobrara NRD v. Dep......
-
50-State Survey of State Court Decisions Supporting Expert-Related Judicial Gatekeeping
...court to adequately demonstrate by specific findings on the record that it has performed its gatekeeping functions.” State v. Casillas, 782 N.W.2d 882, 896-897 (Neb. 2010). Nebraska is another firmly established gatekeeping jurisdiction, and could benefit from a Rule 702 update. Nevada Neva......