State Of North Carolina v. Ward

• Citation: 694 S.E.2d 729,364 N.C. 157
• Decision Date: 17 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 68A99-3.,68A99-3.
• Parties: STATE of North Carolinav.Michael Lemark WARD.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina

364 N.C. 157

694 S.E.2d 729

STATE of North Carolinav.Michael Lemark WARD.

No. 68A99-3.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 17, 2010.

On writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-32(b) to review an order dated 26 March 2009 entered by Judge Cy A. Grant, Sr. in Superior Court, Halifax County, denying defendant's motions for a bifurcated sentencing hearing and to preclude the State from relitigating certain issues related to a previous trial in which a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 6 January 2010.

Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Amy Kunstling Irene, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant.

John Rittelmeyer, Raleigh, for Disability Rights North Carolina and The Arc of North Carolina, amici curiae.

HUDSON, Justice.

Because N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) does not explicitly prohibit a trial court from submitting the special issue of mental retardation to the jury in a bifurcated, rather than unitary, capital sentencing proceeding, we hold that the legislature has left that determination to the sound discretion of the capable trial judges of our State. Such a holding is consistent with the long-standing principle that when a statute is silent on whether to bifurcate, trial judges have the inherent authority and discretion to manage proceedings before them. Here, the record does not reflect an abuse of that discretion. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court to deny defendant's motion to bifurcate his sentencing proceeding.

Background

In 1998 defendant was convicted of the 1996 first-degree felony murder of Patricia Smith King, conspiracy to commit murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, felonious breaking or entering, felonious larceny, felonious possession of stolen goods, and felonious conspiracy to commit breaking or entering and larceny. A full statement of the facts of this case can be found in this Court's prior opinion. See State v. Ward, 354 N.C. 231, 238-43, 555 S.E.2d 251, 257-60 (2001). Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury returned a binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to death.

Upon review, this Court found no prejudicial error in the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial, but did find error in the sentencing proceeding and remanded the case for a new capital sentencing proceeding. Id. at 237-38, 555 S.E.2d at 257. On remand, defendant moved that the trial court bifurcate his sentencing proceeding so that the jury would hear evidence concerning defendant's alleged mental retardation, be charged on that issue, and determine whether he is, in fact, mentally retarded prior to proceeding to the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The trial court denied defendant's motion. On 27 August 2009, we allowed defendant's petition for writ of certiorari to the Court concerning the denial of his motion to bifurcate, as well as the denial of his motion to preclude the State from presenting evidence at the sentencing proceeding relating to the issues of premeditation, deliberation, and the identity of the shooter. As to the latter issue, we conclude that certiorari was improvidently allowed.

Analysis

In the context of the sentencing proceeding following the guilt-innocence phase of a capital trial see N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000 (2009), the General Assembly has provided:

(e) If the court does not find the defendant to be mentally retarded in the pretrial proceeding [as outlined in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(c) ], upon the introduction of evidence of the defendant's mental retardation during the sentencing hearing, the court shall submit a special issue to the jury as to whether the defendant is mentally retarded as defined in this section. This special issue shall be considered and answered by the jury prior to the consideration of aggravating or mitigating factors and the determination of sentence. If the jury determines the defendant to be mentally retarded, the court shall declare the case noncapital and the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e) (2009) (emphasis added). A plain reading of these words shows that the statute suggests a single sentencing proceeding -“ during the sentencing hearing”-while at the same time using language that indicates a required sequence of events within that proceeding: “ upon the introduction of evidence ..., the court shall submit a special issue” that “ shall be considered and answered ... prior to the consideration of ... and the determination of sentence.” Id. Unlike N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, which explicitly provides that a capital trial must take place in two separate phases, first the determination of guilt or innocence, followed by the determination of sentence, N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 is silent-and indeed inherently ambiguous-regarding whether these stages may or must take place in a unitary or bifurcated proceeding.

When construing legislative provisions, this Court looks first to the plain meaning of the words of the statute itself:

When the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required. However, when the language of a statute is ambiguous, this Court will determine the purpose of the statute and the intent of the legislature in its enactment.

Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006). An ambiguous provision, such as at issue here, leads us in turn to the general rule that, “ ‘[i]n discerning the intent of the General Assembly, statutes in pari materia should be construed together and harmonized whenever possible.’ ” State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 330, 677 S.E.2d 444, 450 (2009) (quoting State v. Jones, 359 N.C. 832, 836, 616 S.E.2d 496, 498 (2005) (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). For example, subsection (g) of N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 also indicates that the question of mental retardation must be both considered and decided by the jury prior to the “consideration of aggravating and mitigating factors” pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000(e) and (f):

(g) If the jury determines that the defendant is not mentally retarded as defined by this section the jury may consider any evidence of mental retardation presented during the sentencing hearing when determining aggravating or mitigating factors and the defendant's sentence.

N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(g) (2009) (emphases added). If the jury determines that the defendant is in fact mentally retarded, then it need not consider evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, because the trial judge must impose a life sentence.

Reading this statute to mandate a unitary sentencing proceeding discounts-or at the least underemphasizes-the critical phrase “and answered” in N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005(e). Cf. N.C. Dep't of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009) (“Because the actual words of the legislature are the clearest manifestation of its intent we give every word of the statute effect, presuming that the legislature carefully chose each word used.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Such a reading also disregards the additional words in subsection (g) indicating that, when retardation has been raised as a defense, the jury must “determine” the special issue of mental retardation-first as a separate issue, and then again as an aspect of “determining” the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.

We read this language as envisioning a procedure in which evidence of aggravators is introduced-as well as considered-after the special issue of mental retardation has been answered. Indeed, the pattern jury instructions for capital sentencing proceedings in North Carolina recognize this ambiguity and provide trial judges the flexibility to modify jury instructions in capital cases accordingly. See 1 N.C.P.I.-Crim. 150.05 (2001) (“Death Penalty-Mental Retardation Jury Determination (with Special Verdict Form)”) ¹ (with an opening note stating that “[t]his instruction is written in a manner which contemplates that the jury will return to court with its answer to the mental retardation question before hearing arguments and being instructed [on aggravating and mitigating factors and determination of sentence]. If the trial judge chooses to use a different procedure, this instruction should be modified accordingly.” (emphasis added)); id. (“The one issue for you to determine at this stage of the proceedings reads: ‘Is the defendant, ( name ), mentally retarded?’ ”; “Your answer to this mental retardation issue, either ‘yes' or ‘no,’ must be unanimous.”); 1 N.C.P.I.-Crim. 150.10 (“Death Penalty-Instructions to Jury at Separate Sentencing Proceeding”) (2004) ( “Members of the jury, [having found the defendant guilty of] murder in the first degree [and the defendant having been determined by you not to be mentally retarded], it is now your duty to recommend to the Court whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment.”).

While these pattern jury instructions are not binding on this Court, they were drafted by a committee of the very same superior court judges who oversee capital sentencing proceedings, and they demonstrate these judges' ability to exercise discretion sensibly. In the instructions crafted after N.C.G.S. § 15A-2005 was enacted in 2001, these trial judges have acknowledged the ambiguity in the statute and have addressed it in a careful manner. The instructions maintain consistent treatment of all capital defendants while also allowing for the type of “guided discretion” and “particularized consideration of the relevant aspects of the character and record of a convicted defendant” that we have held is critical to the constitutionality of our death penalty procedures. State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 350-52, 259 S.E.2d 510, 542-43 (1979) cert....