State Of Me. v. Cook., Docket No. Han-08-46.

• Decision Date: 24 August 2010
• Docket Number: Docket No. Han-08-46.
• Citation: 2 A.3d 333
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Daniel O. COOK.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

2 A.3d 333

STATE of Maine

v.Daniel O. COOK.

Docket No. Han-08-46.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Submitted on Briefs: July 7, 2010.

Decided: Aug. 24, 2010.

Jeremy Pratt, Esq., Camden, ME, for Daniel O. Cook.

Michael E. Povich, District Attorney, Mary N. Kellett, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District No. VII, Ellsworth, ME, for the State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., ALEXANDER, LEVY, GORMAN, and JABAR, JJ.

GORMAN, J.

[¶ 1] Daniel O. Cook appeals from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court (Hancock County, Cuddy, J.) for twenty-five total counts: four counts of burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4) (2009); four counts of burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A) (2009); one count of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A), (B)(4) (2009); one count of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A), (B)(5) (2009); eleven counts of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A) (2009); three counts of criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A) (2009); and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1) (2009), ¹ following a jury trial. Cook challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for each count of the conviction. We affirm in part and vacate in part.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] “Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the following evidence was admitted at trial.” State v. Cook, 2010 ME 81, ¶ 2, 2 A.3d 313, 314; accord State v. Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 2, 957 A.2d 80, 83. In November and December of 2006, Cook and his father, David Cook, ² along with his nephew Christopher Cook, and Christopher Lapointe, a friend of Cook's nephew, engaged in a series of burglaries and thefts of seasonal camps in Dedham. During this period, all four lived together in David Cook's home in Dedham, and Lapointe had outstanding warrants in Bangor. The purpose of the spree was to locate and steal copper pipe in order to sell it for scrap metal. The men damaged several doors and windows in the course of the break-ins, stole copper and personal property from the victimized residences, and brought all the stolen property back to the Cook residence. After law enforcement officers came to the Cook residence seeking a suspicious person and inquiring about Lapointe on December 9, 2006, Cook and David Cook dumped the stolen property into a culvert in Ellsworth.

[¶ 3] Lapointe was arrested on his outstanding warrants on December 14, 2006, and became a cooperating witness for the State. The Hancock County Sheriffs Department executed a search warrant at the Cook residence on February 13, 2007. The deputies found a locked gun cabinet along with the key in Cook's bedroom. The guns inside the cabinet were in working order, and Cook had been seen handling the guns.

[¶ 4] A grand jury returned an indictment on June 5, 2007, charging Cook with thirty-two total counts against fifteen separate victims: nine counts of burglary (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A), (B)(4); five counts of burglary (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A); two counts of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A), (B)(4); one count of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A), (B)(5); eleven counts of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class E), 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A); three counts of criminal mischief (Class D), 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A); and one count of unlawful possession of a firearm (Class C), 15 M.R.S. § 393(1)(A-1)(1). Pursuant to M.R.Crim. P. 8(b), the State filed a notice of joinder for Cook and David Cook on the same day.

[¶ 5] Lapointe pleaded guilty to charges arising from the camp break-ins, and testified at trial in December 2007. At trial, Cook stipulated that he “was convicted on June 22, 2001 in Penobscot Superior Court in Bangor, Maine, in Docket No. CR-00-685 of unlawful trafficking in scheduled drugs, a crime under the laws of Maine punishable by imprisonment ... for one year or more.” At the close of the State's case, Cook moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence, which the court denied. The court instructed the jury on both principal and accomplice liability, ³ and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts of the indictment except for five Class B burglaries, one Class C burglary, and one Class C theft by unauthorized taking or transfer.

[¶ 6] The court entered a judgment on the verdict and sentenced Cook to three years in prison, suspended all but two years, and imposed two years of probation on Cook's eight burglary convictions and one Class C theft by unauthorized taking conviction. The court sentenced Cook to one year in jail on the count of unlawful possession of a firearm and ninety days in jail for the remaining fifteen Class D and Class E convictions. All sentences were to be served concurrently. The court also ordered restitution in the amount of $20,027.50, jointly and severally with David Cook, to be paid through probation. Cook's appeal is timely pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2009) and M.R.App. P. 2. ⁴

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 7] Cook's sole challenge on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting each of his convictions. “Upon a claim of insufficient evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶ 19, 985 A.2d 1152, 1158 (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Smen, 2006 ME 40, ¶ 7, 895 A.2d 319, 321. As the fact-finder, the jury's “[d]eterminations of the weight and credibility to be afforded the evidence are within [its] exclusive province,” and it “is permitted to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence.” Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86 (quotation marks omitted); accord State v. Allen, 2006 ME 20, ¶ 26, 892 A.2d 447, 455. Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction when the facts presented are proved beyond a reasonable doubt; to prove facts beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must be convinced of the defendant's guilt by having a conscientious belief that the charged offense is almost certainly true. See State v. Brown, 2000 ME 25, ¶ 15, 757 A.2d 768, 772.

[¶ 8] The jury convicted Cook on twenty-five counts of four crimes in varying degrees of severity: burglary (Class B and C), theft by unauthorized taking or transfer (Class C, D, and E), criminal mischief (Class D), and unlawful possession of a firearm (Class C). Cook's arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence on Counts 1, 2, 6, 8, 12, 14 through 16, 18, 21 through 23, 26 through 29, 31, and 32 are unpersuasive and merit no further discussion. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational fact-finder could have found each element of those eighteen offenses beyond a reasonable doubt based on the evidence presented and the reasonable inferences that may drawn from that evidence. See Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶ 19, 985 A.2d at 1158; Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 19, 957 A.2d at 86. We affirm those eighteen convictions. The remaining convictions warrant further analysis. We begin with a discussion of the elements that the State was required to prove for each crime and then examine the sufficiency of the evidence for Counts 5, 10, 13, 19, 24, 25, and 30.

A. State's Burden of Proof

[¶ 9] Burglary to a structure is a Class C offense. 17-A M.R.S. § 401(1)(A). To prove burglary to a structure, the State must show that the defendant entered or surreptitiously remained in a structure knowing that he was “not licensed or privileged to do so, with the intent to commit a crime therein.” Id.; accord State v. Crossman, 2002 ME 28, ¶ 11, 790 A.2d 603, 606. A structure is “a building or other place designed to provide protection for persons or property against weather or intrusion.” 17-A M.R.S. § 2(24) (2009).

[¶ 10] To prove theft by unauthorized taking or transfer, the State must prove the defendant “(1) obtained or exercised unauthorized control (2) over the property of another (3) with [the] intent to deprive the owner of that property.” Schmidt, 2008 ME 151, ¶ 20, 957 A.2d at 86 (quotation marks omitted); accord 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A). The basic offense of theft by unauthorized taking or transfer is a Class E offense. 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(A). When the State proves that the value of the property taken is “more than $500 but not more than $1,000” at the time of the offense, theft by unauthorized taking is a Class D crime. 17-A M.R.S. § 353(1)(B)(5).

[¶ 11] Criminal mischief is a Class D offense. 17-A M.R.S. § 806(2) (2009). To support a conviction for criminal mischief, the State must prove that the defendant “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly ... [d]amage [d] or destroy [ed] the property of another, having no reasonable grounds to believe that the [defendant had] a right to do so.” 17-A M.R.S. § 806(1)(A); accord State v. Patterson, 2004 ME 79, ¶ 10, 851 A.2d 521, 523.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence1. Counts 5 and 30-Burglary (Class C)

[¶ 12] Cook's convictions for Counts 5 and 30 are for the burglaries at the Zimmerman and Delucia camps. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Lapointe and Christopher Cook, without authorization, crawled under both camps with the intent to steal the copper pipe underneath each location. Cook assisted Lapointe and Christopher Cook in the commission of these crimes by picking them up in a vehicle after each break-in. See 17-A M.R.S. § 57(3) (2009); State v. Nguyen, 2010 ME 14, ¶ 15, 989 A.2d 712, 715 (“Accomplice liability may be found in any conduct promoting or facilitating, however slightly, the commission of the crime.” (quotation marks omitted)). Although Cook contends that he was merely present at each scene, the jury could reasonably infer that Cook knowingly aided Christopher Cook and...