Becker, J.
Eleven days before trial, appellant Kirk Saintcalle requested permission to represent himself on a charge of possession of cocaine. At the same time, he asked for a continuance. The trial court denied Saintcalle's request to go pro se, judging that he was improperly trying to delay the trial. A simultaneous request for a continuance does not establish that an otherwise timely motion to go pro se is made for the purpose of delay. Under the circumstances, denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion. We reverse.
The State filed the information against Saintcalle on August 2, 2007. The record reflects that Saintcalle agreed to extend the speedy trial deadline seven times. New counsel substituted in on January 30, 2008. On March 28, with the trial set to begin 11 days later on April 8, Saintcalle moved to proceed pro se.
The trial judge asked Saintcalle to explain why he wanted to do that, andthe following colloquy ensued:
Mr. Saintcalle: 'Cause I believe I might be able to properly assist myself better.
Court: You believe you'd be able to handle the case better? Mr. Saintcalle: Yes, sir. Court: Why do you think that?
Mr. Saintcalle: 'Cause I been looking over, reading legal material and I just believe I can.
Court: What's your educational level? Mr. Saintcalle: High school. Court: How old are you? Mr. Saintcalle: 23, sir.
Court: And it's not anything with regard to this particular lawyer?
Mr. Saintcalle: No. No.
Court: Do you have any legal training?
Mr. Saintcalle: Not, not, not legally, no.
Court: You've had prior trials before. Is that correct?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes, sir.
Court: All right. Do you know the rules of evidence?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes. I know some of it.
Court: How do you know the rules of evidence?
Mr. Saintcalle: 'Cause I have a Washington state courtroom book that I purchased from another inmate several months ago, so I been looking over that. And I also go the Washington state local courtroom rules too.
Court: Do you recognize that you'd have to be your own lawyer in front of a--have you requested a jury in this case?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes, sir.
Court: I'm sorry?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes, sir.
Court: Do you realize how awkward and difficult that is for someone in your position to be addressing a jury as both the defendant and the lawyer?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes. I believe I can handle the situation, sir.
Court: Do you know the elements of the crime that the State has to prove?
Mr. Saintcalle: That I was intent and I was—I not—what's that word, the word you always use? That I knew. Basically I knew I had the drugs in my possession.
Court: Have you ever represented yourself before?
Mr. Saintcalle: No, sir.
Court: What's the standard of proof that the prosecutorhas? Do you know that? In a criminal case. Mr. Saintcalle: 99.9 percent I believe. Court: No, that's not right. Mr. Saintcalle: What is it then?
Court: Well, I'm, I'm going to ask the questions, but you don't know the burden of proof in a criminal case. Mr. Saintcalle: I'm learning.
Court: Well, you don't know it now. It would be very, very foolish of you to go in front of a jury and try to represent yourself when you don't have the legal training. I'm just, I'm, you know, it's not in your interest to do that. It really isn't.
Mr. Saintcalle: I understand that, but I have the time on my side. I have all the time to learn.
Court: Excuse me?
Mr. Saintcalle: I understand that, but I-
Court: What's the trial date?
Mr. Saintcalle: I don't know. The 8th? The 8th, sir. Have to get a continuance.
Court: You're asking for a continuance? Is that what you're saying?
Mr. Saintcalle: Yes.
Court: And why do you need a continuance? Mr. Saintcalle: To go learn some more stuff and go over some stuff.
Court: Why is it that you're bringing this issue up now as opposed to before?
Mr. Saintcalle: Because before I wasn't really considering. I just, it was going through my mind. I just-
Court: All right. Well, based on my colloquy with you, I don't think you're making a knowing and voluntary and intelligent waiver of your right to counsel and to go pro se. And I also find that what you're really doing is using this in order to delay the trial date and I'm not going to allow that, so I'm going to deny your motion to go pro se and deny any motion to continue the trial date.1
Saintcalle went to trial with counsel and was convicted. Saintcalle appeals. He contends his conviction must be reversed for violation of the right to self-representation.
"As a request for pro se status is a waiver of the constitutional right to counsel, appellate courts have regularly and properly reviewed denials of requests for pro se status under an abuse of discretion standard." State v. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d 496, 504, 229 P.3d 714 (2010). Discretion is abused if a decision is manifestly unreasonable or rests on facts unsupported in the record or was reached by applying the wrong legal standard. Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 504.
Because the right to self-representation is so fundamental, a defendant may choose to proceed pro se even if the trial court believes it is not in the defendant's best interest to do so.
The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law." Illinois v. Allen, 397 U. S. 337, 350-351[, 90 S. Ct. 1057, 1064, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1970)] (Brennan, J., concurring).
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975).
As recently summarized in Madsen, the law permits a trial court to indulge every reasonable presumption against finding that a defendant has waived the right to counsel, but the court may not deny a motion to proceed pro se without stating a reason that rests "on some identifiable fact":
Criminal defendants have an explicit right to selfrepresentation under the Washington Constitution and an implicitright under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Wash Const. art. I, § 22 ("the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person"); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 45 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1975). This right is so fundamental that it is afforded despite its potentially detrimental impact on both the defendant and the administration of justice. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; State v. Vermillion, 112 Wn. App. 844, 51 P.3d 188 (2002)[, review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1022 (2003)]. "The unjustified denial of this [pro se] right requires reversal." State v. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d 668, 737, 940 P.2d 1239 (1997) (emphasis added), [cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008 (1998)].
The right to proceed pro se is neither absolute nor selfexecuting. State v. Woods, 143 Wn.2d 561, 586, 23 P.3d 1046[, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 964] (2001). When a defendant requests pro se status, the trial court must determine whether the request is unequivocal and timely. Stenson, 132 Wn.2d at 737. Absent a finding that the request was equivocal or untimely, the court must then determine if the defendant's request is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, usually by colloquy. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; State v. Stegall, 124 Wn.2d 719, 881 P.2d 979 (1994).... Again, the court shall indulge in "'every reasonable presumption' against a defendant's waiver of his or her right to counsel." [In re Det. of] Turay, 139 Wn.2d [379, 396, 986 P.2d 790] (quoting Brewer [v. Williams], 430 U.S. [387, 404, 97 S. Ct. 1232), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1125 (2001)].
This presumption does not give a court carte blanche to deny a motion to proceed pro se. The grounds that allow a court to deny a defendant the right to self-representation are limited to a finding that the defendant's request is equivocal, untimely, involuntary, or made without a general understanding of the consequences. Such a finding must be based on some identifiable fact; the presumption in Turay does not go so far as to eliminate the need for any basis for denying a motion for pro se status. Were it otherwise, the presumption could make the right itself illusory.
Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 503-05 (some alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
As Madsen states, when a defendant requests pro se status, the trial court must determine whether the request is unequivocal and timely. Here the State does not dispute that Saintcalle's motion was unequivocal. His motion was also timely, coming 11 days before his scheduled trial date. See State v. Breedlove, 79 Wn. App. 101, 109, 900 P.2d 586 (1995) (request to proceed pro se accompanied by request for continuance made 12 days before set trial date not untimely).
Although the trial court found that Saintcalle's waiver of his right to counsel was involuntary, unknowing, and unintelligent, the State does not defend that finding on appeal. We agree the record of the colloquy contains no identifiable fact that would support the finding. Saintcalle was unable to correctly articulate the State's burden of proof, but he knew what he was charged with. When advised that it would be "very, very foolish" and to his detriment to represent himself, Saintcalle acknowledged the risk.
A court "may not deny pro se status merely because the defendant is unfamiliar with legal rules." Madsen, 168 Wn.2d at 509.
The purpose of asking the defendant about his experience, if any, in representing himself and his familiarity, if any, with the rules of evidence and other aspects of courtroom procedure is not to determine whether he has sufficient technical skill to represent himself. Rather, the purpose is to determine whether he fully understands the risks he faces by waiving the right to be represented by counsel,
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