State v. $217590.00 in U.S. Currency

• Decision Date: 25 May 2000
• Citation: 18 S.W.3d 631
• Parties: (Tex. 2000) THE STATE OF TEXAS, PETITIONER v. $217,590.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, RESPONDENT NO. 98-0582
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 631

18 S.W.3d 631 (Tex. 2000)

THE STATE OF TEXAS, PETITIONER v. $217,590.00 IN UNITED STATES CURRENCY, RESPONDENT

NO. 98-0582

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Argued September 8, 1999

Decided April 13, 2000.

Rehearing Overruled May 25, 2000

ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUSTICE O'NEILL delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case involves the forfeiture of $217,590 allegedly derived from illegal drug trafficking. See TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE art. 59.01-.08 (the "civil forfeiture statute"). We must decide whether the claimant, Henry Perez Olvera, voluntarily consented to the search that revealed the money and the evidence linking it to criminal activity. In doing so, we decide the standard appellate courts must apply in civil forfeiture proceedings to review a trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained as the result of an illegal search.¹ We hold that whether a claimant voluntarily consented to a search is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable for an abuse of discretion. In applying this standard, we defer to the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by the evidence. But whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts is a question of law for the appellate courts to decide.

Applying this standard, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Olvera's motion to suppress, and that the court of appeals misapplied the totality of the circumstances test in holding that Olvera's consent was not voluntary. See 970 S.W.2d 660, 667. Because it held that Olvera's consent was not voluntary, the court of appeals did not consider Olvera's points of error concerning the scope of that consent and his contention that the evidence was factually insufficient to establish that the money was linked to a felony drug transaction and therefore subject to forfeiture. Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to the court of appeals to allow it to consider Olvera's remaining points.

I Background

While patrolling U.S. Highway 59 in Bee County, Texas, Department of Public Safety Trooper Jimmy Moore stopped a commercial tractor-trailer driven by Olvera that was missing a mud flap. Olvera's wife and infant child were riding with him, even though they were unauthorized noncommercial passengers. Moore questioned Olvera about the missing mud flap and began a commercial motor vehicle inspection of the trailer and its cargo.²During the inspection, Moore questioned Olvera and his wife about the truck's cargo and their trip. Moore's suspicions became aroused for a number of reasons. First, Olvera was unable to produce the logbook that commercial vehicle drivers are normally required to maintain. In addition, Olvera said that he had picked up his load in a Wal-Mart parking lot, even though the trailer's seal was displaced. Moore thought it unlikely that a shipper would leave an unsealed trailer in a public area. Finally, Olvera did not seem to understand the bill of lading for the vehicle's freight.

After discovering these apparent irregularities, Moore asked Olvera whether he was transporting any contraband. Olvera responded that he was not. Moore, aware that illegal drugs are frequently transported on Highway 59, was unconvinced and asked if he could search the tractor and trailer. Olvera answered, "I guess so." Moore had written consent forms with him, but testified he did not use them because the stop was being videotaped. The videotape of the stop is part of the record.

Moore then called for a narcotics dog and handler. When they arrived about twenty minutes later, Moore remarked to the handler that "[t]his man... does not want this vehicle searched." The dog was led around the truck and alerted to the presence of drugs. Moore instructed Olvera to follow him in the truck to the Bee County Sheriff's Office, where the dog again alerted to the presence of drugs. While searching the tractor cabin, Moore noticed that several screws were missing from a plywood panel in the sleeper area. He removed the panel and found a compartment where the air-conditioning unit should have been. Inside the compartment he found a grocery sack containing $217,590 in cash. He also found marijuana residue in a box adjacent to the compartment. Olvera was given Miranda warnings, after which he admitted that the money represented proceeds from drug sales. The police seized the money, and the State initiated this forfeiture proceeding.

Olvera moved to suppress all evidence and statements obtained as a result of the search, arguing that he did not freely and voluntarily consent to the search as he contends is required by the federal and state constitutions in the absence of a search warrant. The State defended the search's legality, claiming that Olvera voluntarily consented. After hearing evidence, the trial court found that Olvera "orally and voluntarily consented to the search," and granted forfeiture. A divided en banc court of appeals reversed, holding that the State failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Olvera voluntarily consented to the search. See 970 S.W.2d at 667. Specifically, the court concluded that Olvera's consent was not clear and unequivocal because there was evidence he may not have known that he could decline the search. See id. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the money and all evidence linking it to criminal activity should have been excluded as fruits of an illegal search. See id.

II Standard of Review

We have never defined the standard appellate courts should apply in reviewing a trial court's determination that a person's consent to a search was or was not voluntary, and thus whether evidence obtained from the search may be subject to exclusion. Whether a consent to search was voluntary under the totality of the circumstances involves questions of both fact and law. The first part of the analysis involves a determination of the historical facts leading up to the consent. The second part involves assessing whether the trial court's findings demonstrate voluntariness under the totality of the circumstances, which is a question of law. We review a trial court's decision on a mixed question of law and fact for an abuse of discretion. See Brainard v. Texas, 12 S.W.3d 6, 30 (Tex. 1999). Accordingly, we hold that an abuse of discretion standard of review applies to a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence based upon the contention that a claimant's consent to a search was not voluntary.

In applying the abuse of discretion standard, reviewing courts defer to the trial court's factual determinations; a reviewing court does not engage in its own factual review, but decides whether the record supports the trial court's resolution of factual matters. See Goode v. Shoukfeh, 943 S.W.2d 441, 446 (Tex. 1997); cf. Gibbs v. State, 819 S.W.2d 821, 830-31 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (observing that appellate courts defer to trial courts' resolutions of fact issues in suppression hearings); Segura v. State, 826 S.W.2d 178, 181 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd) (noting that the trial court is judge of a suppression hearing witness's credibility and weight to be given testimony). If the record supports the trial court's evidentiary findings, the reviewing court is not at liberty to disturb them. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992). A reviewing court instead determines only whether the trial court properly applied the law to the facts in reaching its legal conclusion. See id.; Segura, 826 S.W.2d at 181.³

The underlying historical facts preceding Olvera's consent are undisputed, perhaps because the encounter between Olvera and Moore was videotaped. Accordingly, we decide whether the trial court properly applied the governing constitutional principles to the undisputed facts.⁴

III Voluntariness of Consent

Courts have identified a number of factors to be considered in determining whether a person voluntarily consented to a search, including, but not limited to: (1) whether the police displayed weapons or used physical force or other intimidating tactics, see United States v. Wyatt, 179 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999); Frierson v. State, 839 S.W.2d 841, 851 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, pet. ref'd); (2) whether the police engaged in misconduct, see United States v. Cherry, 759 F.2d 1196, 1211 (5th Cir. 1985); De Jesus v. State, 917 S.W.2d 458, 462 (Tex. App.-Houston [14 Dist.] 1996, pet. ref'd); (3) whether the police asserted a right to search, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548 (1968); Dawson v. State, 868 S.W.2d 363, 368 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); (4) the degree to which the detainee cooperated with the search, see United States v. Cooper, 43 F.3d 140, 147 (5th Cir. 1995); Frierson, 839 S.W.2d at 851; (5) the detainee's age, intelligence, education, and physical condition, see Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Dawson, 868 S.W.2d at 368; (6) the detainee's attitude about the likelihood of discovering contraband, see, United States v. Gonzales, 79 F.3d 413, 421 (5th Cir. 1996); (7) the length of detention and the nature of the questioning, see id. at 226; (8) whether the police administered Miranda warnings, see id.; and (9) whether the detainee was aware of the right to refuse consent, see Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226-27; Allridge v. State, 850 S.W.2d 471, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

No single factor is dispositive. See United States v. Morales, 171 F.3d 978, 983 (5th Cir. 1999); Arcila v. State, 788 S.W.2d 587, 591 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990), aff'd, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), overruled on other grounds by Guzman, 955 S.W.2d 85. Instead, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227 93 S.Ct. 2041; Meeks v. State, 692 S.W.2d 504, 510 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

Ignoring these countervailing factors, the court of appeals...