State v. $30,660.00
| Decision Date | 20 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-99-822-CV.,13-99-822-CV. |
| Citation | 136 S.W.3d 392 |
| Parties | The STATE of Texas, Appellant, v. THIRTY THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SIXTY DOLLARS AND NO/100 ($30,660.00) in U.S. Currency, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
This is an appeal from the dismissal of a civil forfeiture proceeding. $30,660 in United States currency was seized from the possession of Christopher Tobin by a Corpus Christi police officer following a routine traffic stop. The State subsequently filed this forfeiture action. On Tobin's motion, the trial court suppressed the currency, ordered it returned to Tobin, and dismissed the case, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hold a forfeiture proceeding without the subject of the forfeiture before it. On appeal, the State raises the following three issues: (1) Did the officer properly detain Tobin based on a reasonable suspicion that Tobin was driving while intoxicated or engaged in drug activity? (2) Did the officer properly search Tobin's automobile based on probable cause that there were drugs inside the automobile? (3) Even assuming that the detention and search were illegal, did the trial court err in dismissing the State's forfeiture action for lack of jurisdiction? Without reaching the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress, we overrule all three issues and affirm the court's order returning the currency to Tobin and dismissing the case.
No live testimony was offered by either party at the hearing on Tobin's motion to suppress and for return of the currency. Instead, the parties relied solely on the deposition testimony of Officer Raymund Hullum, which reveals the following undisputed facts. On September 5, 1998, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Hullum clocked Tobin driving 55 m.p.h. in a 35 m.p.h. zone and initiated a traffic stop. Tobin pulled over promptly and showed the officer a valid driver's license and proof of insurance. Hullum noticed that Tobin's eyes were bloodshot. He took Tobin's license and returned to his squad car, where he wrote Tobin a ticket for speeding and checked his criminal record. He discovered that Tobin had been arrested for a drug offense in 1995 and that he was listed as having been a suspect in a possession of marihuana case in June of 1998. There were no outstanding warrants for his arrest. Hullum returned to Tobin's vehicle and issued him the speeding ticket, which Tobin signed.
Hullum then asked Tobin to step out of the vehicle. He immediately frisked Tobin for weapons, reasoning that his safety was in jeopardy because he was alone with a suspect after dark. He felt a bulge in the left front pocket of Tobin's pants and asked what it was. Tobin explained that it was money. When asked how much money it was, Tobin said it was about a thousand dollars. As Hullum continued his patdown, he noticed the smell of burnt marihuana coming from Tobin's person.
The officer decided to check Tobin's sobriety because "[there were] a lot of drunk drivers around that part of town just going home or whatever from the different clubs." He used the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, which Tobin passed. According to Hullum, there was no reason to administer any additional tests because he was satisfied that Tobin was not intoxicated.
Hullum asked Tobin if he had any drugs or weapons in his vehicle. Tobin said no. The officer then requested permission to search the vehicle, but Tobin refused. Undeterred by this response, the officer again asked if there were any drugs or weapons in the vehicle, and again, Tobin said no. The officer asked why, if there were no drugs or weapons in the vehicle, Tobin would not let him search it. "I just don't want you in there," Tobin explained.
At this point, Hullum placed Tobin in the back of his police car. He believed that Tobin was a flight risk because the foregoing exchange had caused Tobin to become agitated and nervous. Hullum returned to Tobin's vehicle and peered through its windows. He saw a large lump underneath the floor mat on the passenger side of the back seat. Continuing his inspection, he noticed a "green leafy substance" on the floor in front of the driver's seat, "right where the driver's feet would be." Believing the substance was marihuana, he entered the vehicle and searched it.
Hullum collected the "green leafy substance," which was later sent to a laboratory for testing. It weighed only five-tenths of a gram and turned out not to be marihuana or any other controlled substance. The large lump was a shoe box containing close to thirty thousand dollars in cash, which Hullum seized.
Tobin was taken to the police station on charges of possession of marihuana and illegal investment. No criminal charges were ever filed against him, and he was subsequently released. Nevertheless, the State filed an action seeking forfeiture of the currency. It alleged that the currency was subject to forfeiture because, inter alia, it constituted proceeds gained from the commission of a felony under the Texas Controlled Substances Act. See TEX. CRIM. PROC.CODE ANN. art. 59.01(2)(D) (Vernon Supp.2004).
Before the forfeiture hearing, Tobin filed a motion to suppress and for return of the currency, claiming that his detention, search, and arrest were illegal. The trial court granted the relief and dismissed the case. This appeal followed.
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute whether the exclusionary rule applies to civil forfeiture proceedings.1 This issue is unsettled in Texas. See State v. $217,590 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d 631, 632 n. 1 (Tex.2000). However, we need not address it to decide this case because we conclude that the civil forfeiture statute does not authorize illegal police conduct. Regardless of whether the exclusionary rule applies, law enforcement agents cannot seize property if their actions leading up to the seizure are illegal. Thus, the trial court did not err in evaluating the legality of Tobin's detention, search, and arrest.
Chapter 59 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifies the circumstances in which property subject to forfeiture may be seized. See TEX.CRIM. PROC.CODE ANN. art. 59.03 (Vernon Supp.2004). Seizure of property is proper if made under authority of a search warrant. Id. art. 59.03(a). Without a warrant, seizure is proper if:
(1) the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the property knowingly consents;
(2) the seizure is incident to a search to which the owner, operator, or agent in charge of the property knowingly consents (3) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judgment in favor of the state in a forfeiture proceeding under this chapter; or
(4) the seizure was incident to a lawful arrest, lawful search, or lawful search incident to arrest.
In this case, it is undisputed that Hullum had no search warrant, no consent from Tobin, and no prior judgment in favor of the State. Thus, for the seizure to have been authorized by article 59.03, it had to have been "incident to a lawful arrest, lawful search, or lawful search incident to arrest." See id.
After reviewing Hullum's deposition testimony and the arguments and authorities presented by each party, the trial court ruled that Hullum's conduct was illegal. In the court's words:
The automobile occupied and being driven by Respondent-Claimant (Tobin) was illegally searched for each or all of the foregoing [sic] reasons: Tobin was illegally arrested because he was arrested in violation of the Texas Transportation Code, was arrested without probable cause, and was arrested without a warrant. Further, the search of the vehicle was egregiously illegal because it was made despite Tobin's express denial and refusal of consent for it to be searched, and was made without probable cause. Therefore, the search was illegal and was not incident to a legal arrest.
From these conclusions, we infer that the trial court concluded that the seizure was not incident to a lawful arrest, lawful search, or lawful search incident to arrest as required by article 59.03. See id. The seizure was therefore unauthorized. See id.
The State's first two issues on appeal claim that the seizure was valid under article 59.03 because Officer Hullum properly: (1) detained Tobin based on a reasonable suspicion that Tobin was driving while intoxicated and engaged in drug activity; and (2) searched Tobin's automobile based on probable cause that there were drugs inside the automobile.
Where the underlying historical facts are undisputed, we decide whether the trial court properly applied the governing constitutional principles to the facts. See $217,590 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d at 634; accord Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) (). Because the parties agree on the facts of this case, we decide the issues of reasonable suspicion and probable cause de novo. See Manns v. State, 122 S.W.3d 171, 178 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (); $217,590 in U.S. Currency, 18 S.W.3d at 634 n. 3 ().
The parties do not contest Hullum's actions in pulling Tobin over for speeding and detaining him long enough to do a background check and issue a speeding ticket. However, they do dispute whether the officer was required to release Tobin after the speeding ticket had been issued. The State argues that Hullum was...
To continue reading
Request your trial