State v. Abernathy
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | COA21-765 |
| Citation | 2022 NCCOA 607 |
| Parties | STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JUSTIN LEE ABERNATHY, Defendant |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 August 2022.
Appeal by Defendant from order entered 10 June 2021 by Judge J Thomas Davis in Cleveland County Nos. 19 CRS 2165, 19 CRS 54910 Superior Court.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Christine Wright, for the State.
Sarah Holladay for Defendant.
¶ 1 Defendant Justin Lee Abernathy appeals from the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress methamphetamine discovered during a traffic stop. Defendant argues the trial court erred because (1) it failed to consider the unreasonable duration of the police pursuit; (2) it determined there was reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop; and (3) it made findings of fact that were conclusive, unsupported by the evidence, or otherwise erroneous. We find no error.
¶ 2 On 18 November 2019, a grand jury indicted Defendant on one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by transporting and one count of trafficking in methamphetamine by possession. Both charges relate to 680 grams of methamphetamine recovered from Defendant's vehicle during a traffic stop in Cleveland County. Evidence at the suppression hearing tended to show as follows:
¶ 3 On 8 October 2019, after receiving information from a Rutherford County narcotics officer, the Forest City Police Department began to follow behind a 2005 gold-colored Hyundai Elantra that was suspected to contain a large quantity of methamphetamine while it traveled on Highway 74. Defendant was the driver and only person in the vehicle. Defendant became aware he was being followed by law enforcement, and shortly thereafter pulled off the highway and into an Arby's[1] drive-thru, where he ordered food before returning to the highway.
¶ 4 Defendant traveled out of Forest City jurisdiction into Cleveland County, where Investigator Travis Glover with the Cleveland County Sheriff's Department "picked up where Forest City PD left off" in following Defendant. Investigator Mitchell Hinson then replaced Investigator Glover and continued following the vehicle. Investigator Hinson testified that Defendant's Hyundai was traveling in the left-hand lane at a much slower rate than other vehicles on the highway, causing several cars to switch lanes to pass Defendant on his right. Investigator Hinson followed the Hyundai for approximately one and a half miles, then initiated a traffic stop and pulled the Hyundai over onto an exit ramp for impeding the flow of traffic in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 20-146 and 20-141(h).
¶ 5 Because Defendant would not fully roll down the window, Investigator Hinson attempted to speak to Defendant "through the crack in the window" throughout their entire interaction. When Investigator Hinson spoke to Defendant, Defendant avoided eye contact, ignored the questions, and continued to eat food.[2] When asked for his driver's license, Defendant gave a license that was faded and illegible. During the exchange, Investigator Hinson observed a pistol vault, a small locker designed to store handguns and ammunition, in the passenger floorboard. Investigator Hinson asked Defendant if any weapons were in the car. When Defendant again did not answer, Investigator Hinson opened the driver's side door. Investigator Hinson discovered a large machete in the driver's side floorboard and a large sum of money in the driver's side door.
¶ 6 Investigator Hinson then pulled Defendant out of the car and placed him in handcuffs. Investigator Hinson "explained to him that he was not under arrest; he was being detained until [Investigator Hinson] could identify who [Defendant] was and figure out if there [were] any weapons on his person."
¶ 7 Investigator Hinson escorted Defendant to the guardrail by his patrol car where another deputy was located. The other deputy identified the status of Defendant's driver's license and began issuing a warning citation for impeding traffic. Meanwhile, Investigator Hinson asked Defendant for consent to search the vehicle, which Defendant denied. Investigator Hinson brought out a nationally certified drug K-9 from his patrol car and allowed it to sniff Defendant's Hyundai. The K-9 alerted to the presence of narcotics by barking, jumping on the side of the car, and trying to get into the vehicle.
¶ 8 Investigator Hinson then "began searching [the interior of] the vehicle." The search revealed a white, crystal-like substance in a bag, which Investigator Hinson believed was crystal methamphetamine based on his experience with numerous drug classes, years of training in the identification of crystal methamphetamine, and hundreds of observations of crystal methamphetamine. Two other officers searched the trunk of the vehicle, where they discovered additional methamphetamine totaling 680 grams. The officers placed Defendant under arrest for trafficking methamphetamine.
¶ 9 Defendant moved to suppress evidence gathered during the traffic stop. On
10 June 2021, after a hearing on the matter, the trial court entered a written order denying Defendant's motion. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that Investigator Hinson's stop for Defendant's low rate of speed was based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion and that Investigator Hinson's detainment of Defendant and use of the K-9 drug sniff were consistent with the scope and purpose of the stop which he was investigating.
¶ 10 Following the suppression hearing, Defendant pleaded guilty to both crimes as charged, but expressly reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Defendant timely appeals.
¶ 11 Defendant makes a number of challenges to the trial court's order denying his motion to suppress. Defendant argues that (1) he was unconstitutionally seized by an extended police pursuit prior to the traffic stop; (2) information given to Cleveland County police by Forest City police concerning possible drugs in Defendant's vehicle did not provide reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop; and (3) based on "several errors in the trial court's findings of fact," the trial court "failed to resolve material conflicts in the evidence." Each argument fails.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 12 During our review of a trial court's order on a motion to dismiss, "we are 'strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.'" State v. Williams, 362 N.C. 628, 632, 669 S.E.2d 290, 294 (2008) (citation omitted). Competent evidence is "evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the finding." State v. Wiles, 270 N.C.App. 592, 597, 841 S.E.2d 321, 325 (2020). "Where the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, such findings and conclusions are binding upon us on appeal." State v. Wynne, 329 N.C. 507, 522, 406 S.E.2d 812, 820 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Where conclusions of law are challenged, the standard is de novo and challenged conclusions are subject to full review. State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citation omitted).
¶ 13 "An appellate court accords great deference to the trial court . . . because it is entrusted with duty to hear testimony, weigh the evidence, and resolve any conflicts in the evidence." State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114, 726 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2012) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Even should evidence be found contrary to the trial court's findings, appellate courts are bound by the trial court's findings of fact when they are supported by competent evidence. In re C.H.M., 371 N.C. 22, 38, 812 S.E.2d 804, 815 (2018).
B. Unconstitutional Seizure ¶ 14 Defendant first asserts that the trial court should have suppressed evidence found during the traffic stop because the officers seized him unconstitutionally "well before Investigator Hinson activated his blue lights." Defendant argues that the length of a pursuit before a traffic stop is "short" in most cases, and despite being "free to leave," he was still "unable to 'terminate the encounter'" because of the pursuing officers' show of authority.
¶ 15 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution each serve to protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. State v. Garner, 331 N.C. 491, 506, 417 S.E.2d 502, 510 (1992). The "[t]emporary detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a 'seizure' of 'persons' within the meaning of [the Fourth Amendment]." Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-10 (1996); see also State v. Bullock, 370 N.C. 256, 257, 805 S.E.2d 671, 673 (2017).
¶ 16 A "person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another." United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 412 (2012). The United States Supreme Court determined in Michigan v. Chesternut that "allowing officers to follow as one drives one's own car does not restrict one's movement by a show of authority." Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988) (...
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