State v. Abrams
| Decision Date | 24 June 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 14–0260.,14–0260. |
| Citation | 868 N.W.2d 881 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. McCall D. ABRAMS, Defendant–Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, Patricia Reynolds, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Austin Mouw, Student Legal Intern, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Alexandra Link, Assistant Attorney General, Ryan Ashley, Student Legal Intern, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Kelly G. Cunningham, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by VAITHESWARAN, P.J., DOYLE, J., and MILLER, S.J.*
Defendant McCall Abrams appeals his convictions and sentences for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of a simulated controlled substance with intent to deliver, and two counts of failure to affix a drug tax stamp. Abrams has not shown he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress claiming another person's consent to search a vehicle was not voluntary. Nor does the record support Abrams's assertion the district court abused its sentencing discretion by relying on a single factor in imposing sentence. We affirm Abrams's convictions and sentences.
On May 8, 2013, officers from the Rock Island, Illinois, police department had a vehicle driven by Tyra Reaves under surveillance as part of a narcotics investigation. The officers saw McCall Abrams (Abrams) and his cousin, Darious Abrams (Darious), enter the vehicle. Reaves pulled away from the curb without signaling and failed to completely stop at a stop sign. The officers stopped the vehicle based on the traffic violations. Reaves consented to a search of the vehicle. The officers found $1300 in Abrams's shoe. Abrams, Darious, and Reaves were taken to the Rock Island Police Station.1
Abrams signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and agreed to talk to officers. He stated he came to the Quad Cities area for the purpose of selling narcotics. Abrams stated he travelled to Chicago about once a month to purchase crack cocaine to sell in the Quad Cities. He stated he was living in an apartment in Davenport, Iowa, with his girlfriend, Reaves. He stated he kept crack cocaine at Reaves's apartment.
Reaves signed a written statement consenting to a search of her apartment. Officers from Illinois and Iowa worked together to search the apartment. Inside a cereal box in the kitchen the officers found eleven baggies of crack cocaine, with a total combined weight of 31.49 grams. They also found a pill bottle containing fifty-eight tablets of simulated ecstasy. The officers additionally found a digital scale that had crack cocaine residue on it. Documents addressed to Abrams were found in the apartment.
In Iowa, Abrams was charged with possession of a controlled substance (crack cocaine) with intent to deliver, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(1)(b)(3) (2013); possession of a controlled substance (simulated ecstasy) with intent to deliver, in violation of section 124.401(1)(c)(8) ; two counts of failure to affix a drug tax stamp, in violation of section 453B.12; and conspiracy to commit a non-forcible felony, in violation of section 706.1(1).
The case proceeded to a jury trial commencing on January 13, 2014. Officers testified concerning Abrams's statements and the items found in the apartment. Abrams testified and denied being in a relationship with Reaves or living in the apartment. In rebuttal an officer testified that during the interview at the Rock Island Police Station Abrams described Reaves as his girlfriend. The jury found Abrams guilty of the charges against him.
The sentencing hearing was held on February 20, 2014. The court merged the conviction for conspiracy into the drug possession charges. Abrams was sentenced to twenty-five years on the charge of possession of a controlled substance (crack cocaine) with intent to deliver, ten years on the charge of possession of a controlled substance (simulated ecstasy) with intent to deliver, and five years on each of the two charges of failure to affix a drug tax stamp, all to be served concurrently. The court also waived any mandatory minimum sentences for the drug possession charges. Abrams appeals his convictions and sentences.
Abrams claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did not file a motion to suppress claiming Reaves's consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary.2 He asserts Reaves would not have felt she was free to refuse to consent to the search. Abrams contends that all of the evidence resulting from the search of the vehicle, his statements at the police station, and evidence discovered at the apartment should have been suppressed. We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 2005).
The State argues Abrams does not have standing to assert Reaves's consent was not voluntary. The State asserts Abrams did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in Reaves's vehicle and so cannot claim his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a search of the vehicle.
Abrams relies upon State v. Osborn, 200 N.W.2d 798, 804 (Iowa 1972), which states, “To be charged with an offense of possession gives rise to a claim of an invasion of privacy, and standing to question the legality of the search and seizure becomes automatic.” This statement is premised upon the United States Supreme Court case of Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260–61, 80 S.Ct. 725, 730–31, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 702–03 (1960). The automatic standing rule espoused in Jones, however, was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2554–55, 65 L.Ed.2d 619, 630 (1980). Although Osborn has not been specifically overruled, we stated in State v. Hungerford, 311 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa Ct.App.1981), that the automatic standing rule was no longer applicable due to the Supreme Court's decision in Salvucci. We conclude Abrams cannot rely upon the automatic standing rule to provide him with standing to challenge the search of the vehicle. See Hungerford, 311 N.W .2d at 701.
A person's Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 566 (Iowa 2012). A person, however, is not required to make an independent showing of standing. Id. at 567. A challenge to a search based on the Fourth Amendment “will stand or fall on a defendant's ability to show a substantive violation which in turn is based on a showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched or the particular objects seized.” State v. Henderson, 313 N.W.2d 564, 565 (Iowa 1981). “The party challenging a search must establish that his or her own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, not the rights of someone else.” State v. Ortiz, 618 N.W.2d 556, 559 (Iowa 2000).
We engage in a two-step analysis to determine whether there has been a violation of a person's Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Naujoks, 637 N.W.2d 101, 106 (Iowa 2001). First, we consider whether the person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area that was searched. Id. A person must have both a subjective and objective expectation of privacy in the area. Id. “We determine whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy on a case-by-case basis.” Id. Second, we determine whether the State has unreasonably invaded the person's protected privacy interest. Id.
In Rakas v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court considered whether passengers had a legitimate expectation of privacy in a vehicle that was searched by officers. 439 U.S. 128, 130, 99 S.Ct. 421, 432, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 392 (1978). The court noted the passengers “asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile, nor an interest in the property seized.” Id. at 148, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 404. The court concluded the passengers did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the portions of the vehicle that were searched. Id. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433, 58 L.Ed.2d at 405.
The Iowa Supreme Court followed Rakas in State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1995), where a defendant sought to suppress evidence found in his mother's vehicle, in which he had been a passenger. The court determined the defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d at 343. The court stated, “Halliburton was merely a recent passenger in his mother's vehicle.” Id. at 342. He was neither the driver nor the owner of the vehicle. Id. The court determined the district court had properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence found in a search of the vehicle.3 Id. at 343.
We conclude Abrams did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle searched by the officers. Abrams was not the driver of the vehicle. He was not the owner of the vehicle. The evidence shows he was merely a recent passenger. Because Abrams did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, he cannot show his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a search of the vehicle. See Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 567. Thus, even if defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress claiming Reaves's consent to search the vehicle was not voluntary, the motion would have been denied on the ground Abrams did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Abrams has not shown he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
Abrams asserts the district court abused its sentencing discretion. He contends the court relied upon a single factor, the amount of crack cocaine he possessed with intent to deliver, in sentencing him to imprisonment, and thus abused its discretion by imposing imprisonment instead of probation. Our scope of review is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. Our standard of review is for an abuse of sentencing discretion.4 State v....
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