State v. Adams, 95-04407
Decision Date | 28 June 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-04407,95-04407 |
Citation | 683 So.2d 517 |
Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1522 STATE of Florida, Appellant, v. John Daniel ADAMS, Appellee. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Deborah F. Hogge, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellant.
Richard D. Mars, Bartow, for Appellee.
The State of Florida appeals a pretrial order in which the trial court excluded from evidence as to count one of the information various statements made by the appellee to law enforcement officers because the state could not establish the corpus delicti of the crime charged in that count, "deliberately assisting another in the commission of self-murder," a violation of section 782.08, Florida Statutes (1993). The state also challenges that part of the order in which the trial court dismissed count two of the information, charging the appellee with being a principal to the common law crime of suicide under the carry-over provisions of section 775.01, Florida Statutes (1993), based on its determination that the "common law crime of suicide is an anachronism and is not part of the substantive law of the state of Florida." 1 We have jurisdiction to determine the correctness of both aspects of the trial court's order in accord with Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.140(c)(1)(A) and (B).
We reverse that part of the order excluding the appellee's statements to law enforcement because we conclude that the state presented substantial evidence establishing the corpus delicti of the crime of assisting self-murder. We affirm, however, the dismissal of count two, although for a different reason.
The parties presented the following testimony for the trial court's consideration in connection with the appellee's motion to exclude his statements from evidence. On March 14, 1995, the victim, who was specifically identified, and his longtime neighbor were talking over the fence separating their residences. The appellee, who was visiting the victim, was also present. According to the neighbor, the victim did not appear intoxicated and seemed to be in a good mood although the neighbor assumed something was bothering the victim because he wanted to talk. After several minutes, the neighbor returned to his home.
Approximately fifteen minutes later, a man named Larry went to the neighbor's home and advised him that the victim was dead. The neighbor immediately proceeded next door to investigate and found the victim lying on the ground with blood on his head and a shotgun beside him. The neighbor checked for a heartbeat and determined for himself that the victim was dead. The neighbor then approached the appellee, who was standing on the victim's porch, and asked him what happened and where the victim obtained the shotgun. According to the neighbor's testimony, the appellee replied that the victim
Shortly thereafter, law enforcement officers from the Polk County Sheriff's Office arrived at the scene to conduct an investigation and ultimately determined that the victim had committed suicide by shooting himself in the head with a shotgun. During the course of their on-scene investigation, different officers interviewed the appellee on several occasions because he was the only eyewitness to the incident. According to the officers' collective testimony, the appellee told them that the victim was depressed about his financial situation, stated he felt like killing himself, and asked for the appellee's shotgun. The officers further testified that the appellee advised them that he then gave his loaded shotgun to the victim and essentially told the victim that if he wanted to kill himself, "don't talk about it, do it."
After the investigating officers reported the substance of the appellee's statements to their on-scene supervisor and an assistant state attorney who had also responded to the scene, the appellee was arrested for assisting in the self-murder of the victim. The appellee made no statements following his arrest. As noted, the state ultimately charged the appellee with one count of assisting self-murder, one count of being a principal to the common law crime of suicide, and one count of manslaughter by culpable negligence.
In this appeal, the state first contends that the trial court erred in failing to consider the appellee's statement to the neighbor in determining whether the corpus delicti of assisting self-murder had been sufficiently established to allow into evidence the statements the appellee made to law enforcement, citing State v. Snowden, 345 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA), cert. denied, 353 So.2d 679 (Fla.1977). We agree with this contention because a careful examination of the trial court's comprehensive fact-finding order reveals that this critical statement was never considered. We also agree that Snowden controls the disposition of this issue.
In Snowden, the court confronted an issue strikingly similar to the issue in this case. There the court undertook an analysis of whether the defendant's statements to her neighbor arose out of the res gestae, which it defined "as the circumstances, facts and declarations which grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character, and which are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation or fabrication." Id. at 860 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). It emphasized, however, that the word "contemporaneous" was "not to be taken in its strict meaning and it is not necessary that the acts or declarations should be precisely concurrent in point of time with the main facts, nor is time the only criterion for determining whether a thing said or done is part of a given transaction." Id. (emphasis added). The court observed, instead, that the ultimate test for admissibility centered on "spontaneity" and a "logical relation to the main event." Id.
In its analysis, the court in Snowden then drew a sharp distinction between a res gestae statement and admissions and confessions, noting that "the terms are not synonymous," that "a res gestae statement is admissible notwithstanding the fact that it may not be admissible as a confession or an admission," and that "[s]tatements admitted into evidence as part of the res gestae constitute original evidence." Id. at 859-860 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). The court concluded its analysis by holding that the defendant's statements to her neighbor were part of the res gestae and, as such, should have been considered by the trial court as "original evidence" in determining whether the corpus delicti of manslaughter had been sufficiently proven. Id. at 860. Accord Knight v. State, 402 So.2d 435, 436 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981) ( ); Davis v. State, 582 So.2d 695, 700 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) ( ).
In accord with Snowden, we conclude that the appellee's statement to the neighbor was a res gestae statement and, as such, should have been considered by the trial court as "original evidence" in determining whether the state had proven the corpus delicti of the crime of assisting self-murder. 2 We also conclude that when this statement is so considered, along with the other evidence presented to the trial court, the state met its preliminary burden of establishing by substantial evidence the existence of each element necessary to show the commission of the crime charged, thereby rendering the appellee's statements to law enforcement admissible into evidence. See, e.g., Burks v. State, 613 So.2d 441 (Fla.1993). 3
We approve, in that regard, the trial court's legal conclusion that the corpus delicti of assisting self-murder consists of (1) the fact of the death of the decedent by suicide, (2) the fact that another assisted in the suicide of the decedent, and (3) the identity of the decedent. As to the second element, we specifically note our agreement with the trial court's reasoning, based on an analysis of the corpus delicti of homicide law, that in establishing the corpus delicti in this case, "instead of showing that the death was 'caused by the criminal agency of another,' " the state must "demonstrate that 'another assisted in the suicide of the deceased.' " It follows from this analysis that in establishing this aspect of the corpus delicti of assisting self-murder, the state need not establish the element of "deliberateness" before the appellee's statements to law enforcement are admissible. Cf. Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132, 135-136 (Fla.1961) ( ). 4
Measured against these standards, the facts in the record clearly establish the existence of the corpus delicti of assisting self-murder. The victim was specifically identified and the evidence demonstrated that he had killed himself by a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head, factual issues which the appellee does not dispute. More important, based on the appellee's statement to the neighbor, it is readily apparent that the state proved that the appellee assisted the victim by furnishing him the instrument the victim specifically requested to commit self-murder. The fact that the appellee also told the neighbor that he did not think the victim would follow through with his announced intention to kill himself does not diminish this determination because we are not concerned at this juncture with whether the state can prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, especially the critical element of "deliberateness." See State v. Allen, 335 So.2d 823, 825 (Fla.1976) (...
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