State v. Aguilar
Decision Date | 09 November 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 38068.,38068. |
Citation | 296 P.3d 407,154 Idaho 201 |
Court | Idaho Court of Appeals |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Javier AGUILAR, Defendant–Appellant. |
Sara B. Thomas, State Appellate Public Defender; Jason C. Pintler, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Jessica M. Lorello, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.
Javier Aguilar appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentences for three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In 2010, a jury found Aguilar guilty of three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of sixteen. I.C. § 18–1508. The district court imposed a unified term of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of seven years, for each count. The district court also ordered that the sentences be served consecutively. Thus, the district court sentenced Aguilar to an aggregate term of life imprisonment, with a minimum period of confinement of twenty-one years. Aguilar appeals.
Aguilar argues that the district court erred by allowing the jury to hear testimony from a counselor concerning the long-term impact that sexual abuse can have on victims. Specifically, Aguilar contends that the testimony was irrelevant and, therefore, inadmissible pursuant to I.R.E. 401 and I.R.E. 402. Pursuant to I.R.E. 401, relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Irrelevant evidence is not admissible. I.R.E. 402. We review questions of relevance de novo. State v. Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho 758, 764, 864 P.2d 596, 602 (1993).
The state called the counselor as its first witness at trial. The following colloquy took place:
Aguilar asserts that this testimony by the counselor was irrelevant because it did not have any tendency to make the existence of any fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would have been without the testimony. Specifically, Aguilar argues that the jury did not need to consider how a victim of sexual abuse will be impacted in the long term in order to determine whether Aguilar committed lewd conduct as charged in this case.
The state argues that the counselor's testimony was pertinent to the victims' credibility and, therefore, such testimony was proper pursuant to State v. Dutt, 139 Idaho 99, 73 P.3d 112 (Ct.App.2003). In that case, prior to trial, Dutt moved for an order requiring the state to submit an offer of proof concerning the testimony of a witness the state intended to call as an expert on the subject of delayed disclosure by child victims of sexual abuse. Alternatively, Dutt sought to exclude the counselor's testimony. The district court denied Dutt's motions. Over Dutt's objection, the counselor testified at trial in general terms concerning the progression of sexual abuse through various phases. The counselor also testified in general terms about the behavior and characteristics of victims and offenders as the sexual abuse progresses through each phase, including the victim's tendency to delay disclosing the abuse and the possible reasons for the delay. Id. at 103–04, 73 P.3d at 116–17.
On appeal, Dutt argued that the district court erred by admitting the counselor's testimony. Specifically, Dutt asserted that the counselor was not qualified to testify concerning the general behavior and characteristics of victims and offenders in sexual abuse cases, which included the phenomenon of delayed disclosure. Id. at 104–05, 73 P.3d at 117–18. This Court concluded that, based upon the counselor's experience, personal knowledge and specialized training, the counselor was qualified to offer her expert opinion concerning those general behaviors and characteristics. Id. at 105, 73 P.3d at 118. We determined that the progression and various phases of child sexual abuse, including delayed disclosure, were subjects that were beyond the commonsense, experience, and education of the average juror. We also determined that the issue of whether the victim's conduct in disclosing the details of her sexual abuse in the case was consistent with the behavior of other sexually abused children was a matter beyond the common experience of the jury and was, therefore, a proper subject of testimony by a qualified expert. We concluded that the counselor's testimony gave the jurors specialized knowledge that could assist them in evaluating the victim's credibility and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting that testimony. Id.
The situation here is distinguishable from Dutt. The central issue in Dutt was whether the counselor was qualified to testify concerning the general behavior and characteristics of victims and offenders in sexual abuse cases, including the phenomenon of delayed disclosure. Here, there was no question about whether the counselor was qualified to testify. Further, Dutt does not stand for the broad proposition advanced by the state in this case—that generalized expert testimony about behavioral and emotional characteristics of victims and offenders in child sexual abuse cases and long-term impacts that victims of sexual abuse may suffer is always relevant because it assists the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility. As described above, the counselor in Dutt was specifically called as an expert on the subject of delayed disclosure by child victims of sexual abuse and the victim's conduct in disclosing the details of her sexual abuse was at issue in that case. This subject matter of expert testimony was previously determined to provide jurors with specialized knowledge that could help them evaluate the credibility of a victim. See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 22, 878 P.2d 188, 196 (Ct.App.1994). Thus, in Dutt, the counselor's testimony as it related to the issue of whether the victim's conduct in disclosing the details of her sexual abuse was consistent with the behavior of other sexually abused children was relevant because such testimony assisted the jurors in evaluating the victim's credibility. Here, however, the counselor testified in general terms about the long-term impact that victims of sexual abuse may suffer—chemical dependency and issues related to body image, anger management, self-esteem, anxiety, depression, promiscuity, and trust. While this testimony may be considered relevant to the credibility of an alleged victim in a case where evidence shows that the victim actually suffers from such long-term impact, aside from the testimony of one alleged victim that he was taking medication to treat depression caused, in part, by what Aguilar had done to him, there was no testimony presented indicating that the alleged victims suffered from the long-term impact identified by the counselor. Therefore, we conclude that the counselor's testimony...
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